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Abstract 
 
This paper is concerned with examining the Integrated Water Resources Management 
(IWRM) approach, which has become popular for demand-driven water management in the 
last 12 years. The growing issues of water scarcity combined with the perceived failure of the 
traditional supply-driven management approaches and growing concerns about poverty, have 
served as an important impetus for IWRM, which is built upon notions of coordination, equity 
and efficiency. In this paper we assess the validity of IWRM by considering its application in 
a real-life setting in the Rufiji River Basin in Tanzania (a basin of national importance for 
both food production and hydro-power). We do this by first identifying the roots of IWRM; 
something that we believe is unique to our study. We found these roots to be within the realm 
of New Institutional Economics (NIE), and operationalised via integrated planning, 
governance, economic and sustainability considerations.  We then investigate the evolution of 
IWRM as well as the factors which have contributed to the broad appeal of the approach. 
These factors include risk, political promotion, vagueness, good-governance, and the 
promotion of the IWRM approach by the World Bank  the worlds biggest donor and aid 
organization.  Following a consideration of the history of water management in Tanzania that 
has led up to the case study project intervention, we introduce our case study area and World 
Bank funded project, River Basin Management & Smallholder Irrigation Improvement 
Project (RBMSIIP). RBMSIIP sought to 1) strengthen government capacity to manage water 
at a national and local level, and 2) improve irrigation efficiency in selected smallholder 
schemes. What follows is not just another project implementation assessment. By combining 
our findings from the NIE theoretical roots of IWRM with part of Mazmanian & Sabatier´s 
(1989) Analysis of Policy Implementation and conventional project evaluation, we believe we 
have devised a unique and highly relevant way of analysing IWRM, not just on an 
implementation level, but also on policy, strategic and concept levels. In our consideration of 
the different levels we highlight many strengths and weaknesses. However as for the 
RBMSIIP implementation and outcomes, while there were a number of successes, 
unfortunately they tended to be overshadowed by the failures. The fact that even more water 
is being used will probably mean that conflicts  which are beyond the capacity of the 
institutions to address  will increase. Furthermore, not only does the basin water regulatory 
body lack the capacity for effective management, the fact that management is also a serious 
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drain on resources and many users can only see deterioration in resource availability, is a 
cause for serious concern. So much so, that we would question the sustainability of resource 
use in the basin. It is difficult to say precisely at which level main faults lie. In terms of the 
Dublin Principles (UN 1992), while they have some notable weaknesses, we would argue that 
they have a significant strength in serving as a good first step in getting some kind of 
international agreement on water management problems and possible solutions linked with 
poverty alleviation. The IWRM conceptual framework is excellent in the sense that it includes 
all the favoured ingredients for good water governance. However, the fact that the framework 
is based on theory, and offers no kind of operational direction is a very serious weakness. The 
rationale and strategy of RBMSIIP was an important first step in trying to introduce IWRM-
related management approaches in Tanzania setting. But we would argue that the lack of 
consideration of the conflicting policy goals of key ministries meant that the project was 
seriously flawed in terms of resource use efficiency. Furthermore, the fact that existing 
informal institutions and customary laws were not taken into account has served to make local 
management more complicated and more conflictual. However, we would argue that the main 
problem in our case study stems from the fact that the World Bank interpretation of IWRM is 
too complex for the Tanzanian setting. IWRM based on NIE requires efficient markets, a 
solid framework of well functioning institutions combined with well informed actors. The 
theory is that this should provide the basis for coordinated and integrated planning. A 
problematic assumption of this approach is the reliance on existing formal markets and 
institutions that can be further developed. While a counter argument would possibly be that 
the RBMSIIP attempted to create and develop these markets and institutions, we would 
counter that an abrupt leap from a more livelihood based economy to a more market based 
economy is beyond the capacity of the setting. In our recommendations section we offer a 
suggestion for addressing this weakness, but we are unable to offer any solutions for most of 
the issues in the basin. 
 
 
 
****** 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Methodology 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce our problem field and study area. We begin by 
looking at the importance and scarcity of water, both generally and in the context of Tanzania, 
our study area. Following this we identify management problems and approaches, which lead 
into an introduction of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM), its relevance and 
our interest in somehow evaluating the IWRM approach. We then move on to detailing our 
methodological overview which describes our problem formulation and working questions, as 
well as the methods we employed to answer these questions. We conclude the chapter by 
briefly discussing the outline and importance of the following chapters. 
 
1.1 The Importance & Scarcity of Water 
Water is a natural resource that is multifunctional and multidimensional. It is the means of 
every form of life. It is a habitat, a means of sustenance, a means of production and transport, 
as well as a commodity. By this very nature, water creates networks: It is linked to other 
natural resources such as land, forests and air. Aquatic systems are typically interconnected. 
For example, environmental problems have repercussions from one end of a hydrological 
basin to another, where various stakeholders use water for their needs. Water is international, 
national, regional and local, with highly diverse temporal and special frames of reference. The 
complexity of this network makes it difficult to implement adequate management measures. 
Demographic and urban growth and the worldwide progress of industrialization combine to 
increase the demand for water. The ecosystems which produce and regenerate this resource 
area threatened, polluted or destroyed. (Wenger et al (ed.) 2003: 3). 
 
Some Key Water-Related Statistics: 
 
• The world population tripled during the 20th century, its water needs have multiplied by six. 
• 1/6 of the world population has no access to drinking water, 1/3 is not connected to a waste water 
treatment system. 
• 7 million people die each year from diseases transmitted by water. 
• Irrigation areas have multiplied by 5 during the last century, and 70-80% of the water used worldwide 
serves the agricultural sector. 
• 70% of industrial sewage in developing countries is fed into water ways without any form of waste 
treatment. 
• 50% of the worlds wet zones have disappeared during the 20th century. 
• 1/3 of catchment areas have lost up to 75% of their forests. 
• There are over 47,000 major dams worldwide. 
 
(Wenger et al (ed.) 2003: 3)   
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A study first published in 1999 by the International Water Management Institute (2005), and 
regularly revised, called Water Scarcity in the Twentieth Century projects water supply and 
demand for 118 countries over a 20 year period. The map illustrating the findings of the last 
revision can be seen below (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1: Projected Water Scarcity in 2025 
 
 
 
Countries are grouped into three categories of water scarcity: Physical water scarcity (all red), Economic water scarcity (all brown), and 
little or no water scarcity (blue) White countries are ones with no estimates. And all countries with diagonal lines will import more than 
10% of their cereal demands by 2025. 
 
Physical Water Scarcity: This is defined in terms of the magnitude of primary water supply (PWS) development with respect to 
potentially utilizable water resources (PUWR). Physical water scarce condition is reached if primary water supply of country exceeds 60 
percent of its PUWR. This means that even with highest feasible efficiency and productivity, PUWR of a country is not sufficient to 
meet the demand of agriculture, domestic, industrial sectors while satisfying its environmental needs. Countries in this category will 
have to transfer water from agriculture to other sectors and import food or invest in costly desalinization plants.  
 
Economic Water Scarcity: Economic water scarce countries have sufficient water resources to meet their additional PWS needs, but 
require to increase their PWS through additional storage and conveyance facilities by more than 25 percent. Most of these countries face 
severe financial and development capacity problems for increasing PWS to those levels (Picture 1: Water Scarcity in Tanzania vs. 
Picture 2 of the same river in the wet season). 
 
The third category includes countries with little or no water scarcity. These countries are not physically water scarce and also need to 
develop less than 25 percent of additional PWS to meet their 2025 needs. 
 
(IMWI 2005) 
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As can be seen from the figure 1 (above), Tanzania, the country where our case study is 
situated, falls into the second category as a country facing economic water scarcity, 
whereby the scarcity of water supply is seen as a factor limiting economic development. 
Recent estimates from the Ministry of Water and Livestock Development (MWLD) estimate 
that only 50% of the rural population and 69% of the urban population in Tanzania have 
access to a reliable water supply (GoT 2002). Moreover, an estimated 30% of rural water 
supply schemes are not functioning properly (Madulu & Dungumaro, 2002). Furthermore, 
alongside a growing demand from the domestic sector (which is critical to address in terms of 
direct poverty alleviation), the demand from industrial, agricultural and power production* 
sectors is also increasing. These later demands are critical in terms of development, and are 
often overshadowed in terms of attention by domestic needs. The reason for this could be that 
domestic demands, being of a direct humanitarian nature, are regarded as the most acute. 
Furthermore, the fact that the demands from other sectors are more difficult to estimate makes 
them harder to quantify. 
 
(*N.B. It should be noted that while energy production from hydropower is often considered 
as none consumptive, we would argue that it has demands in terms of the timing of resource 
supply, as well as a net loss due to evaporation from dams that is important to consider.)  
 
1.2 The Problems of Water Scarcity in Tanzania 
In situations where water is scarce, it tends to be the poorest who are most affected. Severe 
problems in Tanzania relating to water supply include pollution, sanitation, conflict and 
availability which are typical in many developing countries. Aggravating issues include 
periodic droughts (see pictures 1 & 2 following), population increases and cultural norms and 
traditions. (These problems and issues are discussed in more detail in chapter 6.) Until 
relatively recently the emphasis has been supply-driven solutions, but now there has been a 
notable shift to more demand-driven solutions.  
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Picture 1: The Great Ruaha (part of the Rufiji River) in the dry season (drought). (SMUWC 20022) 
 
 
 
 
Picture 2: The Great Ruaha (part of the Rufiji River) in the wet season 
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From Supply-Driven to Demand-Driven Management Approaches 
Tanzania and many other developing countries have traditionally focussed on supply driven 
approaches. From post colonial times massive amounts of water resources developed through  
 
 
large schemes have served to help the emerging countries of Africa and Asia in supporting 
their expanding agriculture and urban settlements. It also helped to eliminate the food crisis of 
the 1950s and 1960s and improved the quality of life for many people (Saleth & Dinar 2004: 
9-10).  
 
While the old approach of engineering solutions, the treatment of water as a free good and 
bureaucratic allocation and management had its benefits; it has also had its drawbacks. The 
down-side of the old supply-driven approach has resulted in a numerous technically focussed 
donor-driven schemes which have either had short lives or have required constant subsidies. 
In Tanzania, the case of such schemes is well documented in Ole Therkildsens (1988) book 
Watering White Elephants which details the lessons learned from donor-funded planning 
and implementation of water supplies in rural Tanzania.  
 
As supply-driven solutions have been widely regarded as a failure, attention has shifted to 
demand-driven approaches which are based upon notions of sustainability. For about the 
last 12 years a concept called Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) has been 
growing in popularity as an approach which can be used to sustainably manage water 
resources. It is seen as the worldwide solution to water management problems, as it accounts 
for interests relative to water conservation and use, as well as all major political, legal, 
administrative, economic, environmental, social and cultural aspects.  
 
If effective, long lasting solutions to water problems are to be found, a new water 
governance and management paradigm is required. Such a new paradigm is encapsulated in 
the IWRM [Integrated Water Resource Management] concept, which has been defined by 
GWP [Global Water Partnership  a World Bank, UN and SIDA funded organization] as, a 
process which promotes the coordinated development and management of water, land and 
related resources in order to maximise the resultant economic and social welfare in an 
equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital-ecosystems (GWP 
2003:1). 
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Given the ambitious aims of the IWRM approach, and the notable organizations who endorse 
it, the obvious question for any interested student is, so does it work? Our study seeks to 
answer this simple but important question by evaluating the sustainability of its application in 
the context of the Rufiji River Basin in Tanzania.  
 
We believe the analysis of IWRM put into practice is of great interest from an academic, 
political and technical point of view, as this approach has become broadly accepted as the 
principle approach for interventions in water management. The World Bank funded project 
(RBMSIIP) in Rufiji Basin has resulted in many crucial institutional, legislative and 
organisational changes not just at a basin level but in a regional and national level. Further, 
RBMSIIP serves as an example of the changes at a local level that are affecting the 
livelihoods of farmers, pastoralists, women, and local social organisations, as well as local 
and basin level governmental institutions.     
 
1.3 Evaluating IWRM 
In the process of finding out which theories could be best applied to somehow evaluate the 
usefulness of IWRM in Rufiji we considered many options: 
• Governance: This theory deals with, The making and implementation of rules, 
and the exercise of power within a given domain (Keohane 2002:2). We knew 
governance has become a popular solution theory, and could appreciate how a 
study of the formal and informal governance frameworks (possibly from UN to 
individual villager level) and the role of power would make an interesting study in 
IWRM. From our readings we could see how governance was considered a key part 
of IWRM. 
• Economics: The environmental economic theory we were interested here would 
relate to roles of private property rights and the market in resource management 
(e.g. North 1993, Saleth & Dinar 2004). The application of water as an economic 
good is the most controversial element within IWRM, due to cultural and social 
issues (e.g. poverty). Trying to get to grips with how this can be successfully 
applied in developing countries is a general challenge for water managers, and 
consequently, would make an interesting study. 
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• Common pool resources: This theory developed by the likes of Hardin (1968) and 
Ostrom (1999) examines the use, abuse and management of common pool 
resources, of which water is a prime example. Furthermore, the attraction for us 
was that the regulatory problems that so many theorists in this branch write about 
are very apparent in our Tanzanian study case.  
• Capacity Building: The emphasis here is the importance of individuals, 
institutions and society having the knowledge, the physical ability and the power to 
manage their environments, with sustainable capacity development is the elusive 
goal (e.g. Fukuda Parr et al ed. 2002 missing reference). In our case study it was 
obvious that there were capacity challenges in a development oriented setting. 
Perhaps we could examine the capacity requirements of the IWRM approach in 
relation to the realities of the setting, map the shortfalls, and make 
recommendations for the case and IWRM in general? 
• Actor-oriented approach: Researchers such as Long (2001, 2000), Ploeg (1989) 
Villarreal (1992) challenge a dynamic approach for the understanding of social 
change, which stresses the interplay of internal and external factors and 
relationships, and recognise the central role of the human action (agency) and 
consciousness. This approach deals with active social actors who process 
information and strategise in their dealings with various sectors and institutions, 
and have the agency to act, take decisions and change situations that concern and 
affect them. This theory could have given us the possibility of an in-depth analysis 
of the power relations between stakeholders and social actors in the Rufiji Basin 
and the social responses to the interventions, but this would have required a much 
longer field research and leaving away the more broad aspects of IWRM.  
• Rural Livelihoods Approach (LA): Theorists such as Fuller (2004), Franks 
(2001) and Hanemann (2004) acknowledge this concept as a development 
approach.  The L.A. principles could encompass aspects of water management 
techniques that may have been, in some cases, applied to water projects in 
developing nations.  The L.A. approach is people centred and focused on education, 
social and cost sharing principles. We feel that linking NIE to the Livelihood 
approach could not be possible as emphasis of economic structural reform is more 
conducive to the guiding principles of the IWRM concept. There is no clear 
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evidence that the L.A. could conceptualize the capacity of property rights and full 
cost recovery as does the NIE/IWRM link. So it is clear to us that although 
acknowledgeable as an approach, it is not linkable within our study. 
• Development theory: The possibility of addressing development theories and 
approaches for an analysis of IWRM and the World Bank intervention within the 
debate of development from different perspectives ranged from: the Neo-liberal 
approach, commanded by the World Bank, IMF, etc. assuming a central role of the 
market to maximize human welfare that together with the global economy is 
considered the way to development. Or a more critic approach where under- 
development is considered not an internal problem but due to external factors such 
as the unequal exchange and commerce of services and goods, while surplus and 
gains are taken from Third World countries (Escobar 1988, Hall 2002, Said 2002). 
 
In terms of our final choice two points were critical: 
 
Firstly, we decided that we wanted to evaluate the main theoretical aspects of the complete 
IWRM concept, rather than just a single part. The importance here is to understand that 
IWRM is a package of solutions, and as the word integrated implies, these solutions share 
an important relationship with each other. We were therefore interested in considering the 
complete package and the relationships between the different solutions within the package. 
Consequently, we felt that, despite IWRM being a broad and vague approach, it was 
important to consider it as a whole. 
 
Secondly, we were unable to find any kind of academic study or paper of any kind identifying 
the theoretical roots of IWRM. This both worried and excited us. The worry was that we 
would have the job of trying to identify those roots in what could easily turn into a purely 
theoretical paper. The excitement was that it would both allow us to possibly be amongst the 
first people to evaluate IWRM based on its own merits, and this would result in what we hope 
will be considered interesting and relevant study.  
 
As a consequence of these two points we decided to focus our efforts on identifying and 
discussing what we believe are the theoretical roots of IWRM, which we could then use to 
 17
help us assess the validity of the approach in a real-life setting. It is not that the other theories 
we considered for analysis were without relevance, on the contrary, they all had great validity. 
However, the approach we decided on served to not only give us a more complete and deeper 
understanding IWRM, but by combining our findings from our analysis of the theoretical 
foundations of IWRM with both part of Mazmanian and Sabatiers (1989) analysis of policy 
implementation, and conventional project  evaluation (involving a systematic investigation of 
how the RBMSIIP project implementation has worked (or not worked)), we believe we have 
devised a unique and highly relevant way of reviewing IWRM. Our method is original and 
seems to be of value in assessing IWRM interventions, not just from the project 
implementation level, but also from the policy and strategic levels. 
 
The real-life setting we chose to asses was a World Bank funded IWRM project in the Rufiji 
Basin in Tanzania. We chose this project for the following five reasons: 
• Two of our group had previously visited Tanzania and felt this was useful in providing 
a feel of both the country and the culture. 
• This was one of the very first efforts of the World Bank to operationalise the IWRM 
approach, which made it very interesting. 
• Rufiji Basin is of great significance due to its strategic position in Tanzania. Not only 
is the basin home to the countrys main hydroelectric production plants, its fertile soils 
and irrigation systems are essential for crop cultivation which makes an important 
contribution to national food security.  
• The importance of the basin meant that there was a lot of primary and secondary 
information available from a variety of sources. 
• And finally, the more we read about the basin, the actors and the outcomes, the more 
fascinated we became. For the purposes of the report we chose the following problem 
question: 
 
Summary of the chapter so far 
In this opening section we have introduced the importance and scarcity of water, both 
generally and in the context of Tanzania, our study country. Following this we identified 
management problems and approaches, which lead to an introduction of IWRM, its relevance 
and our interest in somehow evaluating the approach. In the process of considering how best 
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to evaluate IWRM we considered various theories and approaches. We based our final 
decision allowed us to review the whole IWRM package (rather than just individual facets in 
isolation) based on its own merits by combining our findings from our identification of the 
theoretical roots of IWRM with part of Mazmanian and Sabatiers (1989) analysis of policy 
implementation, and standard project implementation analysis. We believe this is a unique 
and relevant way of analysing IWRM. The next section of this chapter details our 
methodological overview which describes our main problem formulation and working 
questions, as well as the methods we employed to answer the questions. We conclude by 
briefly discussing the outline and importance of each of the following chapters.
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1.4 Methodological Overview 
The process we went through to develop this problem formulation and report was not a linear 
one. It was not simply a case of reading about water management problems and theory; then 
investigating how the theories evolved into a popular management approach called IWRM; 
then finding a case study we could evaluate to reach some conclusions to see whether IWRM 
really leads (or could lead) to sustainable water resource management. It has been far messier 
and much more chaotic than this. This section serves to describe how we organized our 
findings to arrive at this report. We begin by briefly outlining the process that took us to our 
problem formulation and supporting questions. Following this we introduce the specific 
supporting questions and discuss their relevance and detail. Finally, we will detail the 
methods we use during our research, as well as our study limitations. 
1.4.1 Problem Formulation  
In the course of our reading on development and natural resource management we 
discovered a popular approach called Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM). 
Exponents of IWRM claimed that if IWRM could be successfully applied in a real-life setting, 
the end result would be sustainable water resource management. We wanted to test this 
claim in a developing country, so our next step was to find a suitable IWRM-based project 
implementation that we could assess. 
 
We ended up choosing a World Bank funded project in the Rufiji Basin in Tanzania for the 
reasons outlined at the end of the previous section that relate to; our previous knowledge of 
the country; the importance of the IWRM implementation; the strategic importance of the 
basin and the available information; as well as our interest that grew with our readings.  For 
the purposes of this report we chose the following problem question:   
   
How has IWRM helped exert sustainable water resource management in the Rufiji 
River Basin, Tanzania? 
 
The efforts to answer this question involved gathering information, attending conferences, 
interviewing various people, a frenetic two week field study in Tanzania, and a lot of reading 
on everything from deep economic theory to Swahili phrase books. But in order to frame our 
research and answer the question we concentrated on learning more about: 
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• The core ideas behind IWRM and their theoretical roots 
• The circumstances have led to IWRM being adopted as best practice 
• Whether it really creates sustainable water resource management 
 
This framework formed the basis for the following three supporting sub-questions. 
 
1: What are the theoretical roots of three key elements of IWRM? 
Identifying the undocumented theoretical roots of IWRM was essential for us to develop a 
deep understanding of the reasoning behind the approach. Only with this depth of knowledge 
could we fully appreciate the objective of each element, and be able to critically evaluate its 
application in our case study with confidence. Furthermore, we felt it would enable us to 
perhaps make some more general conclusions as to the applicability and sustainability of 
IWRM. 
 
We started by looking at all the numerous definitions and interpretations of IWRM and 
discovered that they have four key concepts in common in one form or another: equity (via 
governance), efficiency (via economic considerations), coordination (via integrated planning) 
resulting in sustainability.  
 
From our lectures, readings and discussions on development theory, we identified a clear link 
between IWRM and New Institutional Economics (NIE) worldview that the incentives and 
rules can be used to regulate the behaviour of social actors that problems of environmental 
degradation or control are caused by the lack of insufficient rules and incentives; and that 
solutions come via the market and institutions.  
 
Therefore, we chose the NIE theoretical approach to evaluate IWRM in guiding and 
establishing the framework and rationale for the actors that are leading interventions, policy 
and planning mechanisms, as well as reforms and institutional changes. An example of the 
basic assumptions of these theories put into practice and their benefits and drawbacks forms 
the basis for our case study analysis in the Rufiji Basin in Tanzania. As noted earlier the 
identification of the roots of IWRM is something that we believe is unique to our study.  
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2: What circumstances have led to IWRM being adopted as best practice? 
Our next step in producing the report was out the answer to questions relating to why, who 
and how: Why is it being used? Who is promoting it? And how are they promoting it? The 
purpose of doing this would give us an important understanding of how IWRM has been able 
to make the transition from an abstract approach to what is widely regarded as a strategic tool.  
The method we employed was primarily an extensive literature review, as can be noted from 
the numerous references in the chapter. There are no available books on this subject, so 
detective work aimed at piecing together a complicated puzzle formed the bulk of the 
mental work. 
In this chapter we look at: 
 
• The links between poverty and sustainability and water, and how water management 
has become perhaps the foremost priority on the UN development political agenda 
• How IWRM started as a result of the UN Dublin Conference in 1992 and has been 
growing almost exponentially in recognition ever since. 
• The key factors behind the broad appeal of IWRM relating to risk, politics, vagueness, 
governance and policy appeal  
• The remarkable role of the World Bank in supporting in promoting IWRM, and the 
reasons that lie behind this. 
 
3: Does IWRM lead to sustainable water resources management when put into practice 
in the field? 
Consideration of this final sub-question clearly leads us into addressing our main problem 
regarding, How has IWRM helped exert sustainable water resource management in the Rufiji 
river basin in Tanzania? An interesting point to note is that we were tempted to switch this 
third sub-question with our main problem question. The reason we chose not to, was because 
of our study limitations in terms of time and resources. We understood that it would be ill 
advised to make any sweeping statements (positive or negative) about such a delicate area 
after carrying out what some academics might describe as, a very superficial study involving 
just one case in one (developing) country. However, our research regarding relating to all 
sub-questions did leave us feeling we had a good understanding of IWRM application in the 
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Rufiji Basin context. And from our conclusions on the sustainability of IWRM in this basin, 
we felt able to make at least some broader conclusions and tentative recommendations. 
 
It should be noted that this is not just another implementation study, as we would argue that 
we have devised an original and relevant way of reviewing IWRM. Our analysis method is 
based on combining our findings from our identification of the theoretical roots of IWRM 
(NIE related elements) with project implementation analysis (Degnbol & Engberg 2003.) and 
part of Mazmanian and Sabatiers (1989) analysis of policy implementation as described as 
follows: 
 
The implementation of a process, that can be a policy, a programme or a project, usually 
incorporates problems to be addressed, objectives to be pursued and, in a variety of ways 
decisions consolidated in a policy that structures the implementation process (Rein and 
Rabinovitz 1978). The crucial role of implementation analysis is the identification of the 
variables which affect the achievement of objectives (legal, social, economical, etc) 
throughout the entire process. 
 
Therefore we focus on factors and variables affecting the implementation process of the 
project as a whole, adapted from Mazmanian and Sabatier´s (1989) analysis of policy 
implementation, as this project also involves policy development and implementation. One of 
the major contributions of implementation analysis is its emphasis on the overall theory for 
obtaining desired changes (Ibid). The process must be viewed in terms of its different stages 
which we divided as followed: 1. The tractability of the problems being addressed and the 
rationale behind the process. 2. The ability of the project to structure the implementation 
process, including strategy, objectives and activities. 3. The main outcomes, impacts and 
external variables and factors affecting the project and it process. 
 
Furthermore, using conventional evaluation practice and methods for analysing the funded 
World Bank project, RBMSIIP, we get a deeper understanding of the implementation and 
characteristic of IWRM in Rufiji. In this sense, we have been trying to evaluate the process 
and impact of this project, examining issues of decision-making, project design, impact and to 
what extent an intervention achieves the desired results and thereby helps to solve the 
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problems the intervention aimed solving. In other words, impact evaluation examines in what 
respects and to what extent specific inputs and activities achieve the formulated goals 
(Degnbol & Engberg 2003:217) or aspects that do not achieve or furthermore that achieve 
impacts which have not been expected. 
 
Our method is original and seems to be of value in assessing IWRM interventions, not just 
from the project implementation level, but also from the policy and strategic levels. 
 
Through our analysis of RBMSIIP in the Rufiji Basin we evaluated the different project 
approaches, assumptions, values, rationale. It gave us the possibility to get a picture of the 
results of an intervention with IWRM principles, how they also are transformed and how they 
are operationalised in the field.  
 
While we divided the analysis into the three aspects as integrated planning, economics and 
governance, each of them were used to evaluate the sustainability of the outcomes of the 
project within water management in the Rufiji Basin. Finally, we considered all the aspects of 
the sections and ended with concluding statements on the sustainability of each component of 
the RBMSIIP project, as well as some recommendations. We chose to evaluate sustainability 
within the context of the intervention within the Rufiji Basin in relation to the above three 
aspects. 
1.4.2 Methods Used 
The following methods were used during our research: 
 
Interviews: A full list of interviewees as well as our questionnaire can be found in appendix 1 
and 4. We conducted different semi-structured interviews in Denmark and in Tanzania related 
with the area of study, the subject, the World Bank funded project, and IWRM. Interviews 
were semi-structured as we needed flexibility and possibility to adapt to the interviewees and 
as specific interaction with the local villages had to be based on local circumstances which 
resulted in adaptation by the interviewers. The interviews were oral and in the case of 
Tanzania were taped for dictation and translation after the interview process was completed.  
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In Denmark we conducted interviews to researchers that are the experts on IWRM (GWP 
partners in Denmark, DHI) and/or have an extensive experience on water management in 
different parts of the world, specially in Third World countries (researchers of DIIS, Danida, 
DHI). Interviews were conducted through informal and formal meetings or by telephone, they 
were not taped but we took notes during and after each interview. 
 
In Tanzania the interviews were strategically placed in different levels: 
 
• Upper Ministerial Level (Ministry of Water & Livestock Development, Ministry of 
Agriculture and Food Security) 
• Low  Middle Ministerial level (Department of Hydrological Statistics, Irrigation 
section) 
• Basin level (River Basin Water Office)  
• Local level (Water User Associations, Village leaders, farmers and pastoralists) 
• Academic level (researchers from RIPARWIN, independent researchers from Dar es 
Salaam University, and Morogoro Agriculture University)  
• Multilateral level: The World Bank senior advisers 
 
It is important to note that emphasis and problems addressed were different on each level and 
this gave us the possibility to evaluate the positions of each actor, the values, rationale, 
approaches and priorities given to the water management issues.  
For example, when we interviewed officials at the Upper ministerial level the evaluation of 
the RBMSIIP project was that some problems existed during the process of intervention but 
the overall result after implementation was very successful.  When we conducted interviews 
at the low-middle levels more problems seemed to surface and success was good but there 
were major flaws at the local level. At the local level interviews we observed quite a different 
environment in comparison to the information that we collected at the Upper level. Conflicts, 
contradictions and misunderstandings arose and the RBMSIIP project appeared more fragile 
and with some limitations.  
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The academics that we interviewed especially in Tanzania had different approaches, from a 
neutral to a very critic view of IWRM and the RBMSIIP project, but they gave us very 
explicit details about issues within water management and our case study area. 
 
As you will see in our limitations one would have to conduct an interview process over a 
much longer time span to identify the reality of our interview sample group.  This meaning 
that most if not all of our sample group except for one village who had not been affected by 
the donor project were within the boundaries of the World Bank funded project. Another 
limitation within the interviews was that the ones conducted in the villages were made in 
Swahili and this limited the flow and many times understanding of the answers and questions. 
Furthermore, the translators were personnel from the Rufiji River Basin Office, probably 
limiting the independence of the translations. 
A list of our interviews can be found in our bibliography. 
 
Meetings: 
We organised and/or participated in meetings at the different levels described above, such as 
village meetings where we had access to the different sectors of the local society, such as 
pastoralists, farmers, women, young and elders (See picture 3a and 3b  below) 
     
Picture 3a: Village leader interview in            Picture 3b: WUA leader on left MAFS officials  
Ilalasimba           on right (Mapogoro). 
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Literature review:  
Over the previous months our group reviewed several reports, books, web-sites, articles from 
different researchers, institutions and writers including governmental, NGO´s and 
independent reports and academic papers.  
 
Field Study: From February 26th to March 12th, our group travelled to Tanzania to conduct 
primary research as a complement to our literature review and to experience the affects of the 
World Bank funded project.  We conducted interviews in Dar es Salaam to people involved in 
the RBMSIIP project within the Ministries of Water and Agriculture and to some academics.  
We travelled to Iringa District where we conducted interviews with local staff and had access 
to most data bases for the region. We also visited 3 villages and irrigation schemes  two of 
which were rehabilitated by the RBMSIIP project and one that had not been rehabilitated.  
 
After Iringa we travelled to Morogoro where we attended the East African River Basin 
Management Conference.  It was here where we had key interviews with academics and were 
able to network with many participants from all over the world. The mixture of attendants 
included academics, country representatives, Donor organisation representatives and students.  
 
Conferences: 
We attended two conferences related with water management: 
• Danish Water Forum  Copenhagen, Denmark 
• East African River Basin Management Conference  Morogoro, Tanzania 
 
1.4.3 Scope & Limitations 
The following serves to set both the boundaries of the study and highlight its weaknesses: 
  
• Development interventions: It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss 
development theory, including the reasoning and debates surrounding donor 
interventions and their actions in developing countries. However, we do acknowledge 
that this is of great relevance in terms of IWRM as a development intervention, and 
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would have liked to develop this area of our study. Unfortunately, we found the scope 
of our study to be extremely large without taking on development theory 
considerations as well.  We therefore acknowledge that this could be considered a 
weakness in this paper. Although it should be noted that IWRM is an approach that 
can be and has been applied in both developing and developed countries. 
 
• Defining sustainability: As noted earlier, sustainability is typically sited as the end 
result of the successful application of IWRM. Unfortunately, little to no effort seems 
to be made to define sustainability in the IWRM context; with the concept being 
linked to terms such as ecosystems, use, and benefits. This naturally gives us 
problems in terms of evaluation because we have to define what sustainability means. 
Defining exactly what sustainability means is highly debated and very important to 
any discussion on resource management (e.g. Whiston (2001), Lele (1991), Dryzek 
(1996). Indeed it could easily dominate our study. In order to avoid this but still give 
credence to the term, we chose to define the term as being generally used to indicate 
longevity with the vision of permanence within the context of our case study. 
 
• Interview bias and spread: We did our best to interview a broad cross-section of 
people during the course of our study. This included people from the World Bank, 
GoT officials from various ministries, NGO workers, both dependent and more 
independent academics, as well as rural villagers both involved and excluded from 
RBMSIIP. However, everyone naturally had some kind of bias in some shape or form 
for financial reasons, friendships, development interests, employment etc. 
Furthermore, despite having what we believe was a broad cross-section of 
interviewees; we were only able to interview a limited number of people. Therefore it 
is possible that, given we have no prior expertise or knowledge in this area, that some 
of our findings and conclusions are doubtful. 
 
• General Study Scope: Time and resources is the bane of almost all students. Our 
study has certainly not been an exception, particularly given the ambition of our paper. 
One very senior IWRM academic warned us that we had a mountain to climb in terms 
of trying to make sense of IWRM and its applicability. He advised us to consider just 
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one element e.g. economics which he believed would be more than enough to write a 
PhD on. But we agreed with each other that it would make an unbalanced study to just 
consider one part of a holistic package that required the implementation of all 
elements to succeed.  
 
• Short Period of Field Research: Due to budgetary and study time constraints we 
could only participate in field research within a 14 day period in the wet season. 
Although we did accomplish many objectives we were not able to travel extensively 
throughout the Rufiji Basin.  We would have preferred to stay for many months 
especially in the dry season when stakeholder conflict is at its peak. We felt this was a 
limitation as the tone and information from interviews may have been different due to 
the stress of water scarcity and we would have a visual understanding of water 
shortages within the villages and the drying of the Rufiji River. 
 
• Translators: When arriving in Iringa, we identified the need to hire translators for 
interview research in the local villages. After an interview with a River Basin official 
we were offered a translator from the basin office. We felt this was a limitation to our 
study, but the short period in the area and the student budget we did not have another 
possibility. The limitation to have an official translator is the possible intimidation 
level or formal interview atmosphere which may not existed if we were with a neutral 
translator which had no official ties to the government.  
 
• Sample in Tanzania: The Rufiji Basin is a huge area located within 9 regions, and we 
were able to visit just a small part of the Iringa District.  Therefore, we got a small 
sample of the effects of the RBMSIIP project at the local level as there were schemes, 
villages, pilot activities, etc in the area that we were not able to visit.  This also 
includes other stakeholders such as the hydropower dam at Mtera.  
 
1.5 Outline & Importance of Each Following Chapter 
 
Chapter 2 identifies and considers the theoretical roots of IWRM which we have found to be 
based within New Institutional Economics (NIE). To the best of our knowledge, this link 
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never been identified in any academic paper before. We discuss how NIE theory is 
operationalised via IWRM in the form of integrated planning for coordination of actors; 
governance for equity, as well as establishing and enforcing rules; and economics for 
efficiency in the form of tools of control. The importance of making this theoretical link 
means we able to use our findings to help analyse the validity of IWRM in a unique and 
relevant way. 
 
Chapter 3 examines the evolution of IWRM and how it came to be adopted as a worldwide 
best practice.  This involves links between poverty, sustainability and water, as well as the 
promotion of IWRM on the political agenda, the broad appeal of the approach and the key 
role of the World Bank. The reader is thereby given an important understanding of how and 
why IWRM has been able to make the transition from vague principles to what is widely 
regarded as strategic tools. 
 
Chapter 4 gives a general introduction to Tanzania in terms of the countrys geographical, 
social political, economic and aid situation, before going on to detail the history of water 
management in Tanzania. The importance of this chapter is in setting the context by 
introducing the various management actions and events which have led up to the perceived 
need for the RBMSIIP. 
 
Chapter 5 introduces the case study area and leads into our analysis of the IWRM project. 
The chapter is divided into seven separate sections: 
 
1. The Case Study Area: An introduction to the study area in order to set the scene 
2. Analysis Method: How we chose to analyse the project and present our findings. 
3. Introduction to the Case: The River Basin Management Smallholder Irrigation 
Scheme Project (RBMSIIP) 
4. Rationale: The opinions driving the need for the RBMSIIP 
5. Strategy: The way to implement RBMSIIP 
6. Actions & Outcomes: What was achieved as part of RMBSIIP  
7. Externalities: Key factors outside the influence of RBMSIIP that can be expected to 
have an impact 
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The importance of this chapter is that introduces the reader to the case study and our analysis 
method (based on a combination of NIE theory and Mazmanian and Sabatiers (1989) 
analysis of policy implementation, followed by our actual analysis. While we have edited out 
the actual complete analysis for purposes of presentation, we do highlight critical key points. 
 
Chapter 6 is our case impact discussion, where we consider the key points we highlighted in 
our analysis of RBMSIIP. Through our analysis of RBMSIIP in the Rufiji Basin we evaluated 
the different project approaches, assumptions, values, rationale. It gave us the possibility to 
get a picture of the results of an intervention with IWRM principles, how they also are 
transformed and how they are operationalised in the field. The importance of this section is 
that it proves that our analysis can be successfully applied to determine the validity of IWRM 
in the context of the Rufiji Basin in terms of integrated planning, governance and economics 
(sustainability is considered in the conclusions).  
 
Chapter 7 begins concludes on the validity of the IWRM intervention in the Rufiji Basin in 
terms of sustainability, our strengths and weaknesses findings, as well as some broader 
thoughts on NIE and IWRM. Following this a number of key recommendations are made. The 
importance of this chapter is that it helps us answer our problem question and make some 
broader considerations about IWRM and water management in general.  
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Chapter 2: The Theoretical Roots of IWRM: NIE 
As noted in our introductory chapter, in the process of finding out which theories could be 
best applied to somehow evaluate the usefulness of IWRM we considered many options. 
These ranged from comparing IWRM with actor-oriented approaches to considering just the 
applicability of the economic aspects of IWRM. In the end we decided that two points were 
critical.  
 
Firstly, we decided that we wanted to evaluate the main theoretical aspects of the complete 
IWRM concept, rather than just a single part. The importance here is to understand that 
IWRM is a package of solutions, and as the word integrated implies, these solutions share 
an important relationship with each other. We were therefore interested in considering the 
complete package and the relationships between the different solutions within the package. 
Consequently, we felt that, despite IWRM being a broad and vague approach, it was 
important to consider it as a whole. 
 
Secondly, we were unable to find any kind of academic study or paper of any kind identifying 
the theoretical roots of IWRM. This both worried and excited us. The worry was that we 
would have the job of trying to identify those roots in what could easily turn into a purely 
theoretical paper. The excitement was that it would both allow us to possibly be amongst the 
first people to evaluate IWRM based on its own merits, and this would result in what we hope 
will be considered interesting and relevant study.  
 
As a consequence of these two points we decided to focus our efforts of identifying and 
discussing what we believe have become the theoretical roots of IWRM. The reason for using 
the word become will be made clear in the chapter following this one when we detail the 
relationship between IWRM and the World Bank.  
 
This chapter is a consideration of the theoretical roots of IWRM, which we believe to lie 
within New Institutional Economics (NIE). We will begin by noting the guiding principles 
that IWRM stems from and identifying what we believe to be the common elements in 
subsequent interpretations of IWRM. Following this we will explain the linkages between 
NIE and the three core elements of IWRM. Having identified the three core elements of 
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IWRM, we will use them to help us assess the validity of the approach in a real-life setting in 
the Rufiji Basin in Tanzania. 
2.1 The IWRM Guiding Principles and Concepts 
It is broadly agreed that the concept of Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) was 
a result of an Earth Summit conference held in Dublin in 1992. During the course of the 
conference four basic principles were ratified regarding how best to sustainably manage water 
resources (see table 1 below). 
  
Table 1: The Guiding Principles from Dublin 
 
Concerted action is needed to reverse the present trends of over-consumption, pollution, and rising threats 
from drought and floods. The Conference Report sets out recommendations for action at local, national 
and international levels, based on four guiding principles.  
Principle No. 1 - Fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to sustain life, 
development and the environment 
Since water sustains life, effective management of water resources demands a holistic approach, linking 
social and economic development with protection of natural ecosystems. Effective management links land 
and water uses across the whole of a catchment area or groundwater aquifer.  
Principle No. 2 - Water development and management should be based on a participatory approach, 
involving users, planners and policy-makers at all levels 
The participatory approach involves raising awareness of the importance of water among policy-makers 
and the general public. It means that decisions are taken at the lowest appropriate level, with full public 
consultation and involvement of users in the planning and implementation of water projects.  
Principle No. 3 - Women play a central part in the provision, management and safeguarding of 
water 
This pivotal role of women as providers and users of water and guardians of the living environment has 
seldom been reflected in institutional arrangements for the development and management of water 
resources. Acceptance and implementation of this principle requires positive policies to address womens 
specific needs and to equip and empower women to participate at all levels in water resources 
programmes, including decision-making and implementation, in ways defined by them.  
Principle No. 4 - Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized as 
an economic good 
Within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic right of all human beings to have access to clean 
water and sanitation at an affordable price. Past failure to recognize the economic value of water has led to 
wasteful and environment1ally damaging uses of the resource. Managing water as an economic good is an 
important way of achieving efficient and equitable use, and of encouraging conservation and protection of 
water resources. 
 
(WMO1992) 
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These principles were called the Dublin Principles, rather than the IWRM Principles. As table 
2 illustrates below, there is no single agreed definition for IWRM. 
 
Table 2: Some definitions of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM) 
 
• IWRM is about integrated and joined-up management. It is about promoting equitable access 
and efficiency for the greatest benefit for the greatest number of people, to achieve more sustainable 
utilization of water, including for a better environment (Moriarty et al 2004) 
• IWRM is a process which promotes the co-ordinated development and management 
of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the resultant economic and 
social welfare in an equitable manner without compromising the sustainability of vital 
ecosystems (GWP 2000) 
 
• IWRM is a process of assignment of functions to water systems, the setting of norms, enforcement 
(policing) and management. It includes gathering information, analysis 
of physical and socioeconomic processes, weighing of interests and decision making 
related to availability, development and use of water resources (Hofwegen and 
Jaspers 1999) 
 
• IWRM involves the coordinated planning and management of land, water and other 
environmental resources for their equitable, efficient and sustainable use (Calder 
1999) 
 
• IWRM expresses the idea that water resources should be managed in a holistic way, 
coordinating and integrating all aspects and functions of water extraction, water 
control and water-related service delivery so as to bring sustainable and 
equitable benefit to all those dependent on the resource (EC 1998) 
 
Adapted from Moriarty et al 2004:6 
 
However in our opinion, there are four key concepts which, in one form or another are present 
in almost all definitions of IWRM. These are: equity, efficiency, coordination and 
sustainability.  
 
Table 3 (following) is an analysis of the above definitions in the context of equity, efficiency, 
coordination and sustainability.  
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Table 3: IWRM for Equity, Efficiency, Coordination & Sustainability 
 
 
Definition By 
Equity 
(Governance) 
Efficiency 
(Economics) 
Coordination 
(Integrated 
Planning) 
Sustainability 
Moriarty et el 
(2004) 
It is about 
promoting equitable 
access 
efficiency for 
the greatest 
benefit 
integrated and 
joined-up 
management 
achieve more 
sustainable 
utilization of 
water 
 
GWP (2000) 
 
in an equitable 
manner 
in order to 
maximize the 
resultant economic 
and 
social welfare.. 
co-ordinated 
development and 
management 
of water, land and 
related resources 
without 
compromising the 
sustainability of 
vital 
ecosystems 
Calder (1999) 
 
equitable.use efficient.use coordinated 
planning and 
management of 
land, water and 
other 
environmental 
resources 
sustainable use 
Hofwegan & 
Jaspers (1999) 
(implied) (implied) (implied) (arguably implied) 
EC (1998) 
 
equitable benefit 
to all 
 managed in a 
holistic way, 
coordinating and 
integrating all 
aspects and 
functions 
so as to bring 
sustainable 
benefit 
Adapted from Moriarty et al 2004:6 
 
Firstly, IWRM aims to promote more equitable access to water resources and the benefits that 
are derived from water in order to tackle poverty. Secondly, IWRM aims to ensure that scarce 
water is used efficiently and for the greatest benefit of the greatest number of people. Thirdly, 
IWRM aims to coordinate the planning of projects and activities that have both a direct and an 
indirect impact on water resources. Finally, IWRM aims to achieve more sustainable 
utilisation of water, including for a better environment. The goal of sustainability is to be 
achieved through coordination, equity and efficiency. 
 
Through our readings related to IWRM and its implementation (e.g. World Bank 2004a, 
Saleth & Dinar 1999/2004, GWP 2003, Moriarty et al 2004), and our case study analysis, we 
would argue that the main operational aspects of IWRM come in the form of integrated 
planning, governance and economic considerations, that are meant to lead to sustainability: 
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Integrated Planning (coordination): This is the need to define a management area and to try 
to coordinate, or at least consider, all relevant anthrop-centric interests that have an impact on 
the supply, demand and quality of water. For example, consider a river basin as a 
management unit and when you plan domestic water supply take into account water needs for 
irrigation and power generation. Only by taking into account all relevant related aspects can 
planning have the desired impact. 
 
Governance (equity): This entails a transparent, accountable and ultimately well-functioning 
institutional framework that is required to regulate the use and abuse of water. In IWRM this 
can involve the decentralization of power, and formal and informal institutions that take into 
account the needs of all users, and are able to find some kind of satisfactory balance (an 
element of social fairness is often included e.g. womens right and local participation). In the 
world of IWRM, only by having a well-functioning institutional framework based on notions 
of equity that take into account all users, can water be properly regulated. Equity amongst 
all stakeholders is important for good governance because the ideal is stakeholders feel like 
they are both getting a fair deal and are empowered to manage the resource. 
 
Economics (efficiency): Money is the chosen tool used to help regulate demand. For 
example, in conditions of water scarcity, users have a quota (or right) to use a certain amount 
of water which they must pay for. Using more than the agreed quota leads to an increase in 
charges and possible a fine. While consideration is meant to be given to the poorest members 
of the community, ultimately the fees charged must be enough to pay for the costs of 
governance and planning to be economically sustainable.  
 
These elements are meant to lead to sustainability: 
 
Sustainability: This is typically sited as the end result of the successful application of the 
other elements. Unfortunately, little to no effort seems to be made to define sustainability in 
the IWRM context; with the concept being linked to terms such as ecosystems, use, and 
benefits. Therefore, we can perhaps conclude that the term is generally used to indicate 
longevity with the vision of permanence.  
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(It should be noted that effective implementation of these three elements requires 
consideration of physical systems and systems supporting legislation that can be 
enforcement.) 
2.2 New Institutional Economics & IWRM 
From our lectures, readings and discussions on development theory, we can identify a clear 
link between IWRM and New Institutional Economics (NIE). The evolution of New 
Institutional Economics (NIE) and theories within began with economists such as Ronald 
Coase where much of the NIE theory is highly inspired. NIE is a branch of economics that 
goes beyond the usual economic focus on markets, to look more closely at human-made 
institutions (DLLT 2005). Put in simple terms NIE has a; 
 
Worldview that incentives and rules can be used to regulate (i.e. govern) the behaviour of 
social actors;  
Problems of environmental degradation or control are caused by the lack of insufficient rules 
and incentives (e.g. Hardin 1968); 
Solutions come via the market and institutions. The market is regarded as the best form of 
regulation, but has its faults. Consequently the market needs to be complemented by 
regulative institutions (e.g. Ostrom 1999).  
 
We believe there are clear linkages between this thinking and IWRM. We can illustrate this 
by considering our three IWRM elements in the context of NIE: 
 
• Integrated Planning & NIE:  
In IWRM this element supports governance by taking into account the needs of all 
stakeholders. Integrated planning has a role at the policy level, but is more visible 
when incorporating all actors in a defined geographical unit of management (e.g. a 
river basin) as part of a plan. The idea related to NIE is to involve or take into account 
the interests of all actors and stakeholders, in an effort to agree the rules of the game. 
Plans, in one form or another, are essential for the operationalisation of strategy and 
are used to regulate peoples actions.  
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• Governance & NIE:  
IWRM typically involves a revision of institutions in order take into account all actors 
and stakeholders in a chain that links the highest levels of formal government (e.g. 
ministries) with the end users (e.g. in the form of village Water Users Associations). 
In this way all actors and stakeholders (institutions) can be regulated. This is very 
attractive to NIE thinking, primarily because it helps apply the rules of the game and 
devolves power away from formal governments, who are seen as often being 
obstructive and too slow to react to change and needs.  
 
• Economics & NIE:  
The economics element of IWRM involves water rights and user fees. It is not only 
mean to be as a means to fund governance; it is also used as a means to regulate the 
demand of users and protect the resource. NIE states that the market is the tool to 
regulate demand, help protect resources and dictate the distribute resources, although 
this regulation needs to be complemented by governance (see above).  
 
What follows will be a discussion of NIE thinking in relation to the three IWRM elements we 
have identified  integrated planning, governance and economics. For structural purposes we 
will first consider the role of economics (the market) to regulate the demand for water. 
Secondly, we will discuss the critical role of governance (institutions and collective) in 
regulating stakeholders, as well as applying an agreement of the rules of the game. Finally, we 
will consider the importance of integrated planning for coordinating the actors in a defined 
place (e.g. a river basin). 
 
2.2.1 Economics 
We will start by considering the NIE worldview of the water crisis as being an economic 
constraint to be solved by economically-focussed solutions. Following this will be an 
introduction to what New Institutional Economists (NIEs) see as being the faults of the old 
system. We will then conclude by considering the shift from centralized government 
regulation to more market-oriented regulation.  
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The NIE worldview is that water remains a major economic constraint on economic 
development, especially among countries in the lower income range because of the 
multifarious uses of water in all aspects of life (Saleth & Dinar 2004).  
 
In view of the close linkages between the financial status, physical health, service quality, 
and economic performance of the water sector, the overall process of economic development 
itself depends critically on water sector performance. The key issue in the economic 
dimension of the water challenge is, therefore, how to improve the financial and economic 
sustainability of the water sector and thereby enhance and sustain its indispensable 
contributions to socioeconomic development (Saleth & Dinar 2004:8). 
 
The Problems of the Old System 
NIEs are quick to point out the benefits of the old supply-driven approach as having an 
important historical role in supporting a world with a growing population and an expanding 
scale of economic activity. From post colonial times massive amounts of water resources 
developed through large schemes have served to help the emerging countries of Africa and 
Asia in supporting their expanding agriculture and urban settlements. It also helped to 
eliminate the food crisis of the 1950s and 1960s and improved the quality of life for many 
people (Saleth & Dinar 2004: 9-10). But there are a new set of resources and development 
realities which need to be taken into consideration. 
 
While the old approach of engineering solutions, the treatment of water as a free good and 
bureaucratic allocation and management had its benefits, according to NIEs, it has also had its 
day. The down-side of the old supply-driven approach has resulted in a century-long 
accumulation of the negative effects of water development projects and their mismanagement. 
The end result has been to reduce the relevance of the supply side approach as it is no longer 
consistent with the problems of the new era, which are related to the management of water 
scarcity (Saleth & Dinar 2004:8-10). 
 
Although the nature and severity of water problems are different from country to country, 
one aspect is common to most countries: water scarcity  whether quantitative or qualitative, 
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or both  originates more from inefficient use and poor management than from any real 
physical limits on supply augmentation. (Saleth & Dinar 2004:1) 
 
Consequently, NIEs would perhaps consider that a more appropriate term for the so-called 
water crisis would be the water management crisis. They believe that old system 
management techniques involving engineering approaches, centralized management, 
bureaucratic allocation and subsidized provision are the enemies of sustainable water resource 
management. What is required is a more efficient and durable solution involving economic 
approaches, decentralized management, and market-based allocation, and full-cost pricing 
(Saleth & Dinar 2004:9). From an NIE point of view, the central problem to be overcome is 
the role of the state. 
 
Perry et al (1997) would argue that water serves important ecological, environmental, and 
aesthetic benefits in many places, and should not be allocated to other uses simply on the 
grounds of economic theory, which includes cost-pricing to the lowest level. Up to some level 
water is a social good whose availability to certain groups and for certain purposes within any 
market force, serves a greater benefit to society as a whole (Perry et al, 1997). Perry would 
see public involvement highly valuable as no one would deny provision of safe drinking water 
to a poverty stricken village that could not pay full costs. This would contradict NIE thinking 
of cost recovery and theories within property rights as water resources would be then shared 
and not become ownership of one firm.  
 
From governments to market control 
NIEs see traditional water supply strategies as being inefficient, economically unsustainable 
and ultimately, environmentally unsustainable. The resulting symptomatic environmental 
problems are due to lower water charges and poor cost recovery, which jeopardises the 
efficient maintenance of water infrastructure as well as the potential for future investments in 
water development projects (Saleth & Dinar 2004:8) This situation stems from too much 
government involvement and bureaucratic control, that often creates passive users and rigid 
administration systems incapable of rapid change (Saleth & Dinar 1999). The solution to this 
problem is seen as decentralization of governance and the introduction of water rights. 
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Decentralization leads to greater participation by water-user stakeholders (Saleth & Dinar 
1999). Water users, who were beneficiaries in the surplus era of water development, have now 
become customers or clients in the new water scarcity era. They are seen as being in the 
front line of resource regulation and protection. In cities straightforward water pricing is the 
preferred method of cost recovery, but in rural areas where agriculture is the main consumer, 
tradable pollution rights or, more interesting for our case, tradable water rights are often a 
preferred method.  
 
Khan (2002) notes that if a trend of decentralization and property rights system occurs, 
previous economic symptoms of such areas as corruption and consolidation could 
increasingly destabilize an economy. Current economic reforms are primarily used to make 
markets more competitive (Khan, 2002), such as the case in Tanzania. Such reforms and lack 
of capacity to perform tasks within civil society participation, does not make the state 
sustainable thus a state failure could occur due to inconsistent market control, illegal rent 
seeking forms new boundaries and thus corruption evolves. Khan would tend to focus on the 
institutions service delivery, raising bureaucratic salaries, improving recruitment, and making 
judiciary more independent (Khan 2002) and notes that market forces are inter-related. This in 
turn would give less incentive for e.g. bureaucrats to accept rent seeking from entrepreneurs 
of this sense thus forming of stabilization characteristics.  
 
Water rights are any mechanism through which a user can access water for a particular use 
without jeopardising another users right. While water rights can be local or customary, in 
IWRM they are more formal and statutory in nature and typically are distributed on a basin 
level. They define volumetric allocation and sometimes the period of allocation and whom it 
is provided for. (Sokile & van Koppen 2003). For this alternative system to function 
effectively and equitably, legal changes are often needed to facilitate a private and 
transferable water rights system (a water market) that ensures full legal, physical, and tenure 
certainty of water rights. With such a water-rights system, economic conditions can create the 
necessary incentives for water exchanges both within and across sectors, and such exchanges 
will enhance efficient water use (Saleth & Dinar 2004:11)  
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According to NIE thinking, water rights should be priced at a point that reflects the cost of the 
resource that the market is willing to pay. So if all water-users are issued with water rights, 
they should be able to buy and sell these rights based on their needs. Only when all the 
resource is owned, and therefore valued, will the resource be respected and sustainably used. 
In general, a higher value and, hence, price of water, is needed to both justify and pay for the 
costly supply augmentation options.  
 
However, the idea of charging for water often, particularly in developing countries, evokes 
contentious issues relating to cost recovery and the privatization of water utilities. Treating 
water as an economic good means making it demand driven and trying to promote higher 
value uses, particularly under conditions of scarcity. The main panacea to these concerns is 
the recognition of water not only as an economic good, but also as a social good as per the 
UN Convention agreement from Geneva, November 2002 (UN 2002). But even the pro-
IWRM InfoResources publication concedes that this remains a highly controversial issue due 
to human rights groups opposing any consideration of water as an economic commodity 
(Wenger et al ed. 2003:6). A number of ideas have been formulated such as, free provision of 
a quantity of water for living (30-50 litres per day according to the WHO) and adjusting water 
rates to suit income levels (Wenger et al ed. 2003:6). As the Global Water Partnership state, 
There is general agreement in the water community that IWRM provides the only viable way 
forward for sustainable water resource management  although there are no universal 
solutions or blueprints and there is much debate on how to put the process into practice 
(Rogers & Hall 2003:30).  
 
And while NIEs believe more market-oriented mechanisms are the key, they concede that as 
markets are not perfect, they require a set of other supportive arrangements. These other 
supportive arrangements come in the form of an institutional framework which serves to 
provide effective governance, as we will discuss next. 
 
2.2.2 Governance 
Besides the legal system of water rights and the physical structure for measuring and 
conveying water, the efficient operation of water markets depends also on the organizational 
governance mechanisms for enforcement and conflict resolution (Easter, Rosegrant & Dinar 
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1999 in Saleth & Dinar 2004:12). Governance is when actors meet (or do not meet!) 
institutions and utilise them in some way or another. In the world of NIE, these organizational 
governance mechanisms come in the form of institutions and the notion of collective action. 
We will discuss both of these mechanisms in the context of water resource management.  
 
Institutions: 
An Institution can be defined as, The humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction. They are made up of formal constraints (such as rules, laws, constitutions), 
informal constraints (such as norms of behaviour, conventions, self-imposed codes of 
conduct), and their enforcement characteristics (North, 1994:1).  
 
It is the development of institutional framework for efficient and equitable use of water that, 
together with policy reforms, constitutes the base for a new governance structure needed for 
water allocation and management (Saleth & Dinar 2004:10). There is an allocation-oriented 
institutional change for sustaining the economic trends of efficiency, incentives and gains, 
which are substantial and also increasing with every increase in water scarcity (Saleth & 
Dinar 2004:13).  
 
Williamsons, (2000) emphasis of influence within the focus of the relationship between 
economic theory and interactions between institutions has brought upon segments of 
cumulative research pertaining to several factors such as social embeddedness, economics of 
property rights/positive political theory, transaction cost economics, and neo-classical 
economics/agency theory. Table 4 below visually explains the interaction of a social analysis 
between institutions conducted by Williamson within the framework of NIE.  We will use this 
table to give the reader a visual description of the levels of governance from an upper 
governance level to the informal institutional level. We identify several characteristics that 
link our theory with concept but we also note as does Welchs 2001 article (following), that 
some constraints are evident within Williamsons analysis.  
 
An inclusion of examples from the Rufiji basin will provide a clear understanding between 
Williamson and Norths work within NIE and application and connection to the practical side 
of IWRM. 
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Table 4:  
 
      
   (Williamson, 2000)  
 
The above framework shows an institutional (formal and informal) inter-relationship between 
such factors (although very far apart) of social embeddedness and Neo-classical economics.  
The solid arrow that connects a higher with a lower level imposes constraints on the level 
immediately below.  The reverse arrows that connect lower with higher signal feedback 
(Williamson, 2000).  
 
The years indicated in the middle refer to the ability to create or change as an institution.  
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As we can see L1 is the social aspect of a relationship and as Williamson (2000) states this is 
where most research is conducted by social scientists and economic historians.  Williamson 
mentions that Institutions at this level change very slowly-on the order of, for example, 
centuries or millennia.  There is still an element of frustration even from Williamson as he nor 
can Douglass North explain why this level has so much persuasive influence upon the long-
run characteristics of economies, hence why Williamson, (2000) labelled word 
embeddedness located in the first box.  
 
In the Rufiji Basin, this level would signify the local leadership and traditional village 
characteristics and decision making.  It is here where traditional leaders still have influence 
within decision making. Here also includes groups which may not have representation at the 
village level but are active within the village area such as pastoralists with adaptive control 
mechanisms that is consistent with Williamsons table in respect to local institutional change. 
Therefore a time lapse occurs to formal change as the informal institution must now supersede 
the formal institution to make decisions. 
 
As we move into boxes L2, L3 it is at these levels where institutional change and formal rules 
such as property rights, laws etc. can be enforced.  It is here where the executive, legislative, 
judicial, and bureaucratic functions of government as well as the distribution of powers across 
different levels government occur (Williamson, 2000:598).  We could assume that this is the 
lowest level of formal governance. Williamson, (2000) confirms this as he states This opens 
up the opportunity for first-order economizing: get the formal rules of the game (the game 
meaning the play or role within formal institution) right.   
 
It is within levels 2, 3 where the RBMSIIP project has made its most dramatic changes within 
the Rufiji Basin and in Tanzania.  Since the inception of the RBMSIIP project, elements of 
policy reform and alignment, decentralization, and property rights or water rights have been 
introduced.  
 
Reform within the upper ministerial level changed in respect to influential policy 
reform/alignment and movement from a centralized form of governance (as in the past) to a 
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decentralized form which, in the Rufiji Basin, had implemented empowerment strategies 
from, for example, the upper governance level of MWLD to the local River Basin water office 
and its officers to enforce water rights and user fees which is prevalent. We could also state 
that Water User Associations (WUAs) has formally recognized the local villages in the sense 
that villages are required to form WUAs in order to apply for Water Rights within the basin. 
 
The alignment process also occurred with some collaboration between specific ministries at 
the upper governance level in Tanzania.  The legal system has aligned itself with 
governmental initiatives/policies such as the revised Tanzania National Water Policy of 2002 
as a result of some cross-sectoral collaborations especially focusing attention within the Rufiji 
basin. The enforcement and implementation at the local level has been a much slower process. 
This can be supported by Williamson again as the shift from level 3 to level 2 and to level 1 
institutional reform takes a much longer period of time.  
   
In level 4 exists the discrete structural analysis of governance and even beyond where there is 
an evolutionary level in which mechanisms of the mind (cognitive science) take shape 
(Williamson, 2000:599).  We could not find in depth discussion of this cognitive level 
subject, nor is it the base of our study. North, (1992:1) states that even at this cognitive level 
individuals make choices on the basis of their mental models or the way they see the world 
and this is influenced by how people would interpret the world around them. These decisions 
are part culturally derived that is passed on from generational transfer of knowledge, values 
and norms which are very radically different among various ethnic groups and societies 
(North, 1992:1). When people then make decisions inside institutions there will always be a 
transaction cost. Neo-classical result of efficient markets only obtains when it is costless to 
transact. When it is costly to transact then institutions matter (North, 1992:2).  
 
Our research does not stem within level 4 cognitive analysis or in depth theory of transaction 
costs in the Tanzanian context  with specific focus on decentralization and 
addition/empowerment of institutions. We are aware the price of transaction costs and 
influences in resource allocation and its possible effects in this process of Williamsons table 
in its relation to the Rufiji Basin. It is important to note level 4 functions and the cognitive 
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decisions that are made by decision makers that effect institutional change but not in this 
study.  
 
Williamson has been critiqued as an individual who takes a rationalist approach to NIE 
specifically within a transaction cost approach (Welch, 2001).  It is not the aim of this study 
to continue in depth economic analysis of Williamsons theories, but we do acknowledge his 
social theory graph as a link from the new institutional framework and interactions that define 
institutions and organizations thus influencing decisions made at all institutional levels.  The 
levels within Williamsons graph have been critiqued as not flexible enough, in fact Welch 
(2001) notes that there is a equilibrium of equal interactions expressed within the levels of 
Williamsons graph, which may not express the true relationship between each level. Missing 
is the inclusion of power relations and implying that each institution within the levels are of 
equal conditions (Welch, 2001).  
 
However, to complement Williamsons graph, Ostroms´ (1990) supporting theory of 
institutions sets out working rules which, determine who is eligible to make decisions in 
some arena, what actions are allowed or constrained, what aggregation rules will be used, 
what procedure must be followed, what information must or must not be provided and what 
payoffs will be assigned to individuals dependent on their actions (Ostrom, 1990: 51). The 
concept of working rules describes rules actually used, monitored and enforced when 
individuals in a given situation make choices about actions they will take. Working rules may 
or may not closely follow formal rules (Guillingham, 1997:22) as we will indicate within the 
relationship of informal and formal institutions via our case study.  
 
It is assumed by Dinar, North and Williamsons institutional theory, that while a private 
water-rights system is crucial to give individuals incentives to use water efficiently, they also 
create conflicts and these can be solved through courts or mainly through collective action 
and user institutions, that with governmental management institutions complement each other 
for the new governance structure for the water sector. It is through collective action that 
groups are responding for maximizing their common interests (Ostrom, 1990:5). 
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Collective Action: 
In This section we will analyse the role of common action and institutions in the framework 
of governance, as well as the link with integrated planning. 
 
Collective action is central to most analysis of NIE (Donor and Schneider, 2000:8) and is 
defined as, A voluntary action taken by a group to achieve common interests.  Members can 
act directly on their own or through an organization. (Dick and Di Gregorio, 2004: brief 3:1) 
  
Collective action occurs when more than one individual is required to contribute to an effort 
in order to achieve an outcome (Ostrom, 2004 brief 2). There are three models within 
collective action which tries to define the accepted way of viewing many problems that 
individuals face when attempting to achieve collective benefits.  The three models are: 
tragedy of the commons, the prisoners dilemma, and the logic of collective action (Ostrom, 
1990:6). We will be focusing within the logic of Collective action and its connection to 
integrated planning. 
 
• Facilitating Collective Action  
Ostrom (2004) notes that any effort to influence policies for i.e., managing water, must take 
into account factors that increase the likelihood those individuals will engage in their own 
collective action to manage local resources (Ostrom, 2004 :brief 2). Inclusion of incentives 
such as promise of increased crop production, or consistent water flow within irrigated canals 
that require low maintenance when built may enhance the option to organize collective forces. 
This may also provide stimulus for facilitators to engage the fundamental understanding of 
traditional factors and developing policies based on traditional practice resulting in national 
and international agencies increasing the level of collective action generated at the local level 
(Ostrom, 2004: brief 2). 
 
In theory, facilitators, community organizers, and similar change agents have catalyzed 
communities to organize bottom-up identification of priorities, planning and action (Bruns & 
Bruns, 2004: brief 15), providing elements of capacity building to, for example, farmers, 
irrigators, and even government agents. Types of capacity building that would occur in our 
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case which includes education within maintenance of irrigations canals, collection of water 
user fees or data collection located at canal intakes.  
 
Within the National Water Policy (2002) there is strong emphasis of collective action 
processes. For example, WUAs, which is a concept formed to focus representation of local 
villages within the Rufiji basin under the guidance of the Policy. The intention is to empower 
local villages to administer water resource management capabilities within traditional and 
rehabilitated schemes.  
 
The WUAs tasks include many facets which include increasing the ability to collect water 
user fees, perform operation and maintenance within irrigation canals and understand 
associated user groups upstream and/or downstream in there area. As mentioned previously, 
the revised National Water Policy (2002) focuses on encompassing property rights/water 
rights, decentralization, creation of Water User Associations (WUA) and to initiate 
empowerment concepts within nine river basins of Tanzania concentrated at the local level 
(Sokile et al, 2005, 28-2).  It is the concept of the WUA to support management functions of 
the Rufiji River Basin office.  The incentive for the farmers to involve themselves in this 
project is the increase likelihood that crop production would increase.     
 
If norms are established and the collective group begins to function under the specific 
objectives set by planners Ostrom (1990:36), notes then in every group there will be 
individuals who will ignore norms and act opportunistically when given a chance. If the 
government, for example, continues to intervene in maintenance of the canals the village 
locals may not consider the duty of maintenance as their own therefore the theory of 
collective action would fail.  This would also include collection of water user fees and or 
administering water rights and management or simply some may ignore the planning 
instruments all together and continued extensive water usage would become evident. 
 
Some of the problems that Ostrom (2004) notes are a continuance of top down strategies 
which become solutions to collective action problems by policy makers who make decisions 
located far from the problems.  Amongst all the solutions that Ostrom provides in dealing 
with these problems one of her mentioned prescriptions include creating institutional 
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mechanisms that local participants can use to organize themselves, such as via special 
districts, private associations, and local/regional representation between governments 
(Ostrom, 2004: brief 2:1)   
 
The creation of institutional mechanisms for stakeholders such as local actors, in our opinion, 
is the fundamental basis to which integrated planning is conceived. It is the notion of 
integrated planning that we will be considering next. 
2.2.3 Integrated Planning 
Dietz (2003), notes that governments are experimenting with various approaches to, for 
example, conflict where by experiments are being conducted with intense interaction and 
deliberation aimed at negotiating decisions or providing structured input via participatory 
processes. If conflict does arise between resource users, and institutions such as governments 
are not present, there is no reason to expect the maintaining of long-run interaction among 
actors living in the same community (Bravo, 2001:12).   
 
In a participatory planning process environment, government stakeholders and community 
participants within the common pool resource would be involved within a collaboration 
context thus defining cross sectoral collaboration. This is an important factor in both NIE and 
IWRM rationale. As Dinar (2004:8) notes, In view of the critical linkages that the water 
sector has with the rest of the economy, viewing water problems as confined strictly to the 
water sector is no longer appropriate. Attempts to fix isolated parts of the water sector will 
influence other dimensions, but an integrated approach is best (Saleth & Dinar 1999).  
 
The thinking here is that an integrated approach to water resource management can recognise 
the inter-linkages between water sector problems, and can fully exploit both the inter-linkages 
and synergies among institutional aspects. Consequently, with an integrated approach you can 
begin by take into account all water related problems within a given area, and then get the key 
institutions to work together to find solutions. As noted earlier, integrated planning has a role 
both at the policy level and a planning level. Agreement between stakeholders on a broad 
strategy serves to coordinate and harmonize interests, and in doing so, seeks to minimise the 
prospect of conflict when policy moves to plan and finally actions.  
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At the policy level, when it comes to national governments, water is dealt with by many 
ministries, for example, agriculture, transport and navigation, power, industry and 
environment, but there often tends to be little coordination between them, and their focus is 
likely to be more on development type issues, than on water resource management. An 
example of a problem stemming from a lack integrated planning at the policy level could be a 
clash of interests between a ministry of water and a ministry of agriculture. In a developing 
country a ministry of water may well have an objective to conserve water (because of water 
scarcity), whereas the ministry of agriculture may well have an objective to increase crop 
production (to feed the people and create a surplus for sale). In isolation, both objectives are 
fine, but if increasing crop production means using more irrigation with no consideration of 
improving efficiency, then a serious problem could well arise.  
 
At the planning and action level an integrated approach is critical for taking incorporating the 
interests of all actors in a defined geographical unit of management (e.g. a river basin). The 
main idea is to agree the rules of the game, and thereby agree on how to regulate 
stakeholders actions and consequently protect the water source. An example of a problem 
stemming from a lack integrated planning at the plan and action level could be between two 
villagers on a river. The both villages might have the objective of growing as much food as 
possible. In years where there was abundant rainfall and the river was full, this probably 
would not be a problem. However, if in years of drought the upstream village took as much 
water as possible and almost nothing for the downstream village a situation of conflict could 
be expected to occur. 
 
It is in this kind of situation that the notion of tradable water rights becomes attractive. For 
example, once the different villagers had been allocated a certain amount of water, they would 
be entitled to either use it or sell it; the rules of the game having been already established and 
understood. 
 
Summary 
This chapter was a consideration of the theoretical roots of IWRM, which we believe to lie 
within New Institutional Economics (NIE). We began by noting the guiding principles that 
IWRM stems from and identifying what we believe to be the common elements in subsequent 
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interpretations of IWRM. Following this we explain the linkages between NIE and the three 
core elements of IWRM, as well as what this means in terms of water resource management. 
Having identified and understood the supposed benefits and drawbacks of the three core 
elements of IWRM that are meant to lead to sustainability, we will use them to help us assess 
the validity of the approach in a real-life setting in the Rufiji Basin in Tanzania. 
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Chapter 3: The Evolution & Promotion of IWRM 
In the previous chapter we identified and discussed what we believe to be the theoretical roots 
of IWRM. In this chapter will examine the evolution and promotion of IWRM. We begin by 
identifying the linkages between poverty, sustainable development, water issues and IWRM. 
We will then move on to examining the factors that lie behind its broad appeal. Following this 
the relationship between IWRM and the role of the World Bank in terms of endorsement and 
promotion will be discussed.  
 
3.1 Linking Poverty with Sustainability 
It has long been recognised that physical sustainability and social sustainability go hand in 
hand, and that poverty and material inequity do not promote good environmental 
management. Therefore, addressing poverty and its associated inequalities is a precondition 
for sustainable existence. 
 
The roots of addressing global poverty with a view to a more sustainable form of 
development came with the advent of the UN Conference on the Human Environment, held in 
Stockholm in 1972. Although the issues of development were approached from the viewpoint 
of humankinds broadly negative impact on the environment in terms of oil spills, use of 
harmful pesticides, toxic waste dumping etc. (Greene 1997), considerable emphasis was 
placed by speakers from developing countries upon the fact that for two-thirds of the world's 
population the human environment was dominated by poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy and 
misery, and that the urgent task facing mankind was to solve those immediate and formidable 
problems. 
 
Indeed, by the end of the conference it was widely agreed that this new movement could only 
succeed if there was a new commitment to liberation from the destructive forces of mass 
poverty, racial prejudice, economic injustice, and the technologies of modern warfare. 
Mankind's whole work and dedication must be towards the ideal of a peaceful, habitable and 
just planet (Greene 1997:316-317). 
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The next key meeting in terms of global sustainable development was, of course, the UN 
Conference on Environment and Development (informally known as The Earth Summit) at 
Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The Earth Summit was a follow up to the meeting in Stockholm 20 
years earlier and involved 45,000 people from 150 states, including 135 heads of state. The 
key themes at Rio were environment and sustainable development.  
 
Principle 5 of the official UN conference report declares, All States and all people shall 
cooperate in the essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for 
sustainable development, in order to decrease the disparities in standards of living and better 
meet the needs of the majority of the people of the world (UN 2002:27). However, some of 
the key work in terms of agreeing priorities in addressing poverty had actually already been 
made in one of the preliminary conferences earlier in the same year.  
 
3.2 Linking Poverty & Sustainability with Water 
Five hundred participants, including government-designated experts from a hundred countries 
and representatives of eighty international, intergovernmental and non-governmental 
organizations attended the International Conference on Water and the Environment (ICWE) in 
Dublin, Ireland on 26-31 January 1992. What bought them together was the recognition that 
the scarcity and misuse of fresh water pose a serious and growing threat to sustainable 
development and protection of the environment. Human health and welfare, food security, 
industrial development and the ecosystems on which they depend, are all at risk, unless water 
and land resources are managed more effectively in the present decade and beyond than they 
have been in the past. (WMO 1992) 
 
What prompted this action was the fact that at the start of the 1990s, more than a quarter of 
the worlds exponentially growing population still lacked the basic human needs of enough 
food to eat, a clean water supply and hygienic means of sanitation, meant that priority was 
given to water resources development and management to the accelerated provision of food, 
water and sanitation to these unserved millions. (WMO 1992) 
 
The Conference participants called for fundamental new approaches to the assessment, 
development and management of freshwater resources, which could only be brought about 
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through political commitment and involvement from the highest levels of government to the 
smallest communities. Commitment would need to be backed by substantial and immediate 
investments, public awareness campaigns, legislative and institutional changes, technology 
development, and capacity building programmes. Underlying all these must be a greater 
recognition of the interdependence of all peoples, and of their place in the natural world. 
(WMO 1992) 
 
All governments were called to carefully study the specific activities and means of 
implementation recommended in the Conference Report, and to translate those 
recommendations into urgent action programmes for water and sustainable development. At 
its closing session, the Conference adopted the Dublin Statement and the Conference Report, 
part of which involved the guiding principles (illustrated in tale 1 in the previous chapter) 
were to be used as a reference point for tackling sustainable water management. 
 
3.3 The Momentum of IWRM 
It was from the Dublin Conference that the concept of IWRM, based on the above principles, 
as a governance approach, began to gain momentum. But things really took off when the UN 
decided that a new coordinating organization was needed to champion the cause of IWRM.  
 
In 1996 the World Bank, the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the Swedish 
International Development Agency (SIDA) created the Global Water Partnership (GWP). The 
GWP initiative is based on promoting and implementing integrated water resources 
management through the development of a worldwide network that could pull together 
financial, technical, policy and human resources to address the critical issues of sustainable 
water management. (GWP 2004a) 
 
By the time of the 2nd World Water Forum in The Hague (2000), the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development (WSSD) in Johannesburg (2002) and the 3rd World Water Forum 
in Kyoto (2003), the GWP was well underway, promoting its work to willing ears. All three 
conferences served to move water up the political agenda. At the 2nd World Water Forum this 
was actually the explicit aim of the conference.  
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At the 2nd World Water Forum, attended by over 5000 participants from numerous UN 
organizations and NGOs, the GWP co-drafted Frameworks for Action for the world and 
individual regions. The chairperson of the conference was HRH the Prince of Orange (also a 
patron of GWP). The frameworks were designed to both highlight the importance of water 
security from a stability and development view point, as well as mobilizing the political will 
to act. The need for IWRM based on the four Dublin Principles was at the heart of the process 
and resulting documents.  
 
By the end of the WSSD (a direct follow-up from the Rio summit), the importance of water in 
relation to population increases, poverty, food production and industrial uses had been 
officially recognized (UN 2002b). While it is definitely debateable as to the relevance, it is 
interesting to note that in the summary document from the summit, water & sanitation was 
the first item (before energy) on the action agenda (UN 2002c).  
 
Cynics might point out that basic requirements such as water and sanitation were more 
attractive and less fundamentally contentious in comparison to other topics such as energy, 
health, agriculture, biodiversity, finance, trade and globalization (which appeared last in the 
summary). And that the solution was definitely fluffy enough for administrative rationalists, 
democratic pragmatists and economic rationalists (Dryzek 1996:61-122) to agree upon.  
 
The more open-minded might point out that water & sanitation is a key cross-cutting 
sustainable development issue. And the facts that over 1 billion people lack access to safe 
drinking water and over 2 billion people lack access to proper sanitation, while half the 
worlds population will experience water shortages by 2025, warrants immediate and 
appropriate action. Indeed, the action agenda item of halving the number of people without 
access to clean drinking water by 2015 is regarded as a desirable and achievable target (UN 
2002c).  
 
Whatever the case, the GWP and a growing body of organizations that shared GWPs views, 
had realized their stated aims of moving water up the political agenda and mobilizing the 
political will to act. However, even more importantly the conference report (UN 2002d) notes 
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that the participating countries agreed to develop IWRM and water efficiency plans, with 
support for developing countries, by 2005.  
 
In the previous chapter we discussed the four key concepts which, in one form or another are 
present in all definitions of IWRM are: equity, efficiency, coordination and sustainability. 
Firstly, IWRM aims to promote more equitable access to water resources and the benefits that 
are derived from water in order to tackle poverty. Secondly, IWRM aims to ensure that scarce 
water is used efficiently and for the greatest benefit of the greatest number of people. Thirdly, 
IWRM aims to coordinate the planning of projects that have both a direct and an indirect 
impact on water resources. Finally, IWRM aims to achieve more sustainable utilisation of 
water, including for a better environment.  
 
3.4 Why is IWRM so Appealing?  
A simple indicator of the broad appeal of the IWRM concept is that when one researcher, 
Larry A. Swatuk, ran a Google search on IWRM in 2003, the search engine returned with 
more than 10,000 links (Swatuk 2004:2). When we ran a search in November 2004 we found 
something in the region of 31,200 links. When we ran the same search in March 2005 we 
found more than 38,000 links. And when we ran the same search in early May 2005 we found 
more than 43,300 links.  
 
In the previous chapter we identified the NIE roots of IWRM, so it is understandable that this 
approach is appealing to New Institutional Economists, but what is it exactly that makes 
IWRM so appealing to a broader audience? In order to answer this question we have decided 
to address its multifaceted inter-related factors under five headings. However, it must be noted 
that other divisions and methods of discussion could be just as relevant for explanation. 
 
Risk Promotion:  
GWP has successfully promoted water as a global risk: The IWRM paradigm is now 
widely accepted as conventional wisdom and the principles have been widely accepted by 
power structures; international and national governmental and non-governmental 
institutions. The cognitive maps of these actors have been either realized or redrawn 
over a 35 year period (from Stockholm until the present day) to create a consensus around 
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the perception that the governance to fresh water is of unacceptably high risk to world 
society, requiring extensive remedial action based on a set of core ideals, as a way in 
which to deal with this self-generated manufactured situation (after Beck 1996).  
 
Political Promotion:  
The link between poverty and concept of sustainable development was made at the 
Stockholm Conference, and the link between poverty and sustainable development and 
water as made at Dublin and Rio. The role of the GWP has been in politically promoting 
these links as well as the policy solution (IWRM) to governmental and non-governmental 
institutions. GWP is helped by the fact that the problem is regarded as both clear and 
measurable i.e. we can see the problem and identify those individuals affected. 
Furthermore, the fact that everyone agrees on the importance of the problem (see risk 
promotion above), combined with its humanitarian nature, was and continues to be 
extremely helpful. 
 
IWRM Packaging:  
Some scholars argue that IWRM is just a fashion rather than a radical new approach 
(e.g. Merry et al 2004). While such criticism might seem harsh considering its good 
intentions, they do have some value. When we examine the principles in their component 
parts it quickly becomes clear that they are not entirely new. Projects that consider river 
basins, include local participation and promote water as an economic good have all been 
tried before. What is arguably new is the fact that consideration of river basins is being 
globally promoted as a way to consolidate fragmented and often conflicting projects, as 
well as promoting the western moral perceptions regarding sexual equality and womens 
rights. What is definitely new is the lumping of all these best practices into one 
marketable solution that can be easily packaged and promoted. In essence, IWRM would 
seem to be a safe and pragmatic bet, rather than a high risk gamble.  
 
Governance appeal: 
There is growing belief that while this global crisis is founded on a mixture of 
unavoidable development factors, such as population growth and increasing resource 
demand, at the heart of the water crisis is poor management or governance. IWRM really 
 58
is being hailed as the answer to all the worlds water problems - providing that the holistic 
approach can be put into effective action. In fact some exponents of IWRM would even 
declare that with careful management and wise selection of priorities there is no reason 
that even in the driest parts of the world there should not be sufficient water to go around, 
and viable solutions exist for many of the problems faced. (Moriarty et al 2004). 
Furthermore, it is also perceived as a way to build up the political systems capacity to 
identify and solve environmental problems (after Jänicke 1997:288-314). For example, 
lending for water resource development accounted for about 16% of all World Bank 
lending over the past decade (World Bank 2004:p1).  They demand an accountable form 
of governance structure for them to work with i.e. promote their policies and receive a 
return on the money they invest. In turn their money (as well as from other donors and 
investors) is regarded as essential for development by poorer countries. IWRM is strongly 
favoured by the World Bank. 
 
Policy approach:  
The policy of IWRM has broad appeal as it combines administrative rationalist 
(bureaucracy), democratic pragmatism (democracy) and economic rationalist (market) 
approaches, which are the three main ways human beings have found to coordinate efforts 
to solve environmental problems (Dryzek 1996:61-122).  
• Administrative rationalists believe that environmental problems should be left to the 
experts; the fact that river basin catchment areas can cover thousands of square 
kilometres means that there is an obvious and substantial requirement in terms of 
scientific experts to provide an educated overview and officials to provide expert 
administration. 
• Democratic pragmatists believe that environmental problems should be left to the 
people; the fact that IWRM involves full public participation at the lowest appropriate 
level throughout the project process, gives democracy a major role. This approach is 
widely recognised as critical for project durability, partly because it can be well-suited 
and/or adapted to traditional forms of governance in developing countries. 
• Economic rationalists believe that environmental problems should be left to the 
Market; they are therefore very pleased to see water and its supply recognised as 
having an economic value. They see this as an important and efficient way of 
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achieving equitable use, and of encouraging conservation and protection. By far the 
most contentious of the principles that IWRM is built around is the notion of water as 
an economic good. Indeed the World Bank is a very strong advocate of full cost 
recovery for water supply and recovery. 
 
So who is IWRM oriented and what are their interests? The 38,000+ Google links are 
generally made up of a mixture of academic papers, news articles, water management courses 
and conferences, government papers, discussion and knowledge exchange forums, as well as 
consultant and NGO websites. But from these we can trace back to the organizations 
promoting the concept of IWRM. In doing so one name clearly overshadow all others; The 
World Bank. Of course there are other notable organizations, such as the World Water 
Council, the World Commission on Water for the 21st Century and the Global Water 
Partnershipbut all these have been created by the World Bank.  
 
If we return to our five factors above (risk promotion, political promotion, IWRM packaging, 
governance appeal and policy approach) and re-examine them in the light of this finding, it 
becomes very obvious that the factors complement the ideas and interests of the World Bank - 
the worlds most powerful development-donor organization. The fact that the World Bank 
promotes the prevailing best practices is regarded as very refreshing or even very necessary 
by the Bank itself (after Hirji 2005). Critics say that the World Bank has been very subversive 
and successful in getting its development ideas generally accepted as main stream water 
management strategy  particularly those relating to water as an economic good (FOEI 
2004).  
 
3.5 From Principles to Policy: The Role of the World Bank 
In terms of application, having won appeal at the macro (international) political level, the next 
steps has been for IWRM to win acceptance at the mesa (national) and micro (local) political 
levels. These are probably the hardest steps as they involve a shift in IWRM from concept-
strategy to working-process. One important step has been of the publication of books written 
by Saleth and Dinar (that we refer to in the previous chapter) that promote IWRM-related 
principles as best practices in water sector management. Table 5 below illustrates what Saleth 
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and Dinar regard as best practices in water resource management. We have divided the 
practices under the headings of integrated planning, governance and economics.  
 
Table 5: Analysis based on Saleth & Dinar (1999) Best Practices 
(For the sake of accuracy, we have tried to stay as close to the authors language as possible) 
 
Country 
 
Integrated Planning Governance  Economics 
Mexico Basin organizations for 
coordination in planning 
Water Users Associations Water Permits and water 
markets 
Chile Various user 
organizations at the 
project level. 
Water administration 
reform 
Full-cost pricing and 
market-based water 
allocation 
Brazil Regional water strategies 
to consider all users 
Water democratization 
via user participation 
 
Spain Basin-based water admin. 
for inter-sectoral 
allocations 
Decentralized governance Water markets 
Morocco Basin-based water admin. 
for inter-sectoral 
allocations 
Institutional reform (based 
on economic self-
sufficiency) 
Privatisation of water 
supply 
Israel   Full cost recovery (urban) 
progressive tariffs 
(irrigation) 
South Africa Catchment management Water courts Market-based water 
sector including multi-
tiered pricing 
Sri Lanka Integrated water body 
planning including reuse 
of water 
Decentralization of water 
management e.g. WUAs  
Introduction of 
commercial water 
companies 
Australia River basin management 
for water allocation 
Institutional reform has 
helped resolve conflict 
Provision of water by 
private companies 
China   Private companies for 
public water supply 
arrangements 
India River valley development 
orgs. for water allocation 
Major institutional 
reforms 
Water markets: ground 
water, inter-regional and 
inter-sectoral 
 
The GWP has also had an important role by creating a plethora of tools and guidance papers 
(e.g. http://www.gwpforum.org/gwp/library) produced through a plethora of technical experts, 
consultants, NGOs, and academics and made available to developing countries. However, the 
leading role here, at least in terms influencing the water policies and strategies of many 
developing countries, is probably the World Bank as the worlds biggest development aid 
donor.  
 
The World Banks Water Resources Sector Strategy (World Bank 2004) is a latest version 
of the 1993 Water Resources Management Paper (World Bank 1993), that was published 
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shortly after the Rio Earth Summit of 1992. The 1993 paper basically focussed on elaborating 
and interpreting the Dublin Principles. The 2004 paper tries, to complement [the 1993 
paper] by focussing on the lessons in translating its principles into practice (World Bank 
2004:28). 
 
While it is a little embarrassing that on page one of the strategy the authors refer to the three 
Dublin principles (gender is included under the what the Bank calls the Institutional 
Principle, which argues that water resources management is best done when all stake holders 
participate), the paper is generally very good at highlighting what it believes are the 
substantial challenges that developing countries face and the steps needed to be taken to 
achieve some kind of sustainable use for development. It acknowledges that action on the 
ground has been slow and that many countries are very far from full implementation of the 
principles in practice, but notes that the experiences of the previous 10 years has reinforced 
the relevance and importance of the Dublin Principles (World Bank 2004:28-29). 
 
Summary & Conclusion 
In this chapter we examined the evolution and promotion of IWRM. We began by identifying 
the linkages between poverty, sustainable development, water issues and IWRM. We then 
examined the factors that lie behind its broad appeal which included risk promotion, political 
promotion, packaging, governance appeal and policy approach. Finally, we identified the 
World Bank (the world\s most powerful development donor organization) in endorsing and 
promoting IWRM. From this we can conclude that regardless of how other organizations or 
individuals seek to interpret and apply the concept of IWRM, the absolutely overwhelming 
the emphasis that the World Bank and its associated individuals and organizations give on 
promoting their interpretation of IWRM has served to become how IWRM is generally 
perceived. 
 
One of the places that the World Bank gained some practical experience in strategy execution 
based on IWRM was Tanzania. From 1996-2004 the Bank funded a US$26.3m pilot called 
the River Basin Management and Small Holder Irrigation Improvement Project (RBMSIIP). It 
is this project we will use as our case study in the chapter following an introduction to 
Tanzania and its water management history. 
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Chapter 4: Water Management in Tanzania 
We will begin with a general introduction to the country of Tanzania before considering the 
history of water management from colonial times to present day. Following this we will 
identify the current water management problems in Tanzania.  
4.1 Tanzania 
The United Republic of Tanzania (see figure 2 below) is the largest country in East Africa and  
 
                                
 
Figure 2: Tanzania 
(Source: University of Pennsylvania, 2004) 
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has enjoyed relative political and social stability since its Independence in 1961 and its full 
formation in 1964 when the island of Zanzibar joined with what is now mainland Tanzania.  It 
is one of the poorest countries in the world, with a population that has almost tripled in less 
than 30 years (WaterAid, 2004). Tanzania is one of the most uniquely diversified countries in 
Africa boasting a rich and diverse resource base along with cultural influences stemming from 
German and English colonial influences to tribal, Islamic, and Muslim which enriches a social 
culture that has been formed over thousands of years.  
 
Tanzania today has a population of around 36 million people and growing by some 1,332,000 
annually with approximately 80% living in rural areas (Maganga et al, 2001). The child 
mortality rate (under 5 years) is 102.13 births per thousand and life expectancy is 44.39 years 
(CIA World FactBook, 2004). The countrys main exports are agriculturally produced 
(coffee, cotton, tea, spices and tobacco).  
 
Geography: 
Tanzania is located in Eastern Africa, bordering the Indian Ocean, between Kenya and 
Mozambique (refer to map 1 above). The mainland has four distinct climatic zones: hot, 
humid tropical coastal plains; the arid central plateau; high, moist and humid lake regions; and 
the temperate highlands. Mt. Kilimanjaro (5,895 m), Africas highest mountain, rises from the 
central plateau. Tanzania has an abundance of lakes and waterways, including Lake 
Tanganyika (second deepest lake in the world) and Lake Victoria (Africas largest lake). 
There are two rainy seasons  March to May and October to December (World Vision, 2003). 
 
Political Atmosphere: 
Between independence in 1961 and the mid 1970s, democratic elections involved more than 
one party. This period was typified by governments with strong socialist ideals. From the mid 
70s until 1995 Tanzania was governed and controlled by one party in a one party election. 
This came to an end in 1995 with the first democratic elections in 25 years, (CIA FactBook, 
2004). But even from the mid 1970s the style of government had been changing to a more 
market oriented approach. 
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Economy:  
Tanzania, as mentioned, is one of the poorest countries in the world.  The economy depends 
heavily on agriculture, which accounts for just above half of GDP, provides 85% of exports, 
and employs 80% of the workforce in the country (CIA FactBook, 2004). Industry typically 
features the processing of agricultural products and light consumer goods. The World Bank, 
the International Monetary Fund, and bilateral donors have provided funds to rehabilitate 
Tanzanias economic infrastructure and to alleviate poverty (CIA FactBook, 2004).  Growth 
in 1991-2002 featured an increase in resource based extraction which mostly included Gold 
and Oil/Gas exploration.  Due to the market restructuring of the Tanzanian economy, recent 
banking reforms have helped increase private sector growth and investment. Continued donor 
assistance (in the amount of US$1.2 billion) and solid macroeconomic policies supported real 
GDP growth of more than 5.2% in 2004 (CIA FactBook, 2004). 
 
Aid: 
The Arusha Declaration from 1967, a construction for a socialist and self-reliant nation, was 
adopted as a strategic intervention to replace the World Bank inspired development 
framework of maximizing growth in a predominantly market-led economy, with poor results 
and contrary expectations. This Declaration put emphasis on basic needs and egalitarian 
development, placed the major means of production, distribution and exchange under the 
ownership and control of the State. On foreign aid, the Declaration was categorical that aid 
should only be accepted as a means for building self-reliance. However, this was not 
accompanied by explicit economic policies which could steer the economy in the desired 
direction. Paradoxically, its investments programme was overly dependent on foreign aid and 
credit. Overtime, this largely import-substituting industrialisation strategy became a foreign 
exchange guzzler, making Tanzania even more and more dependent on foreign aid rather than 
building self reliance capacity (ESRF 1997:2). 
 
Further, Tanzania has been the foremost Sub-Saharan Africa recipient of bilateral aid during 
the 70s and 80s. For the last two decades the foreign assistance has contributed between 50% 
and 70% of the governments development budget (Voipio, T. & Hoebink P. 1999: 22). There 
has also been an important direct involvement of foreign NGOs. By 1986 the ratio of external 
to internal funding of the rural water sector was 80:20  having the donors a corresponding 
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amount of power in programme planning and project design, control of funds and with 
superior access to equipment than the governmental agencies (Huggins 2000). This has 
provoked to make Tanzania an accessible place for experiments in technology and new 
strategies, some donors may also have commercial interests that influence their choice of 
personnel and technology, which may not be ideal for the country (Huggins 2000:15). But, in 
relation to sustainability, the economical and technical dependence on the donors, the lack of 
capacity-building of local social actors, make projects collapse when technical cooperation 
and assistance end. 
 
 
4.2 History of Water Use in Tanzania 
Table 6 (below) details the key water-related events in Tanzanias history from colonial times 
to present day: 
 
Table 6: Key Water-Related Events in Tanzania (from colonial times to present day) 
Years Key Water Events 
 
Reference 
Early 1900s 
 
• Formal water law was introduced to Tanzania by 
German and British colonial settlers in the early 
1900s 
  
Van Koppen, Barbara 
et al (2004):4 
1923 
 
• Vesting of centralized legal control over water in 
the colonial minority rulers 
 
Van Koppen, Barbara 
et al (2004):4 
1945 
 
1948 
 
• Department of Water Development was formed.  
 
• Water Ordinance Act  recognized earlier 
traditional rights under the Indian Limitation act. 
Included was a mandate to prescribe fees payable in 
respect of any application. 
 
Kashaigili, J. Japhet 
(2002) 
Van Koppen, Barbara 
et al (2004):6 
1959 
 
• Water Ordinance - Fees payable in respect of any 
application. Minister appoints national water 
officer. 
 
Van Koppen, Barbara 
et al (2004):5 
 
1961 
 
 
1967 
 
1969 
• Independence from colonialism to socialist 
government. Permits, titles, or rights issued by the 
governmental water authority of the era. 
 
• Arusha Declaration  free water era.  
 
• Rural inhabitants were no longer required to pay for 
water. 
Van Koppen, Barbara 
et al (2004):4 
 
 
Sokile S. Charles et al 
(2005), 28-4 
Van Koppen, Barbara 
et al (2004):1 
 
1970 
 
• Government proclaimed 20 year rural water supply 
program. 
Van Koppen, Barbara 
et al (2004):4 
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1974 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Licenses, fees and titles revised. 
• Water officers have the formal power to curtail 
excessive water abstractions by titleholders and 
manage water scarcity situations. 
• WUAs created 
• Water Ordinance  ignored any existence of 
customary water law, but also stipulated that 
registration for a right was the only way for any 
Tanzanian to receive a water right.  
 
 
 
Van Koppen, Barbara 
et al (2004):6 
 
 
Maganga, P. Faustin et 
al (2001) 
 
1980s  
 
1981 
 
• Government adopted UN goals for water decade. 
 
• Water Utilization Act introduced the idea of basin 
management instead of regional management 
concepts 
 
 
(Kashaigili et al, 
2002:2) 
1990s 
 
 
1991 
 
 
 
1993 
 
1994 
 
 
Mid 90s 
 
 
 
1995-96 
• Water Policies and legal frameworks changed 
dramatically, intensifying the pressure to impose 
one formal blanket system on all Tanzanian water 
users  
 
• Pangani Basin water office opens supported by 
NORAD (Norwegian Agency).  
• New National policy implemented 
 
 
• Rufiji Basin water office opens 
 
 
• Subsidiary Legislation under section 38(2) Water 
Utilization Act. Flat fee for water users introduced 
but not applied. 
 
• Comprehensive review of Tanzanias water 
resources policies and institutions was carried out 
by the GoT and World Bank. 
Mid 90s unprecedented form of water rights and 
fees in the Rufiji and Pangani basins 
 
• Rapid water resource assessments commencing 
• Recognized that the water system was failing and 
user fee system was inadequate. 
• World Bank RBMSIIP pilot project  impact two 
objectives of the project in the text.  
 
Van Koppen, Barbara 
et al (2004):6 
 
 
Van Koppen, Barbara 
et al (2004):6 
 
 
 
 
Sokile S. Charles et al 
(2005), 28-2 
 
Sokile S. Charles et al 
(2005), 28-2 
 
 
 
Sokile S. Charles et al 
(2005), 28-2-5 
 
 
 
 
Sokile S. Charles et al 
(2005), 28-5 
2002 
 
2004 
 
 
• National water policy revised 
 
• National water sector development strategy 
(awaiting cabinet approval) 
 
 
State intervention in the Tanzanian water sector began around 1930, when the government 
started to use public money to build water schemes, but it was not until 1964, when the 
government moved towards socialist policies which pledged to prioritize basic needs and to 
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encourage equitable development, especially in rural areas, and making the water sector an 
important priority. 
Tanzania is endowed with abundant water sources both surface and groundwater potentials. In 
1970, the Government proclaimed a 20 year Rural Water Supply Programme (1971-1990) 
with the objective of providing safe and clean water to over 90% of the population within an 
easy reach of 400m from their homesteads. For Makule (1998) among the achievements were 
attaining self-sufficiency in water technology and 44% of people living in the rural areas had 
access to safe water supply by 1988.   
 
In both rural and urban areas water supply technologies involve a mixture of pumping, pipe-
lines, gravity and shallow wells. The Rural Water Supply Programme mentioned above 
expected to meet 50% of its rural water needs from ground sources. This led to the 
development of deep, medium and shallow wells in many parts of the country. There are 
however, other parts of the country, which are well endowed with surface sources, where 
water flows by gravity (with built gravity supply schemes). 
 
Nevertheless, in the study Drawers of Water II, where a team of researchers analyzed the 
water situation in many communities in East Africa, comparing it to a similar study in the 
same communities 30 years ago, the results were astonishing: water development do not 
show an improvement in the level of domestic water supply serving Tanzania over the past 30 
years (but population had tripled). There has been a decline in the mean per capita water use 
in piped households. Distances travelled to the water sources have not been reduced as 
anticipated. Unpiped households are using less water per capita and are paying more per unit 
of water collected compared to the piped households. Water supply systems are either 
functioning below installed capacity or, in some cases, not functioning at all (Mujwahuzi 
2002:75).  
 
After Tanzania gained Independence in 1961 the government started contemplating and 
formulating the free water for all policy. This was put in place in 1969 when rural 
inhabitants were no longer required to pay for water they used for domestic purposes and for 
livestock. This policy was consolidated in 1971 and the government was required to have 
provided every rural inhabitant with access to adequate and potable water free of charge by 
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1991. In other words, from that time it was the government's responsibility to develop, 
operate and maintain rural water supply schemes with no cost recovery from the users. The 
end result of this approach was the creation of a no commitment attitude on the part of the 
beneficiaries (Mujwahuzi 2002:16).  
 
In 1980 the government adopted the UN goals for the Water Decade, and mobilised external 
assistance to prepare regional water master plans and facilitate rapid construction of water 
supply schemes. Foreign donors responded favourably, and 12 of the countrys 20 regions 
were assigned to various donors. Little attention was given to the ownership of the systems, 
and local communities looked at the installations as the responsibility of the government. 
During the period 1971-1985 many water schemes were constructed. It soon became evident 
that operation and maintenance of the constructed schemes was a burden to the government. 
Governmental funding was not sufficient to cover operation and maintenance (Maganga et al. 
2001; Mujwahuzi 2001).  
 
By 1991, it became clear that the target of providing every rural dweller easy reach to safe 
water was failing. Once again new strategies had been introduced to adapt to new problems 
that were evolving or had evolved in Tanzania.  It was in 1991 that the New National Water 
Policy was implemented.  Concepts within the plan included the continued strengthening of 
nine river basins in Tanzania as management units (part of the decentralization process) and 
water user fees which were introduced in Tanzania by Government notice in 1994 (Mwaka, 
1999).The free water era was over, with the reintroduction of cost sharing in rural areas and 
full cost recovery in urban areas (Maganga et al, 2001). Maganga et al (2001) notes that 
among the new policies feature were: 
 
• In rural areas, village governments were given the responsibility of running their small 
water supply systems, while the management of larger systems remained the 
responsibility of regional and in some cases national authorities. 
• A limited role was assigned to the private sector, stating that it might be involved in 
the provision of water supply services in areas where the government was unable to do 
so. 
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The three main problems with the supply driven approach was insufficient coverage, high cost 
and poor utilization. 
 
In a water allocation perspective, local authorities considered all installations as the 
responsibility of the government, who did not have the capacity to maintain infrastructure. 
This led to 90% of schemes eventually falling to misuse (Maganga et al, 2001). As a result of 
what was termed Rapid Water Resource Assessments conducted by Danida and the GoT 
(funded by the World Bank), it was proven that current operational criteria needed to be 
addressed. In 1996, the Got and World Bank (in partnership) initiated a pilot project referred 
to as River Basin Management and Smallholder Irrigation Improvement Project (RBMSIIP). 
The objectives of this project were to address strengthening the governments capacity to 
manage water resources within a river basin unit approach and to improve irrigation 
efficiency of selected smallholder traditional irrigation schemes in these basins (World Bank 
2004).   
 
As part of RBMSIIP, there has been legislation and enactment of water laws aimed at 
encouraging private companies to participate in the water sector; a review of the National 
Water Policy built on IWRM; and a new National Water Sector Development Strategy was 
finalized in September 2004 and is awaiting cabinet approval.  
 
4.3 Water Management Symptoms and Problems 
Current symptoms of water management problems in Tanzania include: 
 
• Pollution symptoms: The water supply for urban areas as Dar es Salaam (from the 
Morogoro Mountains) is affected by siltation and chemical pollution associated with 
commercial agriculture (sisal processing) in the headwaters. In addition, there is a 
growing problem of contamination from mercury used in gold mining (Maganga 
2001:6). In the rural sectors, pollution of water sources for domestic use is a serious 
problem, caused by faecal contamination from livestock activity within water 
abstractions. 
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• Sanitation symptoms: The lack of latrines or pit latrines with no proper facilities are 
connected with rivers, streams and wells that are used for household consume as 
drinking water, bathing, etc. and sediments and nutrients caused by soil erosion are the 
most common causes. There are also no proper areas for solid waste disposal, 
increasing the risks for pollution of contamination of water for domestic use. 
 
• Conflict: There are different conflicts between water users and uses at a local level 
(village) and at district and regional level. For example a mixed use of irrigation 
systems. The traditional furrow systems are important sources for domestic supply and 
animals, as well as for irrigation. While the amounts used for livestock and domestic 
use are small, this use has important implications for irrigation efficiency because the 
furrows must be kept flowing to meet a regular demand (Maganga 2001:6). Conflicts 
arising between these users are very common at the local level, especially if 
intervention of rehabilitated or new construction of irrigation systems take place 
without taking into consideration the pastoralists and their needs for infrastructure for 
their livestock. 
 
On a more regional level, conflicts between users as farmers/irrigators and 
hydropower stations have also incremented, due to the lack of access to enough water 
flow needed to the optimal operation of the Mtera and Kidatu hydropower stations. 
 
• Issues of availability: A mundane daily reality for many women and children is that 
they have to use a large part of their day to collect water. (Need stat on the time it 
takes for women and children to collect water). One recent study led by the Tanzanian 
government found that school aged children living within 15 minutes of their drinking 
water source were 12% more likely to be attending school than children living over 
one hour from their drinking water source (Ministry of Water & Livestock 
Development et al, 2002). While the report gives no indication that the actual distance 
to the school would be of relevance, the fact remains that if children and women are 
spending a portion of their daily lives collecting water, it leaves them less time to 
carry out other activities such as play, school and work. 
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Tanzania is typical of many developing countries in Africa and Asia where the above 
symptoms are increasing in magnitude due to: 
• Population increases: The countrys rapidly growing population and the subsequent 
demands that the population place on the environment (e.g. agriculture, 
industrialisation, domestic use, power production, waste absorption).  
• Periodic Droughts: Population growth also exacerbates the effects of the periodic 
droughts that seem to have been increasing in recent years. The net result that there is 
even less available water to go around even more people.  
• Cultural norms and traditions: People continue to use water resources and behave 
in the way that they have always done. For example, upstream farmers take whatever 
water they need, without regard for villages further downstream. And in some villages 
there is a long tradition of relieving oneself in the bush, and using a common pit 
latrine is considered a cultural taboo.  
 
Solutions are not simple. For example, it might be tempting to view a reduction in population 
growth as the answer to the countrys water problems. But this would be a mistake. While that 
might be desirable in terms of the current water resource problems, it would fail to address the 
need for water for development, with all the increased industrialisation, more intensive 
agriculture, greater energy demands, and improved living conditions we would expect such a 
scenario to entail. If Tanzania continues to develop other exacerbating factors such as 
agricultural demand might come into play.  
 
From our reading, our interviews and our field observations we have identified a plethora of 
management problems negatively affecting water resource management in Tanzania (an 
indication of which IWRM area/s they could be applied to are in parentheses). They include 
problems of; maintenance and operation (governance); scale of management (integrated 
planning); lack of resources (economics); poor communication (governance and integrated 
planning); a potential for corruption (governance); lack of data and inadequate data use 
(governance); water rights issues (governance and economics); insufficient government 
department collaboration (governance and integrated planning); and poor social organization 
(governance); lack of education and understanding (integrated planning and governance). As 
we detailed in our description of the history of water management in Tanzania, there have 
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been numerous efforts to address these problems since colonial times. The RBMSIIP is the 
latest attempt to find suitable solutions.  
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Chapter 5: Rufiji Basin Description & Case Analysis 
The purpose of this chapter is to introduce both the case study area and the IWRM project we 
have analysed. The chapter is divided into seven separate sections: 
 
1. The Case Study Area: An introduction to the study area in order to set the scene 
2. Analysis Method: How we chose to analyse the project and present our findings. 
3. Introduction to the Case: The River Basin Management Smallholder Irrigation 
Scheme Project (RBMSIIP) 
4. Rationale: The opinions driving the need for the RBMSIIP 
5. Strategy: The way RBMSIIP was implemented 
6. Actions & Outcomes: What was achieved as part of RMBSIIP  
7. Externalities: Key factors outside the influence of RBMSIIP that can be expected to 
have an impact 
 
Where appropriate, key points for later consideration will be highlighted. We have chosen this 
method for purposes of presentation. In the following chapter the key points will be used in a 
discussion of the impacts of the project. This discussion will in turn provide the basis for our 
conclusions. 
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5.1 The Case Study Area: Rufiji River Basin 
This chapter will describe the social and natural environment of the Rufiji River Basin (Figure 
3), where different factors such as ecosystems, climate, hydrology, and ethnic groups interact 
with each other, but also public policies and political processes and changes have had effects 
in this interaction and have conformed the actual situation and landscape of the Basin and 
specifically have shaped the management of water.  
 
 The Rufiji basin covers an area of about 177,420 km2, and drains the Southern 
Highlands into the Indian Ocean. Various water uses co-exist in the basin, including 
domestic and livestock water supply; irrigation (mainly in the Great Ruaha and Kilombero 
valleys); hydro-power generation; fishing and wildlife water supply; and transport. The 
Rufiji Basin comprises four major rivers: The Great Ruaha, Kilombero, Luwengu and 
Rufiji. Several studies have highlighted water resource problems facing the Rufiji basin 
(e.g. Baur et al 2000; World Bank, 1997; and GoT 1995c). Within the basin, water 
scarcity is acute in the Great Ruaha basin, and this has resulted in very low water levels at 
Mtera Reservoir, the main regulatory structure on the Rufiji River. Since 1988, when the 
Mtera Dam was commissioned, water levels have been declining and have not recovered. 
Low water levels have had negative impacts on hydropower generation, resulting in load 
shedding and rationing of electricity nationwide. According to GoT (1995c), a number of 
factors caused low water levels at Mtera, including drought, increased upstream 
abstractions for irrigation, and poor operation of the Mtera reservoir (Maganga 2001: 3).  
 
The greatest water use occurs in the Great Ruaha River sub-basin, which covers an area of 
about 68,000 km2 (Maganga 2001; GoT 1995:2.1) and has a population of 870,000 people 
with an average growth rate of 2.5% (GoT 1995: 1.7). The Basin gained national importance 
as a water resource when Kidatu Dam and hydropower station were open in 1975 and 
subsequently the Mtera Dam (1980) and hydropower station (1988) opened. Both hydropower 
plants are relying on the water from the Great Ruaha River Basin and together the two plants 
provide 85% of the power to the national grid. At the same time the Great Ruaha is the basin 
in Tanzania with the second highest potential for irrigation and includes approximately 20% 
of the area presently under irrigation in the country (GoT 1995:1.6). 
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The Rufiji Basin lies within 9 regions including Iringa, Mbeya, Dodoma, Singida, Pwani, 
Ruvuma, Lindi and Morogoro regions (see appendix 2). The basin is drained mainly by the 
Great Ruaha River and its two tributaries, the Kisigo and Little Ruaha rivers. There is also the 
Ruaha National Park, which is the second largest in the country. 
 
Two distinct landscapes exist in this basin. In the north-western and central lowlands are dry 
and flat plains, characterised by a large number of seasonal and few permanent swamps. The 
plains are to the south east, south and west surrounded by rolling to dissected Upper 
Plateaus, which form part of the Southern Highlands (GoT 1995: 2.3). 
 
The annual mean temperature varies from about 18oC at the higher altitudes to about 28oC at 
the lower and drier part of the basin. The rainfall regime in the basin is unimodal type with a 
single rainy season from November through May and hardly any rainfall during the rest of the 
year. Most of the lower part, comprising the Usangu Plains (south of Ruaha National Park) 
and the Pawaga/Idodi area is semi-arid or semi-arid to sub-humid, whereas the highest part of 
the basin is humid with a sub-humid belt in between. Annual rainfall is lowest, below 700 mm 
on average on the arid plains, growing to 7-1100 mm in the hilly belt, and to above 1600 mm 
in the mountains (GoT 1995:1.7).  
 
There are five perennial rivers and a large number of seasonal streams draining from the high 
catchment. Surface flows, rather than groundwater, are used for domestic and agricultural 
purposes because there is less groundwater and it is more difficult to determine its location. 
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Figure 3: Rufiji River Basin 
 
 
 
 
Source: RUBADA (2004): http://www.rubada.org/pages/basin_hydrology/basinmap.htm 
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Most irrigation is located on the upper parts of the plains and consists of a number of different 
types of farms including large-scale, state-owned farms, traditional smallholder, improved 
smallholder, and smallholder peripheral to the state farms (Lankford & van Koppen 2002:2) 
 
Downstream of the irrigated areas, drainage discharges into smaller streams and swamps 
located towards the tail of alluvial fans. Some streams reach the Ruaha River, the main 
channel supplying the wetland. Beyond the alluvial fans, the plain consists of savannah, 
woodlands and seasonal wetlands, and at the deepest point, a perennial wetland. After leaving 
the wetlands, the Great Ruaha is joined by a number of ephemeral rivers as it flows through 
the Ruaha National Park. Downstream, the Great Ruaha and a number of other rivers 
discharge into the Mtera Reservoir, which also acts as a regulating reservoir for the larger 
Kidatu hydropower scheme further downstream (Lankford & van Koppen 2002:2). 
 
When Mtera is utilizing its full capacity it is releasing 70-90m3/s. The Mtera Reservoir covers 
an area of approximately 600 km2 when the reservoir is at full supply level. Apart from these 
major hydroelectric power stations there are a number of smaller hydroelectric power stations, 
often belonging to missions (GoT 1995:3.12).  
 
5.1.1 Land Use Practice and Social Actors 
 
Indigenous resource tenure: 
In pre-colonial Tanzania, affiliation to certain ethnic group also meant affiliation to a certain 
part of the country. Thus, membership of an ethnic group implied a right to territorial claims 
on accordance with the specific indigenous laws and customs governing the group (GoT 
1995:1.8). 
In the Basin, members of the Sangu and Hehe ethnic groups are therefore the ones who 
according to the native law and custom, have customary rights to land and water in their home 
areas, which cover the Ruaha basin as a whole. This means, that the other groups who have 
moved to the basin are not customarily entitled to such rights, or some have gained these 
rights (after living a long time here) from Hehe and Sangu indigenous authorities, or have 
obtained them through formal legislation or personal arrangements with members of the Hehe 
and Sangu groups (GoT 1995: 1.8). 
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The Ujamaa policy and intervention: 
With Independence in 1961, socialist policies included government control on food marketing 
and with this the Ujamaa (collectivisation), where villages developed into full cooperative 
units with land vested in the village government. Initially relocation to these villages was 
voluntary and uptake slow so enforcement measures were taken (Gillingham 1997:58).  In 
1973 Ujamaa was extended to a process of villagisation in which all rural residents would 
be relocated into nuclear villages with a minimum of 250 households. Each village would 
provide services such as agricultural extension, education and healthcare. All villages were to 
be allocated along main lines of communication (main roads) (Ibid.). 
 
These Ujamaa policies were highly disruptive. Enforced relocation to often-unsuitable sites, 
disrupted production and undermined self-help networks that had existed in pre-Ujamaa 
societies (Foster and Maghimbi in Gillingham 1997). Villages became a mixture of different 
ethnic groups and a heterogenic unit of social organization. 
 
The traditional organizational system as the Chiefdoms and elders of the tribes, which 
allocated access and use of water during pre-colonial and colonial times, were disapproved by 
the new Socialist regime and abolished in 1967 (Gillingham 1997:59). 
 
Today the rural organization, including the Rufiji Basin integrates Regions, Districts, Wards 
and Villages, each of them with different authorities (an outline of the new organization is 
given in the following section). From 1993, Rufiji Basin also established the Rufiji River 
Basin Board and its Water Office for the purpose of coordinating basin-wide water resources 
management issues. Prior to the World Bank project of this study, other institutions were 
somehow overlapping these responsibilities: the Rufiji Basin Development Authority, the 
Principal Water Officer. 
  
Land use patterns: 
Land use patterns are characterised by the presence of the diverse ethnic and social groups, 
which have their own traditions, and knowledge of land and resources use. But also the 
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geographical and climatic factors play an important role on land use possibilities, constraints 
and uses.  
 
Cultivation and irrigation: 
Whereas valley bottom cultivation is very important in the highlands as a supplementary food 
supply with mainly vegetables and grains during the dry season. This traditional system is 
also used as a means to raise some income through cash crops as cabbage, tomatoes and 
onions. Irrigation and valley bottom cultivation are very important for crop production due to 
the large rainfall deficit within most of the basin as well as a long dry season during which 
cultivation is almost impossible in the major part of the basin (GoT 1995: 3.12). Vegetables, 
maize and beans are the most commonly grown crops, with vegetables mostly grown in the 
lowlands and maize and vegetables in the highlands.  
 
New irrigation schemes constructed in the last two decades and since the mid-1990s 
supported by the irrigation project of the World Bank have enhanced the hectares irrigated 
(see following chapter) and as a farmer from Nyamahana stated before the schemes we were 
cultivating sweet potatoes, maize, paddi, beans; now with the schemes we have expanded the 
paddi and maize cultivated areas but also we can cultivate water melons, tomatoes, onions, 
cassava and other fruit and vegetables for selling at the market (See picture 4-7 next 
page)(Faraji Kimario, interview).  
 
Presently 50-75% of the households are practising valley bottom cultivation, with a size per 
household varying from as little as 60m2 to ½ ha. for a farmer, with an average size of 
approximate 0.1 ha. (GoT: 5.3). 
 
Irrigation practice in the Usangu plains within the basin is almost restricted to paddy irrigation 
during the wet season while in the Pawaga/Idodi area is much more diverse. In many areas 
farmers are relying heavily on irrigation as rainfed cultivation is difficult due to the low and 
unreliable rainfall. In Kalenga for example, irrigation is restricted to cultivation of mainly 
maize and vegetables during the dry season, serving as a supplement to the rainfed cultivation 
rather than being the main agricultural activity (GoT: 7.2). Rainfed cultivation is mostly 
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restricted to the wet season and the supplemented with river bottom cultivation during the dry 
season.  
 
In the upper basin where rainfed agriculture and river bottom and wet land cultivation are the 
main activities, livestock keeping has decreased due to ever decreasing availability of 
pastures, even though for the Hehe and Bena people livestock keeping was an important 
activity. To supplement incomes they have brick making, beer brewing and basket work. In 
the lower lying and drier Pawaga/Idodi area the situation is different. Rice cultivation, 
horticulture and livestock keeping are the main economic activities. 
 
      
Picture 4: Papaya Tree           Picture 5: Rice Fields 
 
 
 
      
Picture 6: Banana Trees                                   Picture 7: Maize Cultivation 
 
(Note: All pictures above are within one rehabilitated scheme (Nyamahana) 
 81
Distribution of arable land between various social groups is generally very uneven, and 
landlessness is increasingly becoming a problem for many people. Cultivators vary in their 
ethnical origin. The Hehe are the majority of the population, but Bena, Chaga, Kimario, 
Kinga, Wawanje, Gogos, Nyaakyusya ethnic groups have migrated to the Basin attracted by 
land and water resources and by the availability of wage labour at plantations (GoT 1995; 
interview Faraji Kimario). The Maasai, Warabaig, Wasukuma, Wandengeleko, Wabena, 
Wasungun and Wakinga base their livelihood on a combination of agriculture and livestock. 
Some of them as the pastoralists Maasai and Gogo put emphasis on trans-human pastoralism 
with agriculture as a secondary activity to complement their diet. They migrated to the Basin 
from the northern and arid regions since the 1950s, but in a major number since the 2000s as 
the Basin has a potential for water and land use (Interview Faraji Kimario).  
 
Pastoralism: 
A hot issue in the basin is the increasing number of livestock in the area during the last 30 
years. From 1975 the pastoralists Wasukuma began to in-migrate to the region, later the 
Wagogo as well as the Wataruru. Some settled in existing villages, while others started new 
ones. There are also seasonal movements within the plains depending on the seasonal 
variation in availability of pasture and water. Conflicting interests between agriculturalists 
and keepers of livestock are increasingly causing problems, and pastoralist claim that 
agriculture is expanding at the expense of pastures and that it is becoming increasingly 
difficult for them to get access to land and water (GoT 1995:1.11). 
 
When travelling along the main road to Idodi, one can see the many pastoralists as the Maasai 
grazing their cattle, and in many villages they are an important actor managing the local 
resources and part of the community. Areas where traditional pastoralism is dominant include 
parts of Usangu Plains, the areas around Mlowa, Izazi, and the whole area joining the 
northern shores of the Mtera Reservoir (see picture 8-9 next page). 
 
 
 
 
 82
 
 Picture 8: Masai pastoralists entering Mapogoro village  
 
 
 Picture 9: Masai gathered outside village meeting room 
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Ruaha National Park: 
However, a major part of the basin consist of almost unutilized land and the Ruaha National 
Park covers most of the central part of the basin (GoT 1995:2.5) The main area of fishing 
activity is at the Mtera Reservoir, where a huge number of fishing villages and camps have 
developed after the formation of the reservoir. Further, a number of fishing ponds are to be 
found throughout the basin (GoT 1995:7.13) 
 
The different water resource users are: 
• Rainfed farmers and domestic water users in the high catchment 
• Irrigators on the plains at the base of the escarpments 
• Pastoralists on the highlands, plains and central wetlands 
• Urban domestic water users 
• Domestic water users and rainfed maize cultivators on the plains 
• Fishermen in the central wetlands 
• Women in the different sub-regions and distinct landscapes 
• Wildlife and tourists in the Ruaha National Park that surrounds the riverine reach 
• The Mtera/Kidatu Hydro Electric Power stations of the Tanzania Electricity 
Supply Corporation (TANESCO) (Adapted from Riparwin 2002). 
 
5.1.2 Water Management Institutions 
The water management of the basin before the World Bank project began in 1996 was under 
four main institutions, namely the Central Water Board, the River Basin Water Board and the 
Principal Water Officer, the Regional Water Engineer. The President of Tanzania appointed 
the Central Water Board with a Chairman and the Minister of Water appointed the boards 10-
15 members. The Central Water Board could only formulate and recommend different 
measures to be taken either to control pollution or improve water quality but could not 
implement or enforce the measures (GoT 1995:1.2). 
 
The Water Minister appointed 7-10 members to the River Basin Water Board, with the same 
functions of the Central Water Board but restricted to the area of its jurisdiction (to river 
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basins) as opposed to that of the Central Water Board which dealt with the whole of the 
country. 
 
The Principal Water Officer was responsible for the processing of the application and granting 
of water rights, criss-crossing the roles of the River Basin Water Office that also had authority 
to grant water rights in the basin. 
 
The role of the Basin Water Officer involved the monitoring water resources, abstractions and 
water rights (also issue them), facilitate hydrological research in the basin, quality of the 
water and advise all stakeholders including Ministries on measures to be taken to minimize 
pollution and improve quality; take legal actions against defaulters and assist water users to 
use water property and practice conservation measures (GoT 1995:1.5). 
 
The Regional Water Engineer functions were dealing with control, monitoring and regulating 
water resources in the region, including the development of water supply for domestic use, 
industry and livestock (GoT 1995). 
 
Along with these institutions, in the Rufiji Basin there was also a Rufiji Development 
Authority (RUBADA) which was in charge of promoting development in the Basin, including 
measures of flood control, catchment conservation and to construct, maintain, operate, protect 
manage and control of works for collection, diversion and storage of water in the Basin. 
 
Conflicts of duplication and overlapping of responsibilities among the governmental and 
parasitical organisations where common and many of their roles and responsibilities were 
stated in the different Acts mentioned before and related with resources. 
 
At the local level, the villages had different systems of organizing and solving resource 
allocation problems. In order to manage and solve conflicts for example irrigation schemes 
before the World Bank project in 1996, villages organized themselves in committees at 
different levels, with various types of setups but often were under the leadership of the village 
government  
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(GoT 1995:7.7). Sokile and van Koppen (2003:6) found in the Usangu plains that local 
informal associations related with conflict resolution and managing resources are influential, 
powerful and attractive to the local communities. Some of these organisations that may also 
exist in the rest of the Basin are the following:  
 
• Rotational labour-based groups commonly called Njaanwa 
• Duty-based canal clearing groups called Maendeleo 
• Local committee for organising water rotation and canal clean up, normally made up 
of irrigators at the tail-end or downstream called Kamati ya Maji 
• Clan based groups that dig and manage their own canal (dindilo), referring to 
themselves as Mwana wa pepa 
• Local brewery groups called Kilabu 
 
Along with these institutions, conflicts are often solved at different levels such as one to one 
level, through local elders, canal committee and village leaders and ward level. Women have 
also their own channels of communication and mechanisms to take important part of the 
village decision making process. 
These informal organs and levels have been evolving during a long time and adjusting to the 
changes of time. They are amorphous, temporary and difficult to appreciate by outsiders, but 
daily resource use interactions are widely determined by these interactions. Most of the local 
people feel a strong sense of identity and belongingness and most important is that they are 
able to solve their internal conflicts related to resources (Sokile & van Koppen 2003:6). 
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5.2 Analysis Methods 
In this section we will detail our case study project RBMSIIP and discuss our analysis of its 
impacts. The focus of the discussion will be around the dynamics of how IWRM principles 
are working in practice in the Rufiji Basin. We will begin with a brief outline of how we 
conducted our analysis, taking the different steps of project and policy evaluation, followed 
by a consideration of RBMSIIP in the light of our three IWRM elements (integrated planning, 
governance and economics).  
 
Rein and Rabinovitz (1978) suggest three basic forces or imperatives affecting an 
implementation process: the legal (with its emphasis on statutory intent), the rational-
bureaucratic (with its emphasis on workability, consistency, and organizational maintenance), 
and the consensual (with its emphasis on reaching a modus operandi with major interest 
groups) (in Mazmanian and Sabatier 1989).  
 
Adapting these imperatives to the situation in the Rufiji Basin, we will put emphasis on the 
rational, consensual and organisational setting (governance), the economic principles and 
tools that are guiding this area, the planning and workability of the whole intervention and 
process and finally the legal and statutory intentions and practices on each aspect of the 
interventions in Rufiji.  
 
The implementation of a process, that can be a policy, a programme or a project, usually 
incorporates problems to be addressed, objectives to be pursued and, in a variety of ways 
decisions consolidated in a policy that structures the implementation process (Rein and 
Rabinovitz 1978). The crucial role of implementation analysis is the identification of the 
variables which affect the achievement of objectives (legal, social, economical, etc) 
throughout the entire process. 
 
Therefore we will focus on factors and variables affecting the implementation process of the 
project as a whole, adapted from Mazmanian and Sabatier´s (1989) analysis of policy 
implementation, as this project also involves policy development and implementation. One of 
the major contributions of implementation analysis is its emphasis on the overall theory for 
obtaining desired changes (Mazmanian & Sabatier 1989). The process must be viewed in 
 87
terms of its different stages which we divided as followed: 1. The tractability of the problems 
being addressed and the rationale behind the process. 2. The ability of the project to structure 
the implementation process, including strategy, objectives and activities. 3. The main outputs, 
impacts and external variables and factors affecting the project and it process.  
 
For Mazmanian & Sabatier (1989) the tractability of the problems are not just concerning the 
ones in the project but also a number of social problems which can be easier or more difficult 
to deal with and can affect the project or policy implementation. For example these can range 
from technical difficulties to diversity of proscribed behaviour and target group as well as the 
extent of the behavioural change required. The basic hypothesis is that the greater the amount 
of behavioural change, the more problematic it will be to make a successful implementation. 
In short, some problems are far more tractable than others. 
 
The ability to structure a policy and a project will also depend on clearness of objectives, 
incorporation of adequate causal theory with emphasis on obtaining desired changes, 
allocation of fund, integration and collaboration between implementing institutions and a 
clear relation between strategy, objectives and activities (Mazmanian & Sabatier 1989).  
  
The outputs as Degnbol & Engberg describe refer to the products that immediately result 
from an effort or activity. Examples of outputs could be the delivery of a number of water 
pumps or training activities carried out for a specific number of people. In relation to such 
outputs, impact consists of the changes created as a result of the deliveries and activities. The 
impacts emphasised would depend on the goals (Degnbol & Engberg, 2003:217). As well the 
external variables and factors that are out of the scope and control of the project but have 
influence on the results will be taken into consideration. 
 
We will use the methods and techniques of a conventional project evaluation of the process 
and impact of the RBMSIIP project, aiming to address the whole process from decision-
making, rationale and planning to outcomes and impact analysis, to examine to what extent 
specific inputs and activities achieve the formulated goals. But also, we will analyse the 
effectiveness of the results and their sustainability in order to see if the achieved 
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improvements for the target group are lasting or had the possibilities and potentials to do so 
after the project ended.  
 
Our evaluation of the project will also be based upon: 
• Our fieldtrip observations: What we saw and noted on our visit to three villages in the 
basin, two of which had irrigation schemes funded by the RBMSIIP and one which 
had been unsuccessful scheme applicant.  
• Interviews with key stakeholders: From World Bank and GoT officials in the MWLD 
and MAFS in Dar es Salaam to WUA leaders, Maasai pastoralists and subsistence 
farmers in Iringa District. 
• Literature review: We spent approximately 6 months reading books and internet 
articles on a wide range of issues from resource management theory and World Bank 
Strategy to Tanzanian history and water management approaches.  
• Conferences: We attended two water management conferences. The first was the 
Danish Water Forum in Copenhagen, Denmark. The second was the East African 
Integrated River Basin Management Conference in Morogoro, Tanzania 
• Interviews with academics: We spoke with academics from both the North and the 
South who had opinions ranging from strong support to strong scepticism of the value 
of the RBMSIIP project and IWRM approach.  
• Our personal perceptions: It is important to also note that the perceptions we have 
developed are not only a result of our readings for this project, but who we are as three 
individuals and the cultural baggage we carry.  
 
Of course, any efforts to begin to evaluate a project nearly a year after its completion is a 
challenge. But, the aims of this paper is not an assessment or evaluation of the World Bank 
project per se, but the analysis of the dynamics of water management in the Rufiji Basin and 
the implementation of IWRM and therefore, the RBMSIIP project will help us to look at these 
elements and analyse how they work in practice. By analysing the implementation of the 
RBMSIIP project, problems, assumptions, aims, development strategy, outcomes and impacts 
will reflect concepts and understandings, differentiation in knowledge and power between 
stakeholders, and will clearly take us to the operationalisation and implementation of the 
IWRM principles in the Rufiji Basin.  
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However, our research has been extremely helpful in allowing us to build up a picture of the 
basin and its water resource management challenges before, during and after the RBMSIIP. 
The importance of the Rufiji Basin has meant that it has received more than its fair share of 
attention from the World Bank, GoT, NGOs and academics. Furthermore, while all the 
problems identified in the project have been addressed in some form or another, many of them 
still exist, as will become apparent in what follows.  
 
Please note that the presentation of our analysis has been adapted for better presentation and 
ease of understanding for the reader. In terms of our methodology we systematically analysed 
the stages of RBMSIIP from rationale to impacts. However, to discuss each stage in detail 
would make very tedious reading and would mean a lot of repetition. Furthermore, it would 
mean make the threads of the various key points we were highlighting difficult to follow and 
appreciate. Therefore, when we describe the stages of the project in this paper, we simply 
highlight the key points we want to bring to a later discussion.    
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5.3 The River Basin Management Smallholder Irrigation Scheme Project 
In this chapter we will describe, analyze and evaluate a World Bank funded project, the River 
Basin Management Smallholder Irrigation Scheme Project (RBMSIIP), developed in two 
river basins in Tanzania, the Pangani and Rufiji. This project will be used as a case to analyze 
the situation of water management in only one of the two basins, the Rufiji River Basin, 
which is our area of study. Please note that in some instances we refer to RBMSIIP as the 
project.  
 
We will start describing the background of the project, followed by sub-sections with 
different aspects and components of the project such as rationale, strategy, objectives, 
activities, outcomes and impacts, with an analysis and evaluation of each of them. Further, we 
will integrate these aspects into three main areas of intervention: integrated planning, 
governance and economics, to organize, get the relevant issues for our study and for the 
understanding of the complexity of water management in the Rufiji Basin. 
 
As noted in the Tanzania Water Management section, despite the numerous efforts to address 
water resource management issues, by the early 1990s it was becoming clear that the 
problems were growing in magnitude. In 1995 the World Bank and Danida funded and carried 
out a research project called the Rapid Water Resources Assessment (RWRA). The RWRA 
identified resource availability, use and priority issues in river basins. According to Maganga 
et al. (2001), in this assessment it was identified that demand for water was exceeding 
available resources in some basins and that conflicts were seriously growing from local into 
national and even international level. Also the assessment noted the very inefficient water use 
in irrigation systems and deterioration of water resources due to municipal and industrial 
pollution. It was recommended that there was a need of improving water resources 
management in the country starting with the priority basins of Pangani and Rufiji.  
 
Consequently, in December 1996 the Government of Tanzania (GoT) started implementing 
the River Basin Management and Smallholder Irrigation Improvement Project (RBMSIIP). It 
was an IWRM inspired project that was funded by the World Bank. 
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The project began in 1996 and was closed in June 2004, following two extensions (one of one 
year and one of 6 months), and the final report was presented in December 2004. The 
implementing agency was the Government of Tanzania, through the Ministry of Agriculture 
and Food Security and the Ministry of Water & Livestock Development. 
 
The stated objectives of the project were to: - Strengthen the Governments capacity to 
manage water resources and address water-related environment concerns at the national level, 
and in the Rufiji and Pangani River Basins; and to improve irrigation efficiency of selected 
smallholder traditional irrigation schemes in these basins (World Bank 2004). The project 
sought to achieve this through a stronger institutional, regulatory and incentive framework for 
basin management and enhanced stakeholder participation and irrigation scheme operation. 
There were two main components: 
- River basin management 
- Smallholder irrigation improvement. 
 
The project was one of the first efforts to translate the Banks 1993 Water Resources 
Management Policy into practice in Africa. The policy signified a new paradigm for the Bank 
for a more comprehensive approach to IWRM, multiple uses and users rather than specific 
sectoral activity. It was also the first International Development Association (IDA) investment 
in smallholder irrigation in Tanzania (World Bank 2004). 
 
The projects timing and design addressed the Governments priorities, as it was prepared 
during a time of heightened national interest in available water resources. Conflicts 
surrounding Usangu and the Great Ruaha River, load shedding following the drying up of 
hydropower reservoirs in 1994 (85% of Tanzanias electricity came from hydropower) had 
raised several queries. The 1991 Water Policy addressed mainly supply issues, and did not 
deal comprehensively with cross-sectoral linkages, allocation, participation aspects, etc. while 
RBMSIIP responded well to these priorities (World Bank 2004). 
 
For the World Bank, the RBMSIIP project responded to the identification of the river basins 
priorities action and therefore Pangani and Rufiji were elected for the project having the most 
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acute conflicts related to intersectoral water allocation between agriculture, environment and 
hydropower. The principal economic users of water in the two basins are hydropower and 
irrigation, and practically all hydropower-generating capacity in the country was in the Rufiji 
and Pangani basins, with hydropower located downstream of irrigated areas. RBMSIIP aims 
were to capture the opportunity for substantial economic gains, to both hydropower and 
smallholders, from enhanced upstream water management and irrigation infrastructure, 
together with the assumption that potential increasing in crop productivity also provided 
strong incentives for farmers to buy into the idea of water savings (as the World Bank also 
assume that farmers/traditional irrigation systems spill water). 
  
This project was a challenge in many aspects for the World Bank and for the Tanzanian 
authorities, as many new approaches were integrated and experimented within the time 
frame of the project such as: 
• River basins as a unit of planning  
• The identification of the Rufiji and Pangani basins as the most conflictive due to 
sectoral disputes and increasing demand  
• The coordination of administrative bodies  
• The opportunity to establish a framework for IWRM, institutional reforms and 
forming a platform for stakeholder water involvement. 
• The introduction of water user fees for all members of the Basins 
• The rewriting of the National Water Policy 
• The review and rewriting of water related laws 
 
These challenges can be integrated in three main approaches and areas of intervention: 
integrated planning, governance and economics, which we will be using to analyse the 
situation of water management in Rufiji through the RBMSIIP project. The criteria and thread 
behind the project were the following: 
 
Integrated Planning: 
The relationship between the above approaches and IWRM is quite clear. The river basin is 
understood to be the optimal planning unit. While the idea of the MWLD in managing a river 
basin was certainly nothing new, the idea of trying to integrate and plan for all the activities 
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within that basin that had an impact on water was. Most importantly the two basins selected 
for attention were the most important from a development point of view due to food 
production and power supply.  
 
Governance:  
There was a desire to address governance issues through the reformation of existing power 
structures. An important barrier to institutional reform and integrated planning is the 
fragmented and lack of collaboration between governmental institutions and their criss-
crossing roles. A main issue is to strengthen river basins authorities that should be able to 
plan, monitor and manage these units. Within this governance element we find notions of 
stakeholder participation (for the weakest members of the communities, including women), 
and the devolution of power through a more decentralized form of governance. Further, the 
idea here is to empower local communities, while reducing the likelihood for corruption and 
mismanagement.   
 
Economics:  
The introduction of water user fees to all members of the community is seen as means to limit 
resource use, and thereby encourage conservation. The notion is that this is a sustainable way 
for Tanzania to move from supply-driven to a self-financing, demand-driven water supply. 
Behind this also lies the hope that if water management in general can become self-financing, 
Tanzania will be able to break the cycle of donor-dependency in terms of water sector 
funding. The issue of irrigation efficiency is also considered in this area, in terms of the 
creation of incentives and technology for the farmers to avoid the loses of water, have a 
better control over the use and the flow, and get more crop per drop, increasing by this way 
food production and income generation for the farmers. 
 
In the following chapter, we will analyse each of these three areas described above, including 
aspects of regulation, as this is seen as a means to formalize and give power and meaning to 
initiatives relating to integrated water planning, governance and economics. Regulation 
covers both formal and informal laws and rules. As Gillingham (1997) noted regulations 
prescribes methods or procedures for solving a problem, allowing some actions while 
disallowing others, but these may or may not reflect formal rules.  
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5.4 Rationale of the Project 
In this section we will describe the rationale of the project including the assumptions and 
problems related with water management, which in turn provide the framework for the design 
of the project. 
 
According to the World Bank Staff Appraisal Report (1996), Water resource management 
has become an issue of national importance. It is only in recent years, with the rapid increase 
in the demand for water for hydropower production and irrigation that followed the 
liberalization of economic activity, that water has become scarce in select river basins. The 
conflict in the demand for water can only be resolved through more transparent, structured 
allocation and control mechanisms for basin water resources. The ability of the Water Officer 
to manage water resources in the Rufiji Basin is severely constrained by:  
• The lack of information on the quantity of surface (and ground) water available (the 
hydrological and meteorological networks are in severe disrepair);  
• The lack of systematic monitoring of water quality (the sampling and analysis systems 
are in poor shape);  
• The lack of water control structures on many smallholder irrigation schemes;  
• The lack of funding for the operations of the regulatory agencies; 
• The low level of the "economic water user fees" and the inadequacy of penalties for 
pollution and overuse, in the Water Utilization (Control and Regulation) Act of 1974 
(and Amendments). Environmental and water quality considerations in the 
management of these two key river basins receive minimal attention. Irrigators, 
environmental concerns, livestock herders and other stakeholders have no voice in the 
management of river basin resources (World Bank 1996:12-14). 
 
The rationale of the project took into account important issues in the Rufiji Basin that are 
detailed below, and assumed issues to solve them by integrating governance, management, 
environment, economics and supporting regulation.  
 
There was a conflict in water use between upstream irrigators and downstream hydropower 
generation plant at Mtera due to a fundamental lack of communication and planning between 
the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Energy and the Ministry of Water. Another issue 
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was the overlapping roles of institutions dealing with water related aspects with conflicting 
objectives and power problems due to competing access to limited resources. At the local 
level, participation in decision-making was also a weak start point for reforms and 
management and therefore the need for reforms in the institutional setting and a more broad 
participation of all stakeholders.  
 
There was a stated need for economic incentives and a more efficient system that could both 
fund the water governance structure and control the water use, abuse and inefficiency. The 
rationale was basically giving water a monetary value, so people would be more aware of the 
use of water, monitor and conserve it. Further, management was constrained because fees and 
penalties were inadequate. Moreover, the World Bank and GoTs assumption that local 
irrigation schemes loose water and are not efficient, gave the basis to include the need for 
water control structures and rehabilitate small irrigation schemes that could help farmers to 
increase food security and income generation. 
 
 
Key Points: 
• Integrated Planning: The rationale of the project identified two main problems 
to be solved, the increasing water demand for irrigation and hydropower 
production, and the need of integration of all stakeholders. 
• Governance: There was a lack of regulatory capacity  
• Economics: Fees and penalties were considered inadequate, as they did not serve 
to regulate use or cover the operational costs of the regulatory agencies. 
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5.5 Strategy: Overall Project Objectives & Component Objectives  
The objectives of the project were: (i) to strengthen the Government's capacity to manage 
water resources and address water related environmental concerns both at the national level, 
and in the Rufiji and the Pangani river basins; and (ii) to improve irrigation efficiency of 
select smallholder traditional irrigation schemes in these two basins. In carrying out these 
objectives, the project would improve stakeholder-participation in basin management and 
irrigation scheme operation, and strengthen the institutional, regulatory and incentive 
framework for basin management (World Bank 1996:15).  
 
Under the river basin management component, to be implemented by the MWLD, the project 
would fund interventions designed to improve water management both at a national level, and 
in the two target basins. Activities to be funded include: (i) strengthening national water 
resources management by reforming the regulatory framework to improve stakeholder 
participation in river basin management, strengthen the water rights concepts and 
management, increasing penalties and raising fees for water use; and improving information 
gathering and analytical capabilities at the national level; (ii) improving both the regulatory 
capabilities, and the information and resource monitoring capabilities at the basin offices in 
Rufiji and Pangani; and (iii) rehabilitating the hydrometric network in the Rufiji and Pangani 
basins (World Bank 1996:15). 
 
The second component, the improvement of smallholder irrigation schemes in the Pangani 
and Rufiji Basins would be implemented by MAFS following the priorities established in the 
National Irrigation Development Plan. No new schemes would be established under this 
project, and no virgin areas will be opened to irrigation. In those schemes selected for 
upgrading, the Government would assist in setting up farmer organizations, and would 
provide financing for the improvement of infrastructure to be maintained and operated by 
water-user organizations (World Bank 1996:16). 
 
The strategy of the project was to combine the two components based on capacity building of 
the institutional setting for governing water in the basins and the improvement of water 
efficiency, with the review of the adequate regulations. The rationale behind these elements 
was to get an holistic approach of what the main problems and limitations were for the 
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management of water at a basin level that was reflected in the activities and in general in the 
design of the project. 
 
The idea of integrated planning in the objectives was based on the inclusion of policy and 
legislative framework, strengthening of governmental and basin management institutions and 
the water quality monitoring. Furthermore, the irrigation component aimed to improve some 
schemes while also improving the capacity in the sector, participation in the management and 
mitigation of negative environmental effects. It was recognised that water resources have to 
be managed to meet multiple uses and needs with a holistic view, and planning had to meet 
these aims. 
 
The changes of the institutional framework were mainly concentrated in reforms in 
Governmental (national ministerial), basin and district levels (river basin offices, water 
boards), and somehow at the users level, as the establishment of water user associations. With 
the economic component, the main strategy and objectives of the project were the incentives 
to promote the control, monitor and efficient use of water. And this was through the increase 
of water tariffs and penalties (in the legislation and in practice) for the use of water for urban 
supply, irrigation, hydropower generation and other uses and for issuing licenses for the 
discharge of pollutants, so these fees and pollution were retained within the basin and used to 
support the costs of managing water resources in the basin. 
 
 
 
Key Points: 
• Integrated Planning: MAFS has an overall policy objective of growing more food 
and irrigation efficiency, while MWLD has the objective of trying to conserve water 
in the basin 
• Governance: The regulatory framework was to be thoroughly revised for better 
regulation and stakeholder participation. 
• Economics: Water rights were to be strengthened and fees raised and to be applied to 
all water users 
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5.6 Actions & Outcomes 
In this section we will start by describing the specific actions taken and their outcomes (what 
and how), before considering them under the headings of integrated planning, governance and 
economics. A discussion of the impacts of the project will be left to the following section. 
 
As already noted, the project had 2 related components, RBM (river basin management) and 
SIIP (smallholder irrigation improvement project). Appendix 3a and 3b list the actions and 
outcomes for each component. Important highlights included (World Bank 2004:3-12): 
 
River Basin Management Component: 
• Strengthening of the overall policy framework (figure 4):  
o National Water Policy was reviewed 
o National Water Strategy created 
• A review of the legislative framework: A review of the new water law, the Water 
Resources Management Act, will provide legislative backing for ongoing institutional 
restructuring, re-setting of water use charges and multi-sectoral representation on the 
National and Basin Water Boards as proposed in the new National Water Policy 
(World Bank 2005). It should be noted that the revision of this legislation is still 
ongoing and while new laws have been drafted, they have yet to be passed by the 
Tanzanian Parliament. 
• Strengthening of water management:  
o Revision of the institutional framework (figure 5) 
o Staff training and new equipment 
o Formation of 51 Water User Associations (WUAs) 
o Water user fees were applied (table 7 illustrates the fees): With this provision, 
fees and penalties were to create incentives for conserving water resources and 
abating pollution. Approximately US$51,000 p.a. is collected in water user 
fees. 
 
Smallholder Irrigation Improvement Component:  
• Participatory scheme selection and management 
• Engineering works on schemes (80% GoT funded, 20% WUA funded) 
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• Irrigation sector capacity building: 
o Average rice yields more than doubled 
o Average household income increased from US$340 to US$1100 p.a. in Rufiji 
scheme areas 
 
Figure 4: The Inter-relationship of Tanzanian Water Policy & Strategy with other 
National Policies and Strategies 
 
(GoTa 2004:3) 
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The revision of the Tanzanias national water policy and strategy, as part of RBMSIIP, are 
built upon the desire for national IWRM. The Policy integrates principles of multi-sectoral 
use, treats water as a social, economic and environmental good, recognizes financing of water 
resource management through the application of water user fees, and promotes autonomy at 
the basin level (GoT 2002). 
 
Figure 5: Revised Institutional Framework for Water Resources Management 
 
 (GoTa 2004:17) 
 
 
 
 
 
As part of RBMSIIP institutional management framework was thoroughly revised. Formerly, 
there were three related MWLD departments in charge of water management; the Principal 
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Water Officer (PWO), the Basin Water Office (BWO) and the Water Resources Department. 
The PWO was responsible for authorizing water rights, collecting various fines and water 
charges, as well as carrying out the provisions of the law. In the Rufiji Basin this work was 
designated to the BWO. The organization involved parallel responsibilities and poor resource 
utilization (World Bank 2004:8).  
 
Table 7: Water Users Fees (Controls & Regulations) Act of 1974: Latest prices date 
from 1997  
 
This table illustrates the latest water user fees which were originally introduced in 1994 and revised in 1997.  
 
(Source: van Koppen et al 2004:23) 
 
The main outcomes of this project were the revised national water policy, the coordination 
between stakeholders such as MAFS and MWLD during the project and the strengthened of 
the RBWO to become the main regulatory institution for water management at the basin level. 
As well at the local level the water users through the new associations, the WUAs, became the 
link between the formal and governmental levels and the informal and village levels to control 
and monitor the use and abuse of water, allocations and fee collection. 
 
On the other hand, water rights were reviewed and a minimum flat rate (see table 7 above) 
was applied to users such as smallholder irrigators (domestic and livestock use, small scale 
irrigation, fishing and farming) and higher fees to large scale users. Further, licenses for the 
discharge of pollutants fees were also established. This fee system was to sustain the 
administration of the basin water office, limit water use and promote efficiency. Moreover, 
within the villages with rehabilitated irrigation schemes farmers cultivated more crops and 
had the possibility to increase their incomes (see pictures 10-11 next page before and after 
rehabilitation).
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Picture 10a: Diversion point before rehab.             Picture 10b: Canal before rehab. 
 
 
 
 
      
 
Picture 11a: Diversion point after rehab.                 Picture 11b: Canal after rehab. 
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Key Points: 
• Integrated Planning: The National Water Policy was revised. Coordination between 
some stakeholders. 
• Governance: RBWO was strengthened to be the main regulatory body 
• Governance:  WUAs were formed to coordinate local management and fill the gap 
between formal and informal laws and institutions 
• Economics: Water rights were reviewed and flat rate fees were applied to users 
• Economics: Farmers cultivated more rice and got richer 
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5.6 Externalities Affecting the Project 
In this section we will be describing external factors that are out of the scope and control of 
RBMSIIP, but have had an influence on the results of the project and consequently the 
management of water in the Rufiji Basin. We have chosen not to make an exhaustive list of 
every conceivable externality in favour of concentrating on the most important ones. We have 
also made a decision not to include issues, such as dam construction, that we believe should 
have been addressed in under integrate planning considerations. The factors we would like to 
consider are drought, migration and population increase.   
 
Drought: 
Drought has been prevalent in Tanzania in recent times for example severe droughts were 
recorded in the mid 1970s and early 1990s. But while droughts can be national or 
international in coverage, they can also be regional. For example, as indicated by a WWF 
(2002:27) report, based on local observations, drought has occurred within the area of the 
Rufiji Basin area in at least the last 15-20 years. 
 
The effects of less rainfall are exacerbated by high evaporation rates in the Rufiji Basin. As a 
GoT report described it, Due to generally high yearly potential evaporation rates as 
compared to the yearly rainfall, most of the basin has an annual rainfall deficit. Even the areas 
with a yearly surplus of rain do not ensure a reliable water supply year round, due to the 
uneven rainfall distribution(GoT 1995:3.5). 
 
The obvious consequences of less water being available in circumstances where it was already 
scarce, is greater pressure on the remaining resource in the form of competition between users 
and perhaps greater pollution. Unfortunately, for the purposes of our study, these 
consequences have not been well documented. As we have already noted, there is a great 
challenge in even finding out how much resource is available (water in the river). However, 
what we do know is that drought has had an impact in terms of human movement. 
 
Immigration: 
The national droughts of recent years in more arid northern regions, such as the area around 
Kilimanjaro, has resulted in a migration of people to the comparatively more fertile central 
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and southern part of the country, including the Rufiji Basin. As already mentioned, many 
Maasai, Gogo and Barabaig pastoralists from northern regions are migrating to the Rufiji 
Basin with their cattle and establishing them in existing farming villages or creating new 
ones. In an interview with Mr. Futakamba  (MAFS 1/3/05), he told us, too many people 
have started to migrate to the Rufiji Basin. In some occurrences migrants, most specifically 
from the north, have come with up to 3000-4000 head of cattle. This has served to 
consolidate an important new social actor in the region with needs of resources such as water 
for domestic and livestock use. 
 
These new immigrants put pressure on the available resources and create conflicts when these 
resources are limited or the institutional settings are not established for incorporating them. 
Although the villages with their institutions and local organisations do evolve and develop in 
a daily basis and have the flexibility to arrange mechanisms for conflict resolution and 
resource management, conflicts of scarce and competing resources do worsen with 
immigration. 
 
Therefore, drought combined with immigration to the basin were important external factors to 
RBMSIIP, as new actors were influencing the institutional settings, both formal and informal, 
at the basin level and at the local level. Conflicts with pastoralist immigrants were 
exacerbated and even ended in violent episodes in areas such as the Usangu Plains, and the 
new water user organisations established in the basin had to deal with these new users. In 
terms of resource demand, the negative effects of immigration into the basin are compounded 
by natural population increase. 
 
Population increase: 
The 1988 population census showed that the Great Ruaha Basin, a sub-basin of the Rufiji (and 
an area where water use and users are concentrated), had about 870,000 people with an 
average annual rate growth of 2.5% - including immigrants. It is interesting to compare this 
with the national growth rate of 1.95% (CIA 2005), which is already considered very high.  
 
The most notable increases have been within the more fertile and already populous districts in 
the basin (see table 8 below).  
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Table 8: Population Estimates by Regions in Rufiji Catchment Area 
 
 
(WWF 2002:13, source: GoT, Population Profiles) 
 
The external impact of population growth combined with migration into the basin puts 
obvious extra stress on both the infrastructure and availability of resources for basic needs. 
For example, as mentioned in the Impacts section, the RBWO does not have the capacity to 
manage the basin consistently and effectively. There is evidence of new irrigation canals 
being dug and new areas being cleared for crops.   
 
Summary 
The external factors which were not under the control of the project and that are also 
important issues for the management of the basin are droughts, population growth and 
migration. The effects of each are inter-related. The negative impact of these externalities 
results in additional challenges in terms of planning, governance and fiscal economic controls. 
We believe that these externalities have a direct impact on the sustainability of IWRM-based 
water resource management in the Rufiji Basin, although we are unable to say to what precise 
extent. 
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Chapter 6: Case Impact Discussion 
In this chapter we go into a detailed discussion on all the key points we highlighted from our 
analysis of RBMSIIP. The discussion is based around what we found to be the impacts of 
RBMSIIP. 
 
6.1 Integrated Planning Discussion 
We will begin by revisiting the key points, in terms of integrated planning, that were 
identified in the case study description. These points will then be used to develop our 
discussion.  
 
 
Integrated Planning Key Points: 
1. The rationale of the project identified two main problems to be solved, the increasing 
water demand for irrigation and hydropower production, and the need of integration of 
all stakeholders: Coordination of Stakeholders 
2. MAFS has an overall policy objective of growing more food, while MWLD has the 
objective of trying to conserve water in the basin: Coordination of Objectives 
3. The National Water Policy was revised for coordination purposes: Coordination of 
policies 
 
 
The key points serve to highlight the role of coordination. The coordination of the actions of 
stakeholders based on agreed rules is achieved via integrated planning. The aim of IWRM to 
coordinate and integrate institutions, actions, goals and projects with a holistic approach is 
crucial for the concept. Within basin management the need to integrate water and land 
management is essential. Therefore, the lack of cooperation was perceived as one of the main 
constraints in the basin before the RBMSIIP started; including the lack of knowledge of the 
effect of the human activities on the water resources in the basin; the magnitude of water used 
for various activities - irrigation in particular; and the almost non-existence of cross-sectoral 
collaboration between governmental institutions (GoT 1995:9.13). 
 
Coordination of Stakeholders 
The idea of integrated planning in the objectives was based on the inclusion of areas such as 
policy and legislative framework, strengthening of governmental and basin management 
institutions and the water quality monitoring. Furthermore, the irrigation component aimed to 
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improve some schemes while also improving the capacity in the sector, participation in the 
management and mitigation of negative environmental effects.  
 
The rationale of the project identified two main problems to be solved, the increasing water 
demand for irrigation and hydropower production. Identification of these problems was part 
of the findings of the Rapid Water Resources Assessment report of 1995, which highlighted 
the conflict in water use between upstream irrigators and the downstream hydropower 
generation plant at Mtera. This situation was a source of conflict between TANESCO 
(Ministry of Energy), who run the plant, and the MWLD, who have the responsibility of 
regulating the use of river water. TANESCO felt that MWLD should limit the use of water by 
irrigators - who were being encouraged to grow more crops by the MAFS. Unfortunately, this 
source of conflict does not seem to have been resolved. 
 
Tensions continue to run strong between TANESCO and MWLD, as TANESCO feel that the 
MWLD have continued to fail in their mandate to successfully regulate the flow of water into 
Mtera dam, according to Mr. F. Mpanduji, TANESCO Regional Manager, Iringa (interview 
2/3/05). Mr Mpanduji felt that the conflict continued between the ministries because each one 
feels that they are the main beneficiary to the water source within the basin.  He also stated 
that, TANESCO has no communication with any of the river basin offices within the Rufiji 
basin, and has no clue about either the water policy or any peoples working within the basin.  
 
In return Mr. Kazimoto (MWLD), a Senior Hydrologist at Rufiji RBWO blames the lack of 
water in the dam on TANESCOs hold and release patterns, with downstream users from the 
dam being affected by the hold and release patterns mismanaged for hydroelectric 
generation. Regardless of which ministry is right or wrong, the case serves to illustrate that 
the exclusion of key stakeholders within the basin plays a detrimental role to the success of 
the basin management plan (Kazimoto interview 3/3/05).  
 
This situation arises through a lack of communication and coordination (i.e. integrated 
planning) between the MAFS, TANESCO and MWLD. While MWLD, whose job it is to 
advise and regulate the use of water, lacked the data on which to base management decisions, 
MAFS was possibly well placed to exercise a degree of management over the water used for 
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irrigation, and TANESCO would have had a clear idea about how much water the power plant 
would need and when. This scenario leads us to question the exclusion of other stakeholders 
and the potential impact of their exclusion.  
 
With this in mind, it is important to recognise both that perhaps not everyone with a potential 
interest can be involved in a project of this size, and the simple truth that it can be difficult to 
please all parties. However, we would claim that the planning and implementation of 
RBMSIIP failed to involve many other sector stakeholders within the basin even in a 
consultancy capacity. For example, let us briefly consider some of the other relevant 
ministries:  
 
• Energy and Minerals: This could have been important not only with regard to the 
ongoing conflict over the hydro-electric plant at Mtera already mentioned, but also in 
relation to other proposed power plants and dams on the Rufiji (map1).   
• Community Development: This ministrys vision is to have gender sensitive 
communities with capacity to identify problems and potentials to improve quality of 
life, socially and economically (GoT 2005). In view of the highlighting the importance 
of the gender aspect of participation, this ministrys involvement would have been 
helpful. 
• Land and Human Settlements Development: Part of this ministrys function covers 
land policy, land development and human settlement. In view of migration to the area 
and the increasing size of settlement areas (including farm area), this is an issue of 
small but rapidly increasing importance. 
• Natural Resources & Tourism: Part of the Upper Rufiji flows through the Ruaha 
National Park, the second largest in Tanzania, and certainly one of its most 
spectacular. With tourism being such an important income sector for the community, it 
is significant that this river is subject to seasonal drought that is compounded by 
increasing water use for irrigation further upstream. 
 
The daily work of other ministries is just part of the picture though. Other considerations 
include projects by NGOs and even the World Bank. For example, there was seemingly a lack 
of coordination between RBMSIIP and the World Bank funded Rural Water Supply & 
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Sanitation Project (World Bank 2005a). This US$26 million project was very active in the 
Rufiji Basin at the same time as RBMSIIP, and included activities such as; support for 
equipment and training of district water and sanitation teams to prepare rural water supply 
plans; the appraisal of supply and sanitation projects proposed by communities; support for 
establishing district supply and sanitation funds to finance the construction of new water 
schemes; the rehabilitation and expansion of existing systems; the construction or 
rehabilitation of existing dug or drilled wells, boreholes equipped with hand-pumps or 
powered pumps, spring tapping, piped systems and community sanitation facilities (World 
Bank 2005). (Note: While we could find no evidence of coordination, we cannot prove that no 
coordination took place). 
  
Given the desire within the IWRM approach for more integrated planning across the river 
basin, it would seem that this was not the case for this particular project. We would reflect 
that not only has this lead to missed opportunities, even worse, the delicate balance 
throughout the basin has been negatively affected. Of course, the complications of planning 
and coordination of activities and interests across such a huge area are very apparent, but it 
would seem like some very obvious omissions and errors have been made. However, the fact 
that two key ministries who had previously had a tense relationship had come together, 
formed a good working relationship and achieved many of their objectives must not be lost. 
 
Coordination of Objectives 
One seemingly positive thing to come out of the project was the working relationship between 
MAFS and MWLD. All officials from each ministry that we spoke to commented on this, and 
went on to mention that they thought it was a way they would like to work in the future. They 
have traditionally had frequent conflicts of interests which had not always been constructive.  
 
During the implementation of RBMSIIP there were regular meetings between the two 
ministries and a system for escalation of contentious issues that was well suited to the process 
(Futakamba interview 28/2/05): Cross sectoral initiatives were established in the form of 
Inter-ministerial relationships such as planning groups which encompassed all high level 
officials from ministries, member committees  which encompassed participating ministry 
officers and a facilitators team which includes planners and ministry officers that attend the 
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village and provide information to the selected schemes about issues within areas of water 
efficiency (Futakamba interview 28/2/05). But let us now consider the broad objectives of the 
two ministries. 
 
As already mentioned, the MWLD has the job of regulating the use of water in the Rufiji 
Basin. In the objectives of RBMSIIP it was noted both that there was a lack of knowledge 
concerning the amount of water available for use, and that there was a lack of water control 
structures on smallholder irrigation schemes.  
 
The Ministry of Agriculture & Food Security has an objective to produce as much food as 
possible with the intention of 1) Feeding Tanzania, 2) Providing a surplus for export to help 
finance development. This role involves actively encourages crop cultivation in the Rufiji 
Basin. In fact there are several government owned farms in Mbeya district within the basin. 
Mbeya district is blessed with good soils and access to plenty of water, which makes it perfect 
for growing rice, a staple crop important for feeding the country. Indeed, the support to 
cultivation through irrigation schemes is also an important issue for the farmers as rainfed 
cultivation is unpredictable and the long dry seasons can be overcome with irrigated crops. 
 
So put very bluntly, MAFS has an overall policy objective of growing more food, while 
MWLD has the objective of trying to conserve water in the basin. This potential conflict of 
interest was not highlighted in RBMSIIP, simply because it seems to have been assumed that 
if the two ministries worked together given the conditions of RBMSIIP, there would be some 
kind of regulation and optimisation of water use.  
 
However, evidence pointed out by the SMUWC report (2002) indicates that in parts of the 
Rufiji as much as 30% more water was extracted between 1998-2002 due to increased 
irrigation. The study found that while there are many activities affecting the river including 
livestock, fishing and upstream land degradation, the impact from these is very, very small. 
The report went on to state that, There is no doubt that irrigation, especially during the dry 
season, is the main cause of the river drying up.Unless more water is allowed to pass by the 
irrigated areas and continue downstream, then the river will continue to dry up every year, 
regardless of whatever else is done (SMUWC 2002c:4). Evidently the desire for more 
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crops by MAFS meant more of the water that MWLD was trying to conserve ended up being 
used. These planning objectives are measured based on improved abstraction and 
conveyance efficiency of the irrigation projects rather than increased productivity of water 
(Lankford et al, 2004:4). It seems illogical that RBMSIIP tried to conserve water by basically 
helping farmers use more, but this appears to have been the case. 
 
Coordination of Policies 
Policy and planning in the water sector in Tanzania has traditionally been a disjoined activity, 
without a national picture of water availability and use, and as the World Bank stated 
virtually all work related to water resources management and development has been carried 
out at the regional level. This included for example the formulation of Water Master Plans for 
17 different regions all of which, have been financed and prepared by donor agencies in 
different formats and containing different types of information (World Bank 1996:7).  
 
It is an amazing fact that back in 1994 the RBWO, a government organization responsible for 
granting of water rights in the Rufiji did not know about the National Irrigation Development 
Plan, or the various regional plans (GoT 1995:9.13). Prior to RBMSIIP other ministries had 
also comments on the, need to integrate river basin management and conservation 
programme that will combine conservation of natural resources with provision of basin 
resources requirements of the community, and the National Environmental Policy emphasizes 
the imperative for a horizontal, cross-sectoral and functional division of responsibilities as an 
imperative and as an important policy objective (GoT 1995:9.14). Therefore the coordination 
of GoT policies to provide both a clear overview and direction is essential.  
 
The IWRM principle of unifying and integrating institutions, policies, etc. gives a policy and 
planning tool to this kind of convoluted scenario and context, paving the path to the 
development of a more efficient setting. However, it is a concern for RBWO officers that 
policy and planning continues to be highly sectoral, with land and water resources in the basin 
still being managed separately by different government departments and local institutions 
(Willie Mwaluvanda (9/3/05).  
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The SMUWC study mentioned above also noted that problems of excessive water use for 
irrigation water use coordination relate back to GoT policies in terms of food security and 
efforts to reduce poverty. However, these policies do not fully recognise the links between 
poverty, peoples livelihoods and the environment.understanding and addressing these links 
is key to maintaining peoples livelihoods. (SMUWC 2002c:4). This suggests that there is a 
clear conflict between the policies being put into practice. 
 
 
Discussion Key points: 
• The key problem of the competing demands from irrigators and TANESCO has 
not been addressed. This is due to a lack of communication and coordination 
between MWLD, TANESCO, and MAFS. 
• Other stakeholders and possibly other parallel projects seem to have been excluded 
from the process. 
• Despite working well together, in terms of a harmonious working relationship, 
MAFS and MWLD seem to have conflicting objectives. This has probably helped 
alleviate poverty, but has also served to encourage more water use. 
• The sectoral approach to policy making and planning appears to be continuing. 
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6.2 Governance Discussion 
We will begin by revisiting the key points, in terms of governance, that were identified in the 
case study description. These points will then be used to develop our discussion.  
 
 
Governance Key Points: 
1a. There was a lack of regulatory capacity  
1b. The regulatory framework was to be thoroughly revised for better regulation and 
       stakeholder participation: New Institutional Framework 
2. RBWO was strengthened to be the main regulatory body: RBWO for Basin 
      Regulation 
3. WUAs were formed to coordinate local management and fill the gap between 
formal and informal laws and institutions: WUAs for Local Regulation 
 
 
The World Bank and the GoT had the vision and the strategy to promote equity through a 
more participative and demand-driven approach in water management through the promotion 
and establishment of a framework for decentralisation and good governance but also 
promoting a more equitable access to water resources in order to help tackle poverty and a 
better accountability. 
 
New Institutional Framework 
Figure 2 in the previous chapter illustrates the new institutional framework. The constraint of 
the formal management system in the basin before the project started was that the various 
departments within the MWLD had parallel responsibilities and goals, power conflicts, 
competed for limited resources and suffered too much bureaucracy. This situation led to 
inefficient resource allocation and a lack of coordination between departments (World Bank 
2004). In general, users such as local irrigators, pastoralists, and others were not adequately 
represented in the old system (GoT 1995).  
 
Therefore, the need for a revised institutional framework was an important objective and a 
main activity carried out during the project. A new setup was deemed desirable in order to 
perform core functions such as a) water resources exploration, b) water resources monitoring 
of quantity and quality, c) water allocation, d) pollution control, and other cross-sectoral 
planning activities such as catchment management, basin planning and development. 
Furthermore, a strong institutional setup would be responsible for enforcing the revised water 
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legislation with greater participation as the response to the governance problems. This would 
also ensure that important stakeholders would not get left behind (GoT 2002:26). Probably the 
most important institutions in the new structure were the Rufiji River Basin Water Office 
(RBWO) and the Water Users Associations (WUAs). We believe the attempts to strengthen 
the RBWO and empower the WUAs were positive steps. 
 
RBWO for Basin Regulation  
Previously a constraint of the formal management system in the basins was that the Rufiji 
Basin Water Board had only advisory powers as regards utilization and control, without 
influence e.g. on forestry and agricultural practices.  Moreover, the composition of this Board 
was considered problematic. Of the 11 members of the Rufiji basin board, 8 were civil 
servants, drawn from one category of stakeholder: the government, while users as farmers and 
pastoralists were not adequately represented (GoT 1995). The reorganization and 
strengthening of the RBWO in the Rufiji Basin was a very noteworthy outcome of RBMSIIP. 
Part of this was regulatory power as a result of restructuring. Another part of this was capacity 
building via training and equipment, but also via data availability and monitoring. 
 
Study tours and training courses were the main pillar of capacity building. There were courses 
covering IWRM, project management, monitoring and evaluation, stakeholder analysis, water 
mapping, planning approaches, etc. held in a variety of countries  (Zimbawe, South Africa, 
Denmark, Netherlands, Canada, USA) for some of the staff (World Bank 2004:40). Moreover, 
workshops and meetings at a regional and national level helped the project team and civil 
servants to strengthen their abilities of communicating the goals, objectives, activities, etc. of 
the project to the rest of the stakeholders as villages, and local institutions and by this way 
strengthening the links and collaboration between them (Interview Kazimoto 5/3/05). It is 
certainly difficult to find fault with this exhaustive training approach in terms of the efforts 
involved. However, as Mr. Kazimoto pointed out during our interview, the problem is that 
capacity building efforts are concentrated on educating civil servants, rather than the local 
users and abusers. 
 
Under the legislation of the Water Utilization Act of 1974, amended in 1982, MWLD granted 
water rights for use in domestic, industrial, hydropower, livestock, irrigation, environmental 
and habitat preservation or mining activities. A maximum of 50% of the expected flow of a 
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river at a point can be granted as a right to a person or corporation. In this way, the Rufiji 
RBWO should be in a position to control the rights, know the quantity of water available in 
the basin and it use, monitoring the sum of water rights granted and physical availability 
(World Bank 1996).  
 
This was fine in theory, but the fact that no-one knew how much water was in the river at any 
given time meant the granting and administration of water rights was fundamentally flawed 
(World Bank 1996). This is why RBMSIIP placed so much emphasis on activities such as 
river mapping, monitoring and data collection. But knowing how much resource you have to 
share is only part of the problem. The other major part comes in keeping track of who has 
rights, where these rights apply and how much these rights cover. This is further complicated 
by factors such as the deaths of individuals with rights, and the continuing migration of 
farmers and pastoralists into the basin. Solutions to this problem included: computers (with 
Microsoft Excel) and staff training for list maintenance; vehicles for great RBWO staff 
mobility; flow monitoring stations at strategic points throughout the basin; and the formation 
of Water User Associations.  
 
It is understandable why the RBWO was strengthened and given the mandate to regulate the 
use of water in the basin. Not only are they well placed between the government and the local 
people, when we visited the office and met with the people there we found 12 well qualified 
high-committee people doing their very best to carryout their job. However, a huge stumbling 
block is the size of their task in relation to the resources they have. In other words, they have a 
capacity problem. 
 
To begin with just 12 people have to monitor flow levels and water quality, collect data, user 
registration, collect and administer fees, educate people, enforce regulation, resolve conflicts, 
as well as a host of other tasks, in an area over 177,000km2 with over 1 million users (many 
not connected to roads) covering uses such as power generation, farming, fishing, domestic 
needs, and industry. Added on to this burden are ecological considerations such as the general 
health of the river and the wellbeing of the wild animals that depend on it.  
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On our visit we found that the RBWO (see picture 12 below) had the capacity to visit 
irrigation schemes maybe once or twice a year to collect data at the main canal, then would 
base water rights, water fees and calculate annual water usage based on this limited data. We 
also found broken flow measuring equipment, photocopiers and plotting machines, with no 
money available for repairs. In terms of communication letters are the typical method, and if 
emails need to be sent or collected, someone must drive to an internet café in a nearby town.  
 
Van Koppen et al (2004: 13) refer to a study in 2003 which estimated that there were 573 
unregistered users in the Rufiji basin, which were more than half the registered users. 
Furthermore they noted that information about sites was only documented by mentioning the 
names of the larger streams and nearby villages and wards. There are no detailed maps or map 
references to provide more information. This lack of clarity has aggravated rather than solved 
water disputes in the area. Even maintaining the lists once they are made is problematic, as 
the cost of maintaining them out way the benefits (van Koppen et al 2004:14).  
 
Picture 12: Rufiji River Basin Water Office 
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WUAs for Local Regulation 
WUAs function at the village level, and are meant to be at the heart of local water resource 
management forming the link between formal and informal institutions and laws. It is the 
WUA committees role; to organize and regulate village water distribution; to oversee major 
repairs to canals or additional water carrying structures; to liaise with the catchment water 
committees and the RBWO; and to apply for and hold Water User Rights (an agreement 
which permits them access and use of a certain amount of river water). In relation to the later, 
they also have the responsibility of collecting water user fees from everyone in the village. 
The idea is for these groups to be formed on a demand driven basis. In the Rufiji Basin, there 
have been efforts to set up an apex WUA to provide some kind of district level 
understanding and collaboration between local people. 
 
Behind the concept of the WUAs is the desire of the World Bank to promote decentralised 
governance in the hope that empowering local actors who are in the front line of resource use 
and abuse will encourage responsible regulation and fiscal management. WUAs are also the 
embodiment of IWRM notions of participation at the lowest appropriate level and the 
inclusion of women in power structures. Associations are open to all members of the 
community and the committees are strongly encouraged to contain an even distribution of 
men and women. 
 
The benefit of WUAs for the RBWO is that they provide a single point of contact for a large 
number of people who are interested in having rights to water. Instead of issuing water rights 
for 40 farmers, they can issue one water right to a WUA, thereby making administration much 
easier  especially in relation to resource control and water user fee collection. 
 
While the WUAs are meant to be the link between the informal and formal institutions and 
laws, this can be difficult in some circumstances. In our analysis we found that the WUA does 
represent the local permanent population within the villages and is able to resolve internal 
conflicts, but does not represent pastoralists, such as the Maasai. This has led to conflict 
within some villages in the basin due to the fact that crops are damaged or destroyed when 
cattle try to access the water that the villagers pay for, but the Maasai do not. The formal 
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system fails to include all water users. Due to the typically migratory life of many 
pastoralists it was difficult to include them in the project process (Kazimoto interview 
3/3/05). But even when pastoralists have settled in villages there can be problems. 
 
In the Mapogoro scheme we visited (see picture 13 below), where there is a high 
concentration of settled Maasai, the local WUA tries to charge the Maasai for water use but 
generally they do not pay. As a result the village WUA tries to fine them, but again they do 
not pay. The reason for not paying is because they do not appreciate the economic value of 
water in the sense that the WUA and RBWO would like them to. The reason behind this is the 
Maasais cultural attitude towards money. Maasai are traditionally not heavily involved in the 
money-based economy. Instead they have lifestyle that is based around cattle, which they use 
for trading and sustenance. Mr. Kazimoto of the RBWO told us that user fees and fines are 
the best tool for water management, and while the principle may be generally true, clearly it 
is not the case in all circumstances.  
 
As for attempted solutions to this problem within Mapogoro, some of the villagers would like 
to build a pond where the Maasai members of their community could water their cattle. This 
has been tried in a neighbouring scheme but the results have been inconclusive and the 
villagers seemed not to be in agreement about what to do (Mapogoro villagers interview 
3/3/05). 
 
Picture 13: Mapogoro WUA with pastoralists sitting in  right corner. 
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Part of the goal for the empowered local governance was the inclusion of women in the WUA 
committees. According to World Bank figures the ratio of men to women involved in the 
committees was 65:35 in the Rufiji Basin, this indicates that there is an attempt at gender 
balancing and mainstreaming of women into the management and leadership of the 
organizations (World Bank 2004:11). When we visited the Nyamahana WUA we were told 
that there were actually eight men and seven women in the committee. However, we were told 
that this had been mainly to satisfy the project demands and that in reality the women were 
not active leaders (Kemario & Gwivaha 3/3/05).  
 
When we met with Mr Saidi a senior manager in the Ministry of Water in Dar es Salaam, he 
told us of the how the inclusion of women had been quite difficult for many communities to 
accept culturally, as traditionally men were the leaders. In fact in the new National Water 
Policy there are no specific targets for the inclusion of women in local water management 
structures. After much discussion the proposed figure was deleted from the final report. Most 
of the WUA committee members were typically the traditional village leaders (after Saidi 
interview 1/3/05). Indeed, this was what we found the situation to be in Nyamahana. 
 
 
Discussion Key Points:  
• The new framework seeks to improve governance coordination and stakeholder 
participation. The two most important institutions in terms of Rufiji Basin are the 
RBWO and the WUAs. 
• The RBWO has been strengthened in terms of capacity, but still seems challenged 
in regulating the basin. 
• The WUAs appear to have been successful in managing localized (village) water 
use and abuse, but lack the capacity to deal with conflicts with resident and 
transhumant pastoralists. Women seem included only superficially. 
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6.3 Economics Discussion 
We will begin by revisiting the key points, in terms of economics, that were identified in the 
case study description. These points will then be used to develop our discussion.  
 
 
Economics Key Points: 
1. Fees and penalties were considered inadequate, as they did not serve to 
regulate use or cover the operational costs of the regulatory agencies: Former 
Fees Inadequate 
2.   Water rights were reviewed and flat rate fees were applied to users: New 
Water Fees for All 
3.    Farmers cultivated more rice and got richer: More water = More Crops = 
More Money = More Water 
 
 
The efficiency aim and vision of IWRM is to ensure that scarce water is used efficiently and 
for the greatest benefit of the majority of people. This has been operationalised through 
specific economic strategy and activities related with mechanisms such as cost-recovery, 
water user fees, establishing water monitoring systems of quality and quantity, rehabilitation 
of irrigation schemes. Efficiency has both impacted positively and negatively in many ways in 
the Basin as we will analyse below, creating by this way outcomes and impacts not expected 
by the planners. 
 
Former Fees Inadequate 
Previous attempts at water user fees had not been so successful. As part of the 1994 National 
Irrigation Development Plan, a set of economic water users fees were included. But neither 
the basin level economic users fees nor the charges for delivery of water covered the true 
cost of the resource. This caused two types of problems. Firstly, in both the water supply 
sector, as well as in the irrigation, insufficient revenues were generated to cover operation and 
maintenance costs (World Bank 1996). Secondly, the low tariffs did little to discourage 
inefficient use by industries, domestic consumers and irrigators. As a result, much of the 
urban population in Tanzania was undersupplied and in the rural areas, like Rufiji, wastage 
levels were very high in irrigation schemes, especially small scale traditional schemes. This 
was something to be avoided in RBMSIIP. 
 
 122
RBMSIIP was the Tanzanian pilot for the IWRM related approach whereby all water users 
would be charged, and charges would include instruments such as pollution penalties. With 
this provision, it was believed that fees and penalties would create incentives for conserving 
water resources and abating pollution. (The idea is included in the new National Water Policy 
of 2002.) According to IWRM and RBMSIIP, charges should reflect the true economic cost 
of water resource use and recovery management, which in turn creates economically 
sustainable management (World Bank 1996). 
 
New Water Fees for All 
In Rufiji charges (as noted in table 7 in the last chapter) were introduced for use of water 
included urban supply, irrigation and hydropower generation. There was also to be a charge 
for issuing licenses for the discharge of pollutants. The income from these water use levies 
and pollution discharge licenses is retained within the basins and is used to support the 
administration of basin water offices, including the collection of information on water quality, 
the enforcement of pollution standards, and the administration and monitoring of water rights 
(World Bank 2005:61). Charges to cover the cost of water used in irrigation schemes are 
collected by WUAs. The WUAs pay the water user fee to the RBWO, with whatever remains 
being used to cover scheme operation and maintenance costs  or vice versa in some 
instances. 
 
As van Koppen et al (2004) note, The main difference with the list of tariffs of 1997 
[compared to 1994] was that for small uses below 3.7L/s, charges were not volume based 
anymore. Instead, a flat rate of US$35 per year was applied (...) The motive for this decision 
was, again, the aim to have one uniform legal system for all. The majority of water users in 
Tanzania fell under this category and one cannot exempt a majority from taxation (senior 
water manager, personal communication). A flat rate would increase tax collected and avoid 
the hassle for Water Officers of setting rates for lower amounts than the flat minimum rate  
but at the expense of small users who now have to pay disproportionate amounts.    
 
Van Koppen et al (2004: 14) state that the introduction and application of water user fees in 
Rufiji Basin has lead to corruption by design. This is evident in at least four ways: in arbitrary 
rate setting, weak enforcement, lack of accountability in handling of public funds, and 
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distortion in collective water rights and payments. Furthermore, fee collection actually ends 
up as a loss making activity.  
 
       Rate setting: 
On face value, volume based charging seems to be objective and fair. However, in the 
absence of hard data to assess the volumes allocated and used, the RBWO can only rely on 
subjective judgements. For example, we found that in areas where collection of fees was 
feasible, Water Officers would measure flow rates once or twice a year (in the dry and wet 
seasons), and then estimate a fee for the village based on this reading. A great deal depends 
upon the setting of the gate on the main intake canal on the day of the visit. Van Koppen et al 
(2004: 14) noted that there was confusion and complaints about the amounts to be paid.  
Furthermore, a US$35 per annum flat rate might be a fair amount for some larger villagers 
with one water right, but the smallest users are hit hardest. A number of MWLD employees 
told us it was very common for people to run away and hide when they saw the Water 
Officers coming to collect fees (e.g. Saidi, Kazimoto interviews). This leads to the problem of 
enforcement. 
 
       Weak enforcement: 
Many people we met acknowledged it was difficult to turn up and collect a tax when people 
could perceive no special benefits from paying the tax (Saidi, Kazimoto, Sokile interviews). 
As noted earlier under Governance the limited number of field staff for the area means that 
enforcement is in many cases impossible, especially when the cost of time and transport for 
repeat visits is considered. There are few sluice gates or water control structures for the 
RBWO to close to punish non-payers, and even if these could be locked, villagers would 
simply break the locks when the Water Officers had left. Even where there are controls, 
payment can be difficult to extract from users. For example, van Koppen et al (2004: 15) note 
that on the state owned farms in the basin where the Water Officers close gates, the arrears in 
payment are amongst the highest. 
 
       Lack of accountability: 
Van Koppen et al (2004: 15) also complain that there is a lack of accountability of Water 
Officers who collect fees. Not only are the methods for registering payments very weak 
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(payments are not matched to users on a user fee ledger), the auditor who is meant to check 
the various amounts is more interested in auditing the publicly allocated funding from the 
government. We would like to state that we never came across any accusations of corruption 
and found all the Water Officers we met to be hard working and conscientious. However, we 
can appreciate that if the RBWO is open to accusations of corruption, it would make its fee 
collecting role even more difficult.  
 
        Distorting water rights: 
The creation of WUAs to ease registration and fee collection was a good idea. Instead of 
individuals applying for a water right, they could do so as a WUA, thereby sharing the cost. 
This is a seemingly win-win situation. A total of 51 user organizations had been set up as part 
of the WUA initiative, and as we noted above, many of these organizations are simply 
replications of the existing power structures. Local leaders who collect taxes, and may or may 
not be accountable, means that instead of water being a shared resource for all, the result is a 
source of money controlled by a few. This new system can have the effect of seriously 
distorting customary institutions which results in the weakest members of the community 
being the most seriously affected (Van Koppen et al 2004: 16). Although even collecting the 
money within a well-running WUA can be problematic. In Ilalasimba we found that people 
did not or could not pay the full local charge were given a small fine, but they often did not 
even pay the fine. Family ties within the village made enforcement awkward.  
 
       Loosing money: 
RBWO officials admitted that the process of collecting water user fees from scattered 
smallholders actually costs more than net revenue gained (Kazimoto interview 5/3/05). Van 
Koppen et al (2004: 16) estimated that in 2004 the annual water user fees collected by the 
Rufiji RBWO were around US$50,000, while overall expenditures are around US$225,000. 
Rufiji RBWO stated both that, Taxes were the only means to regulate the use of water and 
that, You have to start as you mean to go on. Its a slow process of educating the people of 
the need to pay but we are winning. For example, last year we collected more fees than the 
year before (Kazimoto interview 4/3/05). The sense can be seen in this point of view, but a 
lot more education will be required before the RBWO is even close to covering its costs. 
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More water = More Crops = More Money = More Water 
It must be noted that considering the cost-benefit of the RBMSIIP in terms of irrigation 
efficiency and overall cost recovery is not the prime objective of this paper. But behind the 
concept of the pilot is notion to test some ideas with a review to repeating them elsewhere. 
Therefore, in the interests of the impact on water resource management, it is interesting to 
briefly highlight the positive outcomes of the SIIP part of the intervention that are noted in 
appendix 3b. On the 2,155ha of farm land in the Rufiji, rice yields have more than doubled; 
farm incomes in the Rufiji rose from US$340 to US$1,000; and over 100 farmers per scheme 
have been trained in improved irrigation techniques and new crop varieties (World Bank 
2004). 
 
In comparison to traditional schemes modern and improved systems (see pictures 14-17 next 
page) are able to take much more of the water over a longer period of time, providing more 
water for irrigation. Farmers both within the irrigation system and the surrounding areas use 
the waste water leaving the irrigation system meaning even less is returned to the river. As 
earlier harvested rice receives a much higher price than late harvested rice, then farmers see a 
clear advantage in planting as much rice as early as possible. Whereas people used to start 
planting in December-January, now they start in September-October, a period where less 
water is generally available. Late planted rice is using water through most of the dry season. 
To compound this, modern techniques that have been adopted, also require more water 
(SMUWC 2002t:7). 
 
All these changes have increased rice production and have extended the growing season from 
about seven months to nearly 12 in this area. With the effect being that almost all the dry 
season flow is being diverted to irrigation. So to answer the question, what do farmers do 
when they get more water, more money and are trained how to maximise output?...the answer 
is grow more rice and use more water.  
 
Furthermore, at least some of the schemes have lead to an increase of land under irrigation. 
Surely, this goes directly against the aims of the project which were to improve irrigation 
efficiency in existing irrigated areas only? In fact it does not because technically speaking 
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only existing schemes were addressed by the project. It is the farmers themselves who have 
then been able to further add to the sub-canals from the improved canals, as there is more  
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Picture 14: Main river intake. Picture 15: Lock to block and divert water 
flow to schemes. 
 
 
 
 
       
Picture 16: Entrance of water to schemes.            Picture 17: Water now heading to schemes  
               via rehabilitated channel. 
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water available. While we are not able to give any exact figures on total irrigation expansion 
throughout the basin as a result of RBMSIIP, when we visited the Nyamahana scheme the 
villagers told us that they had been able to double the area of irrigated land from about 55ha 
to about 110ha (Kemario & Gwivaha interview 3/3/05). While villagers in Ilalasimba, which 
had only just failed to be part of RBMSIIP because there was not enough money, told us they 
currently had 200ha under irrigation and but would like to bring another 1300ha under 
irrigation (Alimba interview 4/3/05).  
 
In a personal conversation with one GoT official he stated, Everyone knows that they have 
been increasing the areas under cultivation. MAFS is happy because producing more food is 
one of their objectives, so they naturally turn a blind eye. As for the MWLD, there seems to 
be very little the Rufiji RBWO can do. Using pricing as a tool to control demand hasnt 
worked. 
 
The Usangu study, introduced in the Integrated Planning section, found that building 
structures that improve the efficiency of irrigation have actually ended up becoming part of 
the problem, as they have little impact on the efficiency of water use. Improving water 
management is not about just physically managing the water, but involves understanding and 
addressing the social and economic issues which govern when and how people use water. 
(SMUWC 2002c:5) 
 
 
Discussion Key Points: 
• The former system of fees was inadequate for both regulation and covering the 
operational expenses of governance. 
• The new fee system is problematic due to arbitrary rate setting, weak enforcement, 
lack of accountability, distorting water rights, and the fact that it costs more to 
collect fees than is generated in revenue. 
• Farmers are becoming wealthier, but they are using more water. 
 
 
 
Table 9, below, is a consideration of the strengths and weaknesses of IWRM, from concept to 
implementation in the Rufiji Basin, that will help provide overall picture of the case study 
discussion and pave the way to the final conclusions in the next chapter.   
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Table 9: From Concept to Implementation: A consideration of strengths and weaknesses  
 
Area Main Strengths 
 
Main Weaknesses 
Dublin Principles: 
 
1) Recognition of water as 
finite & vulnerable  
2) Participatory approach for 
management  
3) Women to play a central role 
in provision and 
management 
4) Promotion of water as an 
economic good. 
 
• Was a good first step in 
getting international 
agreement on water 
management problems, as 
well as possible solutions. 
• The principles have good 
intentions. 
• Is linked to poverty 
alleviation goals 
 
 
• Vagueness leaves the principles 
open to interpretation 
• The social aspect of water is not 
sufficiently highlighted. 
• Water is an infinite resource, the 
problem is management. 
IWRM Conceptual Framework 
based on NIE: 
 
1) Integrated planning 
2) Governance 
3) Economics 
4) Sustainability 
 
• Includes what are currently 
seen as the theoretical key 
elements needed for good 
water management. 
• Has broad appeal. 
• Has good intentions of 
promoting good governance 
and economic self-sufficiency 
• Vagueness causes problems with 
interpretation and measurement. 
• The concepts in themselves 
cannot be easily operationalised 
• Arguably placing women under 
governance reduces the value 
of the ideal. 
• Unable to account for the 
embeddedness of local 
institutions.  
• Institutional framework is too 
complex for the setting 
 
RBMSIIP Strategy/Rational: 
 
1) Integrated Planning 
2) Governance 
3) Economics  
4) Sustainability 
 
• Aims to IWRM elements 
• Aims to review of National 
Water Policy and New 
National Water Strategy to 
encompass IWRM.   
• Review of all legislation 
relating to water. 
• Attempts to clarify water 
rights. 
• Linking higher level 
institutions (e.g. ministries) 
with users (e.g. WUAs). 
• Existing informal institutions and 
customary laws are not taken into 
account. 
• Conflicting objectives between 
MAFS & MWLD. 
• Key stakeholders and actors not 
included. 
• Conflict resolution is not related 
strongly enough to institutional 
rationale. 
• Goals regarding water quantity 
and quality were not made. 
• Over-emphasis on full cost 
recovery. 
• No integrated river basin plan. 
RBMSIIP 
Implementation/Outcomes: 
 
1) Integrated Planning 
2) Governance 
3) Economics  
4) Sustainability 
 
• MAFS & MWLD had a good 
working relationship 
• Laws, policies and strategies 
are reviewed. 
• New institutional framework 
with a strengthened RBWO 
and WUAs for local 
empowerment. 
• Farmers cultivate more crops 
• By-passing of valuable informal 
institutions and customary laws. 
• More water is used by farmers. 
• Competing uses and their 
underlying causes are not 
addressed. 
• Women are only superficially 
included. 
• WUAs do not have the capacity 
to deal with local conflicts. 
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and increase their incomes. 
• Linking higher level 
institutions (e.g. ministries) 
with users (e.g. WUAs). 
• Generally, users do not feel they 
benefit from RBWO. 
• Water fees cost more to collect 
than the revenue they generate. 
• Enforcement of rules and 
regulations is very weak. 
• RBWO lacks the capacity to 
manage effectively. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusions & Recommendations 
This chapter aims to conclude on the highlighted aspects raised in the previous chapter 
concerning governance, integrated planning, economics and sustainability in the Rufiji Basin. 
We will start with the conclusions of the three main areas addressed throughout the paper, 
based on the descriptions, research and analysis of the basin and the RBMSIIP project. In 
terms of answering the main problem formulation and taking into account the conclusions of 
the project, we will define how IWRM has helped exert sustainable water resources in the 
Rufiji Basin. We will then conclude on IWRM principles and the theoretical framework in 
relation with the implementation process.  
 
Following this we will suggest some recommendations that could help develop better water 
management in Rufiji Basin. Finally we would like to close our paper with some reflections 
regarding our study. 
 
7.1 IWRM & the Rufiji Basin 
The main aim of this paper has been to examine how IWRM is implemented and 
operationalized in the Rufiji River Basin in an attempt to obtain a sustainable water 
management. In order to do this we will consider once again integrated planning, governance 
and economics. 
 
7.1.1 Integrated Planning 
We will begin by revisiting the key discussion points relating to integrated planning from the 
previous chapter. The points will be used to develop our conclusion. 
 
 
Discussion Key Points: 
• The key problem of the competing demands from irrigators and TANESCO has 
not been addressed. This is due to a lack of communication and coordination 
between MWLD, TANESCO, and MAFS. 
• Other stakeholders and possibly other parallel projects seem to have been excluded 
from the process. 
• Despite working well together, in terms of a harmonious working relationship, 
MAFS and MWLD seem to have conflicting objectives. This has probably helped 
alleviate poverty, but has also served to encourage more water use. 
• The sectoral approach to policy making and planning appears to be continuing. 
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The presence in the basin of different agencies, institutions and actors, with a variety of 
interests, goals, power relations and resources, not only leads to different approaches to 
development and management goals, but also to different understandings regarding the 
problems and constraints of the basin. An example of this was the inability of the Water 
Officer to manage water resources before the RBMSIIP project. This was a consequence of 
the lack of coordination between key sectors and, as IWRM includes the desire for more 
integrated planning across the river basin, the RBMSIIP succeeded in linking MAFS and 
MWLD with regard to project planning.  
 
The complications of planning and coordination of activities and interests across such a huge 
area are very apparent, and it would seem like some very obvious omissions and errors have 
been made. However, the fact that two key ministries who had previously had a tense 
relationship came together and enjoyed a good working relationship and achieved some 
objectives must not be lost. 
 
As we described in the impacts analysis section, the omission in the RBMSIIP of coordination 
of plans, objectives and policies between key stakeholders such as TANESCO or the Ministry 
of Resources and Tourism has resulted in parallel projects and contradictory aims that 
continue to compromise more sustainable and integrated management. 
  
Even though there was strong collaboration between the MAFS and MWLD during the 
project, discrepancies still occurred in relation to planning objectives of water use and 
efficiency, and there was a lack of policy and project harmonization. As we described in the 
impacts section, the desire for more crops by MAFS means more of the water that MWLD is 
trying to conserve ends up being used. So the perverse situation here is that RBMSIIP was 
trying to conserve water by basically helping farmers using more! Furthermore, this latter 
outcome reflects a sectoral approach to policy and planning that continues with each Ministry 
working separately, with the aim of integrated planning consequently jeopardized. This 
situation could further affect the delicate balance throughout the basin. As more of the limited 
water resources are used, conflicts which are beyond the capacity of the institutions to address 
will increase. 
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While there is an urgent need for scientific research (e.g. to find out exactly how much water 
is in the river) on which to make policy and planning decisions, without effective utilization 
of the information gained, simple collecting data would seem worthless.  
7.1.2 Governance 
We will begin by revisiting the key discussion points relating to governance from the previous 
chapter. The points will be used to develop our conclusion. 
 
 
Discussion Key Points:  
• The new framework seeks to improve governance coordination and stakeholder 
participation. The two most important institutions in terms of Rufiji Basin are the 
RBWO and the WUAs. 
• The RBWO has been strengthened in terms of capacity, but still seems challenged in 
regulating the basin. 
• The WUAs appear to have been successful in managing localized (village) water use 
and abuse, but lack the capacity to deal with conflicts with resident and transhumant 
pastoralists. Women seem included only superficially. 
 
 
The aim of the RBMSIIP project was to set up a new institutional framework to improve 
governance and stakeholder participation as we noted on the previous chapter. The gap in this 
new institutional setting was that conflict resolution was not integrated in the institutional 
rationale. Conflicts between water users as farmers and pastoralists or between farmers and 
hydropower stations, or in-between users of the same type such as downstream and upstream 
irrigators, cannot be solved by the new institutions and setting. 
 
River Basin Water Office (RBWO): 
The project addressed these problems mainly by establishing and strengthening the RBWO to 
plan, allocate, operate and manage resources in the basin, and in some instances resolve water 
allocation conflicts. The RBWO was supposed to be working in solving disputes, examining 
new applications for water and assessing environmental implications. Nevertheless, the 
concept of river basin as a unit of planning and management in the project had pros and cons 
regarding institutional conflict resolution. On the one hand, it provided the possibility for the 
RBWO to have an overall view of the conflicts throughout the basin, and on the other hand 
the RBWO and the other governmental organizations are not able to integrate local 
organizations where conflicts of resource management are better tackled. Local institutions 
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and customary laws of water and resource management were bypassed by the objectives and 
strategy of the project. 
 
The responsibilities and demands placed on the RBWO staff are clearly far beyond their 
abilities to deliver. The problem is not the competence of the staff but the size of the job. 
Given the rules and regulations as they currently stand, there are simply too many offenders to 
have any hope of effective enforcement. According to Mr Kazimoto of the RBWO, This is 
the reason why we try to focus on education rather than enforcement. But it is an up hill task 
given the scale of the problem (Kazimoto interview 5/3/05). Since 1993 not one person has 
been taken to court. He notes Since we do not have the capacity to enforce, we want to rely 
on international agencies for help with capacity building and education of social aspects 
within schemes. At the moment, the river basin office is the only organization helping with 
capacity building to the farmers and WUAs (Kazimoto interview 5/3/05).  
 
The Rufiji RBWO does currently have the ability and willingness to collect and process some 
data in respect to rain gauging, fee collection, and capacity building. However, the problem 
here is the capacity of the 12 RBWO staff regulating a river basin that covers an area of 
177,000 km2, with a heterogeneous population of different ethnic groups and different types 
of resource users and uses. The scale of the basin in relation with the capacity and the amount 
of tasks of the RBWO is a constraint for management.  
 
Water User Associations (WUAs): 
The ideal of participation at the lowest level of the society was the creation of the WUAs. 
They are the cornerstone of the decentralised process of governance and participation of all 
stakeholders in water management in the basin. The constraint here is the bypassing of local, 
informal and traditional organisations that deal with resource use, allocation and conflict 
resolution. There is also a syncretism, unity or reconciliation between local leaders and 
leaders of the WUAs. The problem persists as local leadership is not always an automatic 
guarantee that everyone will or can participate in management of resources and decision 
making. In the RBMSIIP case, the WUA leaders and members were mostly farmers and 
irrigators who paid for their water rights. Members and leaders from other ethnic groups such 
as the pastoralist Maasai were generally not included. The project target group was mainly 
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irrigators and farmers, leaving pastoralists, an important social actor and stakeholder, behind. 
Potential conflicts between farmers and pastoralists are arising continuously and the role of 
the historically dominant ethnic group in the region, the Hehe, will probably prevail. The new 
power structures like the WUAs are becoming a repetition of the formal and governmental 
institutions but also a repetition of the pre-existing local power structures.  
 
Above all these constraints, the WUAs in many cases are becoming a source of localized 
water management, helping the RBWO to manage issues such as data and water fee collection 
in the villages, enforcement of internal rules to control and monitor the payment of fees, and 
also establishing fines for those who do not pay.  
 
There is a relationship between the RBWO and all villages with irrigation schemes. The 
RBWO realizes that establishing good relationships with the local WUAs and instilling trust 
and helps develop good governance and sustainable water management. Good governance 
develops trust, both between people and institutions and between different groups of people. 
Institutions provide a supporting structure through which people can work together to achieve 
good environmental management (SMUWC 2002:16). It is based on these philosophies that 
the MWLD & MAFS are focusing their attention. Although the WUAs have no formal 
authority regarding policy enforcement, funding, or employment of members within the 
WUA, the RBWO seems to have succeeded in creating a sense of ownership regarding the 
project, which has resulted in some of the villagers believing in the benefits that the RBMSIIP 
offered.   
 
The gender aspect considered a main principle in the IWRM Dublin principles was mentioned 
in the project and formally the local authorities are trying to take this into account. 
Nevertheless, gender is described with numbers as indicator of their presence and influence 
(how many women and men are in a WUA) but in practice women are still not appearing as 
leaders and active members. 
 
Finally, the sustainability of this institutional setting is hampering the goals of governance 
without the inclusion of local and informal organisations, mechanisms and channels existing 
in the villages. Furthermore, without the participation of all stakeholders and social actors 
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present in the basin, the changes in the institutional framework will not succeed and will 
continue creating conflicts between resource users, hindering the goal of good governance and 
river basin management. 
 
7.1.4 Economics 
We will begin by revisiting the key discussion points relating to economics from the previous 
chapter. The points will be used to develop our conclusion. 
 
 
Discussion Key Points: 
• The former system of fees was inadequate for both regulation and covering the 
operational expenses of governance. 
• The new fee system is problematic due to arbitrary rate setting, weak enforcement, 
lack of accountability, distorting water rights, and the fact that it costs more to 
collect fees than is generated in revenue. 
• Farmers are becoming wealthier, but they are using more water. 
 
 
Using economics as a tool for water management has been one of the greatest challenges 
experienced in the Rufiji Basin. While the basic idea of trying to make people aware of the 
use of water, monitor and conserve it by giving a monetary value is easy to appreciate, the 
RBMSIIP report explanation that management was constrained because the fees and penalties 
were inadequate indicates a lack of social understanding.  
 
The water fee, seen as water taxation, antagonizes people in the catchment area, because 
they suddenly have to pay the government a fee without seeing any improved water or support 
service. Issues of legitimacy for payment, equity in allocation, cost-recovery mechanisms and 
the general collection, maintenance and upkeep of water rights systems information is still 
wanting (Sokile & van Koppen, 2005:7). This has impacted the region in a way that the 
farmers now feel they own the water and therefore want to get their investments worth, 
leading to major over usage of water distribution and effects downstream users. Conflicts 
have intensified as upstream abstractors take all water they want from the river to justify their 
fees (Sokile & van Koppen, 2005:6). 
 
As we mentioned in the impacts section, the setting of fees is a problem as there is no data on 
volumes of water used and allocated on which to base charges.  
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There is a flat rate minimum fee of US$35 per year per water right (WUAs typically share one 
water right), which is perhaps fair for larger users such as WUA, but there are two problems.  
The first is that it has failed as a tool to limit use and encourage efficiency. As we have 
already noted, the farmers within the schemes increased their crop areas and used more water. 
The second problem is that the minimum flat rate means that the smallest users, who are 
perhaps not even part of a WUA and could be expected to have the most limited resources, 
are hardest hit. This leads to illegal actions and behaviours such as fee avoidance and the 
digging of illegal canals. User groups and individuals (such as the pastoralists) who are in a 
lower power position are the most adversely affected. This ends in a perverse situation where 
an approach that tries to promote good governance via equity and empowerment actually 
serves to further marginalise those people who most need its benefits.  
 
The cost recovery solution has not been successful addressed because the RWBO has not 
enough resources to consistently collect fees, monitor water usage and gauges, and manage 
water allocation. This picture worsens when farmers cannot see the utilities and benefits from 
paying the fees. Studies, reports, new policies and laws are not written for farmers, so there is 
very little information and explanation about changes and actions that farmers are 
experiencing.     
 
At this point the mechanisms are in place to apply these fees but the capacity is severely 
lacking to effectively administer this type of management. If the RBWO is left open to 
accusations of corruption with regards to fee setting and tax registration tools, the danger is 
that more users may try to avoid payment as they lose faith in the system.  
 
Finally, water taxation system can result in undesirable situations when local villages get out 
of control with payments and allocations. The researcher Anna Toner noted that village elites 
in Northern Tanzania had got carried away with the idea of charging everyone in the village 
for water with the intention of using the money to improve supply. In this instance charges 
per bucket from the village had been raised to such an extent that they were beyond the means 
of the poorest people. The village elites had found the idea to be so profitable that they were 
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looking into buying the rights of the neighbouring villages and controlling their water (A. 
Toner interview 8/3/05). 
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7.2 Sustainability 
Taking into account the explanations and analysis on this project; we will now consider how 
IWRM has helped exert sustainable water resources in the Rufiji Basin. In order to assess 
sustainability in terms of governance in the basin we would claim that the concept of 
integration in IWRM has helped to foster some institutional framework and helped the 
coordination between some stakeholders. This is reflected on the MWLD and MAFS success 
in the design of public policies (e.g. the new National Water Policy of 2002, the National 
Water Strategy 2004) and new institutional framework with a more broad participation of 
stakeholders.  
 
However, the continuation of a sectorised policy approach does not bode well for future 
integrated planning within the basin. Furthermore, there is no basin master plan. With this key 
factor in mind we would claim that from a sector policy and planning point of view, 
governance in the basin is not sustainable but IWRM has helped shape the need for it. The 
problem is in the implementation and operationalisation of this goal. If the aim of the RBWO 
is to continue functioning and to exercise it greater responsibility it would require substantial 
donor and economic support. Consequently we would conclude that the RBWO is not 
financially self-sustaining and we cannot see when it will be given the current circumstances.  
 
On a more positive note, there is strong evidence of social acceptance of this new institutional 
framework at present, even though there have been conflicts between users such as farmers 
and pastoralists that the RBWO could not solve. As Munk noted, Governing water inevitably 
involves governing conflicting interests (Munk 2004:8-9). But is it a matter of time before 
the social actors of the basin stop accepting an Office that is not helping them with conflicts 
resolution mechanisms or supply problems?  
 
The RBWO has limited capacity to mobilize social and economical resources to support the 
needs, interests and wishes of the heterogeneous groups and water users of the basin, which 
means that the people of Rufiji do not yet have a strong link and identification with the 
RBWO. Therefore, we can conclude that the sustainability of the RBWO within these terms is 
very weak, with few possibilities to survive in an optimal way. Perhaps it will become as 
many institutions in the developing countries, where administrative and management 
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institutions survive endlessly with the minimum of resources, but with no real influence and 
optimal conditions, becoming a bureaucratic and empty apparatus without any social 
support. 
 
The IWRM desire for participation and decentralization is realized in the WUAs as they are 
also a way of creating autonomous, financially self-independent utility-type organizations. At 
a localized level they may appear sustainable in terms of social organization, but based on our 
research we noted several important flaws. Firstly, they are locally focused to such an extent 
that they only have the capacity to comprehend or consider local water uses. They do not 
know that in an IWRM world they have to care about the next village five miles down stream. 
This actually leads to our second point which is that some of the most water hungry villages 
(the ones included in RBMSIIP) have actually been educated to use more water in terms of 
crop selection and irrigation advice. So while we believe that WUAs are essentially a very 
clever idea that is theoretically sustainable, the way they operate in the Rufiji Basin is 
currently unsustainable. 
 
Finally, the guiding principle of water as an economic good and as a tool for water regulation 
in the Rufiji Basin, using a water rights and fees system had the good intentions to control 
withdrawals of surface and groundwater and to sustain the management and operations of the 
RBWO. But as we described earlier the institutional setting to control, allocate and monitor 
tariffs is not in place and is not self-sustaining. Water registration is complex in the Basin and 
limited within administrative costs. Van Koppen et al. stated the registration and tax 
payment fail to generate any extra water in the zero-sum game of dividing a limited pie during 
the dry season. Without extra water, the many tax payers will soon question the Water Officer 
about his promises to support their access to water in return for accepting registration and 
payment for a water right (Van Koppen et al. 2004:19). As the payments will decrease and 
the dependency of the RWBO on the fee system will intensify and serve to create a situation 
even further away from sustainable.  
 
IWRM has important principles for carrying good governance and better water management, 
but the problems appear in the implementation process as a result of the complexity of the 
context, the diversity of stakeholders and actors, geographical, political and economical 
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factors and variables that hinder the full operationalisation of IWRM and the sustainability of 
the components in an intervention. Nevertheless, IWRM has helped exert a better 
understanding and the will to make some needed changes within the governmental and local 
institutions. However, it has failed to reach the full aim of a more sustainable water 
management through integrated planning, governance and economics.  
 
7.3 Considerations of IWRM Based on NIE 
River basin management based on IWRM entails complex project activities and challenges 
such as strategies, goals, policies, implementing decision making frameworks, promoting 
participation, improving infrastructure, recovering costs, monitoring the process, etc. This is 
done with a view to somehow increasing water use efficiency in a situation of increasing 
water scarcity. In this light, IWRM seems an excellent conceptual framework for good water 
management and governance. However, the fact that this framework is based on theory and 
principles that offer little operational direction is a main weakness. 
 
The vague nature of the principles based on coordination, equity, efficiency and sustainability 
combined with their broad appeal in terms of favoured notions such as participation, poverty 
alleviation, financial independence, gender equality etc. seems to be able to encompass all 
development worldviews, from grassroots approaches (e.g. WUAs) to neo-liberalist 
approaches (e.g. water as an economic good).  
 
The political and economical nature of World Bank-promoted IWRM is enforced by NIE 
economics and political background which unites theoretical and empirical research 
examining the role of institutions in furthering or preventing economic growth (North 1992). 
Nevertheless, some main constraints in these areas are limiting the potential of the IWRM 
approach including aspects of the content of the concepts and principles that IWRM 
represents (as shown in Table 9 of strengths and weakness), as well as the operationalisation 
of these principles. 
 
Theoretically, the assumption of the embeddedness of the informal institutions, customs, 
traditions and norms from the Williamson´s table (p.43); and Norths frustration that this level 
cannot change and he cannot explain why this level has so much persuasive influence upon 
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the economics; helps explain the gap and maybe the reason for IWRM not taking into account 
the social aspects of economics and in the implementation phase do not consider, recognise 
and integrate informal institutions and customary laws in the new settings. 
 
Furthermore, the only levels where changes can be enforced are governmental institutions and 
functions such as the executive, legislative, judicial and bureaucratic and the different levels 
of distribution of power, in addition to laws, regulations and formal rules (Williamson 2000). 
Influenced by this theoretical approach of NIE, World Bank-IWRM is promoting the process 
of getting the rules and institutional setting in place.  
 
NIE considers the values and norms of people, determining the cost of transaction and the 
foundation of institutions in the decision process. But neither NIE theory nor IWRM approach 
make an effort to inter-relate and connect these factors in a more determined way within the 
changes of institutions, economics and governance. The informal structures are often seen as, 
spontaneous and non-calculative (Williamson 2000). 
 
While there were some successes in our Tanzanian case, they tended to be overshadowed by 
the failures and weaknesses. It is difficult to say precisely where the main fault lies. For 
instance, we would argue that the RBMSIIP project rational and strategy tried to take on too 
many issues at one time. We would also question the reality of trying to implement such a 
complex process project in an arena which lacks the capacity to carry the project is a serious 
fault.  
 
However, in our opinion perhaps the main problem is due to the missing link between the 
conceptual framework and its operationalisation. Putting it quite simply, IWRM is a package 
of good ideas, but it is a huge challenge to make them work in reality. As far as we are aware, 
there is only one place for planners and policy makers to go get any kind of operational 
guidance for IWRM and that is GWPs IWRM Toolbox (GWPforum.org). However, these are 
more ideas and guidance rather than concrete tools that can be used directly in real-life 
circumstances. Rather like IWRM in general, they are also open to very broad interpretation.  
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We would argue that the main problem in our case study stems from the fact that the World 
Bank interpretation of IWRM based on NIE is too complex for the Tanzanian setting. IWRM 
based on NIE requires efficient markets, a solid framework of well functioning institutions 
combined with well informed actors. The theory is that this should provide the basis for 
coordinated and integrated planning. A problematic assumption of this approach is the 
reliance on existing formal markets and institutions that can be further developed. While a 
counter argument would possibly be that the RBMSIIP attempted to create and develop these 
markets and institutions, we would counter that the abrupt leap from a more livelihood based 
economy to a more market based economy is beyond the capacity of the setting. In the 
following recommendations section we offer a suggestion for addressing this weakness. 
 
7.4 Recommendations for IWRM in Rufiji Basin 
We would like to end this paper with recommendations based on our findings related to our 
study of IWRM practice in the Rufiji Basin, taking into consideration the analysis and 
conclusions of the RBMSIIP project. But, we do not intend to bring recommendations for all 
the identified problems, conclusions, weaknesses or aspects addressed in the earlier chapters. 
This is because we simply do not have answers for the majority of minor and major problems 
of water management in the basin regarding IWRM operationalisation. The recommendations 
that we put forward we consider to be realistic, applicable and of value.  
 
We will start with general recommendations for IWRM and continue with others that relate to 
integrated planning, governance and economics within the basin. 
 
• Towards an adapted and operative IWRM: 
As we concluded in the previous chapter, IWRM is a conceptual framework built upon broad 
notions of coordinated water management, good governance and economic efficiencies. An 
important issue is that these elements are also vague and broad concepts that cannot be easily 
operationalised at face value. Furthermore, the IWRM package of tools and solutions 
(which are very general) also do not provide concrete methodologies for operationalisation. 
Therefore, a more adaptive IWRM which can provide solutions to problems existing on 
each context of intervention or water management process is necessary.  
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While it can be convincingly argued that it is important to maintain the overall broad 
principles, which can be open to other approaches at the conceptual level, there is a need for a 
more simple and concrete approach at the operationalisation and implementation level. 
Adaptation and flexibility should be at this lowest level, where the serious problems are 
actualized. Mitchell (1990) commented on this aspect, At the strategic level, a 
comprehensive approach should be used to ensure that the widest possible perspective is 
maintained. In contrast, at the operational level, a more focused approach is needed (in 
Lankford 2005:3). Mitchell goes on to argue that actions at the operational level should be 
directed towards smaller number of issues that account for most of the problems (in Lankford 
2005:3). With this in mind, we would also recommend that detailed methodologies should be 
developed for smaller, concrete problems rather than general, broad and vague problems and 
solutions. If methodological tools were based on concrete examples and contexts with 
solutions already proven, it could possibly provide an easier way for policy-makers, 
managers, users, etc. to decide what to choose or try in their own context.  
 
Adapted IWRM requires the capacity to generate new kinds of thinking, the identification of 
solutions that work effectively and the confidence to implement them. IWRM should not 
attempt to create a facsimile of the ideal full form, but use the latter as a check list to craft 
focussed and targeted solutions (Lankford 2005:2). So in the Rufiji Basin for example, this 
approach could mean planning around the consideration that water scarcity occurs only in the 
dry season. In the wet season there is more than enough water for everyone. If the principles 
of IWRM are operationalised with adaptive tools and approaches in resource poor-
situations there would be a greater possibility for transforming the concept into improved 
water management in local situations. 
 
Integrated Planning 
• Intra and cross-sectoral coordination: 
Common agreements among stakeholders with regard to the role, value and ways to evaluate, 
control and manage water are fundamental steps towards successful integrated planning. But 
to reach this aim, strong coordination at all levels is required. As we described earlier, there is 
a lack of effective coordination within upper ministerial levels such as between MAFS and 
MWLD, which has lead to contradictory and conflictive objectives and policies. At the local 
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level there is also a lack of coordination between river basin water users such as between 
upstream and downstream farmers and between farmers and pastoralists. 
 
At the upper ministerial levels we would recommend greater policy and objective 
harmonization. For example, this should not be purely confined to MAFS & MWLD agreeing 
on national water policy, but should include MAFS & MWLD agreeing on agriculture and 
food security policy. Cross-sectoral coordination at the local level, where users consider the 
related issues of multiple sectors such as land, tourism, fisheries, energy, etc. would help 
create local interest for the situation of the whole basin with a more broad view of the 
resources and leading to a closer ideal of integrated planning. In ideal circumstances this 
would have a positive feedback effect regarding inter-sector policy and objective 
harmonization at the ministerial level, as harmonization would be needed to gain support from 
cross-sectoral interest groups at the local level. While it is beyond our local knowledge for us 
to suggest exactly which groups should be formed to handle these process at a local level, it 
would seem sensible to consider adapting already existing and functioning bodies such as 
WUAs, irrigation associations and district councils. 
 
The idea of intra and cross-sectoral coordination is underpinned by the terms of integration 
across natural resource sectors and also by attempting to integrate social and institutional 
dimensions into the overall approach. Water problems cannot be treated in isolation but in 
coordination and in a wider context with other natural resources and planning considerations, 
where water is not necessarily always the prime focus. 
 
• Capacity building and education: 
A water management problem in Tanzania and specifically in Rufiji is the lack of capacity 
building at the local level in order to ensure that users not only understand the implications of 
rules of the game, but also get the necessary tools to become active actors involved in 
decision making processes. Therefore, there is a need for education in WUAs, apex and 
informal organisations in the villages where they are capacitated on water management issues 
and conflict resolutions, and where they can exchange information about interventions, 
policies, institutional frameworks. In this way the can play a more active and productive role 
in decisions and interventions.  
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This involves developing communication and educational methods appropriate for farmers, 
pastoralists, women and other local users, in situations where governmental authorities, 
managers, donors and villages can exchange ideas, information and get feedback from each 
other.  
 
Methods such as the River Basin Game (Lankford & Sokile 2003), which is a visual, fun and 
communicative game that educates the local user about downstream effects of upstream water 
usage, can be recommended as one of the methods to be used in this process on a basin wide 
scale. This game has already been used in the Usangu Plains in Rufiji Basin by projects such 
as RIPARWIN with interesting outcomes (Lankford & Sokile 2003). As many people in rural 
settings cannot read and oral channels are the most used ways for communicating, 
communication tools and channels such as radio programmes, face-to-face activities, are 
better for a broad educational process rather than booklets, brochures and posters used by 
officials and project managers in rural Tanzania. Conflict resolution methods should also 
always be included in any capacity building and educational process, where water 
management and other local, basin and national conflicts can be discussed.   
 
Governance 
• Recognition and integration of all stakeholders  
The recognition of the heterogeneity of stakeholders and social actors in the basin and at all 
levels in Tanzania (rural and urban settings) is essential for good governance, as all actors 
have the potential abilities and rights to contribute to better governance and management of 
their resources. As we described earlier, some stakeholders, such as the pastoralists, were not 
included in both the new institutional setting in the Rufiji basin or the project activities such 
as the rehabilitation of schemes. This has served to create internal conflicts at the village level 
as described before. Therefore, the need for recognition and integration of all stakeholders in 
any intervention process is basic for a proper water management and institutional setting. 
Although it should be noted that, we do recognise that factors such as the semi-nomadic life 
of local pastoralist and the constant influx of immigrants (both pastoralists and farmers) 
complicates this recommendation in a real-life setting. 
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However, the new institutional framework in the basins of Tanzania recognises WUAs as the 
only link between the upper levels (RBWO) and local levels. This not only by-passes the 
existing local and informal social organisations dealing with resources but also forgetting 
other important stakeholders and actors from the basin, which lead us to the next 
recommendation.   
 
• A recognised setting of co-existing formal and informal institutions 
On the one hand, by-passing actors such as pastoralists or informal, traditional and 
indigenous institutions creates a weak and conflictive setting. The informal institutions and 
their un-written customary laws and norms have a potential capacity of mobility, flexibility 
and ability to adapt and change as we described before, even though they are considered 
embedded. On the other hand, sustaining water management requires, as Sokile (2002:6) 
described; commitment, sound enforcement mechanisms and cost effectiveness. Given the 
nature of water mechanism in Tanzania, informal institutions in many ways stand a better 
chance of managing local water resources. It is therefore worth noting that an institutional 
environment that induces credible commitment entails the complex institutional framework of 
formal rules, informal constraints and enforcement that together make possible low-cost 
operations. So a mixed formal-informal institutional framework can therefore effectively 
enforce these constraints as well as reduce costs. 
 
Informal institutions and communication channels have the ability to deal with local conflicts 
of resources and as they adapt in a daily basis to changes, they have important potentials and 
abilities for participating in the managing of the resources, but they also lack a broader picture 
of the area and the needs of the rest of the actors of the basin (such as downstream users). 
Furthermore, new local institutions such as the WUAs have good potential to manage local 
water use and abuse, but lack the ability to deal with local conflicts. 
 
Therefore, a structure of nested institutions as Huggins (2000) suggests, including formal 
and informal, would allow a representation of interests of the many existing groups and 
sectors and would encourage a better management. 
 
• Revising the tasks of the River Basin Water Office 
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One of the main problems identified in the RBMSIIP project was the capacity of the RBWO 
to manage a huge river basin with an enormous amount of responsibilities and moreover with 
scarce resources (human, financial, technological, etc). With such a scenario is very difficult 
to suggest or recommend solutions. However, we would suggest a revision of the tasks of the 
Basin Office that would help them to manage more effectively and qualitative their role 
(although this would not provide a solution to many of the institutions weaknesses).  
 
This revision of tasks would involve the RBWO carrying out an internal evaluation regarding 
the most cost-effective and constructive ways to use the time and the resources they have for 
managing the basin. For example, this could involve a greater role in education and local 
capacity building, rather than enforcement as a senior river basin hydrologist commented 
(Kazimoto 5/3/05). The revision of tasks could also include the collection of fees only from 
people who, in the first instance, can and will pay. We discuss this further in the following 
recommendation below.   
 
Economics 
• The need to establish guiding principles for water fee policy and implementation 
strategy 
There has been an over-emphasis on full cost recovery aiming to fund governance and water 
management through the water fee system, but ending with problems and failures at the 
implementation stage. The economic aspect is very vulnerable and can lead to so many 
contradictions and flaws that we cannot agree in our project group on any recommendation 
and solutions to this aspect. Some of us suggest that the appearance of perverse situations and 
mechanisms where villages get out of control with payments and allocations is a consequence 
of a lack of principles and pre-understanding of water fees and therefore we could suggest the 
need for establishing guiding principles for water fees policy and implementation strategy. 
 
Van Koppen & Sokile (2004) suggest the need to stipulate the following principles:  
- Should generate net income; (but we would rather suggest cost recovery) 
- Be objective, transparent and corruption-proof 
- Provide the right incentive i.e. the incentive to use water more productively 
- Contribute to poverty alleviation, or at least not aggravate poverty 
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- Be linked to accountable service delivery 
 
The discussion here comes with the kind of principles that can be included, and with the issue 
that is again another new document for the local users and river basin staff to be aware, 
knowledgeable and how to be put into practice.  
 
• Differentiation of taxation 
Furthermore, there is a need to differentiate between payers. Van Koppen et al (2004) argue 
that only large scale users should pay in the first instance. However, we differ with this 
opinion as there have been some small scale schemes that have been rehabilitated where 
farmers have tripled production and have resources to pay the user fees and have been paying. 
Focussing on collecting fees from these types of users is perhaps a way to address the fact that 
fee collection brings about a net loss in revenue. Although we recognise that a differentiated 
system would lead to new parameters to consider who can pay and who cannot. 
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7.5 Final Reflections 
The lessons learnt when working on a research paper are multiple. In these last paragraphs we 
would like to convey some reflections on the process and choices made.   
 
One of the weaknesses in this paper is that the impacts identification of the project are 
generalised as social changes in an area. As Degnbol & Engberg describe, it is usually 
impossible to point to impacts that can clearly be seen as an effect of specific projects, 
programmes or political intervention (Degnbol & Engberg, 2003:120). Too many conditions, 
actors and factors exist in a context.  
 
Therefore, for a more in-depth study we would have liked to analyse more social, political, 
development and economical factors in the country and the basin. Moreover we would like to 
have also included a participative evaluation method, where social actors are involved in the 
evaluation process that is problem-solving oriented where the involved actors collect, discuss 
and evaluate the goals and results. It is in itself a learning process of a project (Degnbol & 
Engberg 2003). But, for this purpose, it is necessary to stay a longer period in the study area, 
be involved in it as motivator and therefore an ongoing project, aspects and factors that we 
did not have. 
 
Connecting with this methodology, from the New Institutional Economics (NIE) theory we 
were also perhaps missing a more people centred approach. The weakness of NIE is the over-
emphasis of the economic tools and aspects and even the key role of institutions are normally 
seen from the formal and statutory sides and consequently some social actors and behaviours 
and norms are neglected. For contexts such as river basins in Tanzania, where the social 
diversity is a main factor (socially, economically, politically, etc) NIE, and consequently our 
analysis does not work completely to get a picture of all the necessary variables of a situation.  
 
Our study was in many ways very broad, which made it necessary for us to scope down and 
confine our considerations very much within an NIE-IWRM bubble. For example, we made 
no attempt in this final report to broaden our considerations to other key areas such as; the 
operational value of integrated planning; resource use and management-sustainability 
considerations; development theory and development-driven interventions; or to compare 
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World Bank-related IWRM with other IWRM interpretations or possible alternative 
approaches. Even within our bubble we do not cover aspects such as a technological and 
infrastructure analysis of the implementation of the RBMSIIP project linked with social and 
organisational changes and behaviours.  
 
The main reason for this confinement was that trying to get to grips with our core subject 
matter was difficult enough, especially when we realized that there was no literature detailing 
and analysing the value of IWRM in the way in which we were interested. Consequently, we 
were required to take on this task. Expansion from this field of study could include all of the 
above points and many more. We now have many varied ideas for our second year theses. 
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1: Interviewees 
The following list of people are the ones we interviewed formally and informally during our 
ten days field research trip in Tanzania and people interviewed formally and informally in 
Denmark. All of them have some kind of knowledge and relationship either with IWRM 
(approach, tools, project related, job), water management issues, the Rufiji River Basin, water 
management in Tanzania or the RBMSIIP project. We have organised the list in relation to 
their position and role and in connection with the study subject. 
 
Upper level officials  Related with the Ministries of Tanzania, the formal institutions and 
with knowledge and past relation with the RBMSIIP project. 
 
Saidi A. Faraji (2/3/05) 
Principal Hydrologist/Senior Water Engineer  Water Resources Department, Ministry of 
Water and Livestock Development, Dar es Salaam 
P.O Box 35066 
saidifaraji@yahoo.co.uk 
 
Eng. M. Futakamba 
Assistant Director Irrigation Services, Ministry of Agriculture & Food Security 
mfutakamba@kilimo.go.tz 
 
G.M Kalinga 
Senior official, Irrigation Department, Ministry of Agriculture, Dar es Salaam 
 
Meso level officials  Related with official institutions such as the Ministries of Water, 
Agriculture and Energy. Further, they had knowledge and/or were involved within the 
RBMSIIP project. 
 
George Kazimoto, (3/3/05); (5/03/05) 
Senior Water Engineer - Rufiji River Basin Water Office, Iringa  
rufijimagm@hotmail.com 
 
Willie Mwaluvanda (9/3/05) 
Rufiji River Basin Water Officer 
 
Norbert Ngoni 
Wildlife Division 
norbertjuk@yahoo.co.uk 
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Mpanduji F. (2/3/05) 
Regional Manager  TANESCO Iringa District, Iringa 
 
Joyce Reuben 
Rufiji River Basin Water Office employee 
jomakire@yahoo.com 
 
Godffrey W.T. Surera 
Rufiji River Basin Water Office employee 
suregodie@yahoo.co.uk 
 
Lower level- Village leaders and members from Iringa District, which were involved in the 
RBMSIIP project (Nyamahana & Mapagoro) and were not involved (Ilalasimba). Note: in 
Mapagoro we organised a village meeting with WUA leaders and people outside the WUA 
such as the Maasai pastoralists.  
 
Alimba J.Y. (4/3/05) 
WUA Chairperson  Ilalasimba village, Iringa District, Tanzania 
 
Faraji Kimario, (3/03/05) 
Traditional Village Officer, Nyamahana Village,  
 
Kemario F. & Gwivaha C. (3/3/05) 
WUA committee members  Nyamahana village, Iringa District, Tanzania 
 
Mapogoro villagers (3/3/05) 
Cross-section of population  Mapogoro village, Iringa District, Tanzania 
 
World Bank  Related with the water sector in Tanzania or with knowledge in IWRM & 
RBMSIIP project  
 
Rafik Hirji 
Senior water resources management specialist - Eastern & Southern Africa 
World Bank  
Rhirj@worldbank.org 
 
Vahid Alavian 
Lead Water Resources Specialist  World Bank Institute 
valavian@worldbank.org 
 
Academics  Related with water sector and water management research in Tanzania and 
Rufij Basin 
 
Ana Toner (8/3/05) 
Lecturer, Bradford Centre for International Development 
a.l.toner@bradford.ac.uk 
 
Bruce Lankford 
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Senior lecturer, University of East Anglia, UK 
b.lankford@uea.ac.uk 
 
Charles Sokile 
PhD student, SWMRG 
sokile@email.com 
 
Thomas Lehmberg 
Dansk Ornitologisk Foreigning  Project on water and forest conservation, Morogoro Region 
 
Academics  Related with water management issues, IWRM globally 
 
Helle Munk 
Researcher, Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS, Denmark 
 
Thorkil Clausen 
Director of Danish Hydrology Institute, DHI,  
Board Member of Global Water Partnership, GWP. 
Board Member of Danish Water Forum, Denmark 
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2: Map of Nine River Basins in Tanzania 
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3a: Action Taken & Outcomes for RBM Component of the Project 
Action Taken & Outcomes for RBM Component of the Project 
 
River Basin Management (US$10.6 million). This component sought to improve the national framework for 
comprehensive water resource management (WRM), and strengthen WRM in the Pangani and Rufiji basins. 
 
(a) Strengthening National Water Resources Management (US$4.8 million) included five areas: 
    (i) Policy Framework, to improve the national framework for water management by: (a) funding task 
    forces and studies to update water-related legislation; (b) strengthening MWLD's Water Resources 
    Department; (c) strengthening the offices of BWOs; and (d) funding high-priority 
    hydrological studies that addressed national issues. Financing also included incremental travel and 
    operating costs, per diems and consultancies needed to conduct these activities. 
 
    (ii) Legislative Framework, to support a multidisciplinary Task Force, led by MWLD, to conduct a 
    review and lead public discussion of all legislation pertaining to basin management. The institutional 
    framework and legislation for WRM emphasized four issues: (a) water rights; (b) water charges; (c) 
    protection of water against pollution; and (d) broadening stakeholder participation in basin 
    management. 
 
    (iii) Strengthening WRD. WRD has two sections--hydrological and 
    hydro-geological services, and monitors water availability and use across the country. With offices 
    at Regional level, it administers the data collection networks, gathers information, and forwards it to 
    the central office in Dar es Salaam where they are further processed, analyzed and disseminated.  
    The project planned to review the functions of the Department, and provide training, specialized  
    equipment to improve national monitoring, and vehicles. RBMSIIP also planned to strengthen the  
    Government's regulatory functions by providing equipment, training and technical assistance to the  
    offices of the BWOs in the Pangani and Rufiji Basins. 
 
    (iv) Special studies, to understand features in the two basins, which were important to basin  
    hydrology and environment, natural resource management in the Great Ruaha sub-basins, and 
    river basin modelling. 
 
    (v) Strengthening water quality monitoring, by improving the national monitoring network, upgrading 
    laboratories and equipment in Iringa and Tanga, which serve the two basins, and financing civil  
    works, vehicles and incremental operating costs. 
 
(b) Strengthening Basin Management (US$ 5.8 million). In addition to improving water management 
      capabilities at the national level, RBMSIIP focused on needs in the two basins, including: (i) 
      strengthening regulatory functions of the BWOs, and providing BWO staff at the basin and regional 
      level with training, vehicles and equipment to assist them in information-collecting and  
      development activities; and (ii) rehabilitating the hydrometric networks. 
 
Outcomes: 
• The National Water Policy has been rewritten to incorporate the rationale for IWRM 
• The National Water Sector Development Strategy has been created based on IWRM 
• Rehabilitation of 43 hydrometric and 11 weather stations in the Rufiji basin, and 28 hydrometric and 8 
weather stations in the Pangani basin, and the development of databases; 
• Provision of staff training, computer facilities, and vehicles and equipment, which have resulted in an 
increase in the volume of data handled; 
• Forming of 51 local water user groups and two apex, pilot sub-catchment organizations, in 
       collaboration with BWOs and District Councils; 
• Survey of 98 percent of water abstractors in the Pangani and Rufiji basins. In the Rufiji, 1514 
       abstractions with or without Water Rights have been identified. Of these 69.4 percent or 1050 
       have Water Rights. In the Pangani, a 1992 basin-wide survey indicates a total of 3359 
       abstractions with or without Water Rights. Of these, only 38.4 percent or 1292 have Water Rights; 
• Collection of Water User Fees (excluding TANESCO Royalty fees) amounting to US$58,800 in the 
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       Pangani and US$52,600 in the Rufiji; 
• Specialized studies in the two basins, revealing how the hydrology of Great Ruaha and Pangani Rivers 
functions and how they react to human activity, to provide the basis for designing future interventions; 
• Creating awareness with respect to pollution, and attempting to change industry habits through 
       dialogue. Pollution issues in both basins were handled through dialogue (as the legal costs of  
       charging polluters were higher than the fines set by GoT in the Water Act). No pollution fines were  
       collected. 
 
(after World Bank 2004:3-12 ) 
 
 
 
3b: Action Taken and Outcomes for SIIP Component of the Project 
Action Taken and Outcomes for SIIP Component of the Project 
 
Smallholder Irrigation Improvement (US$20.3 million). This component targeted low-income smallholders 
within selected traditional irrigation schemes, to improve scheme management and infrastructure. Better water 
management and infrastructure were expected to increase water use efficiency, enhance access to and 
distribution of water in these schemes, and free excess water to downstream users. The project planned to 
rehabilitate 25-30 schemes covering about 7,000 hectares over the six years. Activities included: 
 
(a) Participatory Scheme Selection and Management (US$2.4 million), to finance five multidisciplinary 
teams from the Irrigation Department deployed in the two basins to work with the targeted schemes, to 
enhance scheme management and bring them to a position where they could make use of the infrastructure 
improvements offered under the project. 
 
(b) Engineering Works on Schemes (US$15.2 million), to provide Government financing for scheme civil works 
necessary to enhance irrigation infrastructure and efficiency. The total cost of infrastructure 
improvements was estimated between US$1,500-2,000 per ha. GoT was to contribute about 80 percent of the 
total cost of civil works, while farmers were expected to contribute 20 percent, through labor and materials. 
 
(c) Mitigation of Negative Environmental Effects (US$0.7 million), to create capacity to conduct 
environmental evaluations of irrigation schemes proposed for support under RBMSIIP and other 
donor-assisted projects in the Irrigation Department. This activity planned to finance a four-person cell in the 
Department to monitor interventions in smallholder schemes, and ensure that negative environmental 
effects were avoided or minimized. 
 
(d) Irrigation Sector Capacity Building (US$1.9 million), to strengthen the capability of the private and 
public sectors to undertake smallholder irrigation development. Planned training for private contractors 
included design and management of labour-based construction methods. The project also aimed to train staff in 
the Irrigation Department to carry out its `core' functions, including selecting schemes (through participatory 
methods), assessing the feasibility of interventions, organizing WUAs and supporting them until they ran 
smoothly. 
 
Outcomes: 
• Irrigation efficiency has more than doubled on all schemes. Average efficiency has increased from 
       8% to 19% in the wet season, and from 11% to 27% in the dry season; 
• 5,317 farming families have benefited from improved irrigation and drainage facilities on 15 schemes 
       in the two river basins, covering a total area of 5,059 ha; 
• Rice yields and total production have increased in both Pangani and Rufiji basins--average yield 
       has more than doubled, from 1.98 t/ha to 5.27 t/ha in Pangani, and from 1.46 t/ha to 4.06 t/ha in 
       Rufiji. Average maize yields have increased from 1.06 t/ha. to 4.86t/ha. in Pangani, and from 1.08 
       t/ha. to 3.34 t/ha. in Rufiji; 
• Annual household farm incomes have increased from an estimated US$425 to US$1,500 in 
       Pangani, and from US$340 to US$1,100 in Rufiji (current prices- Scheme level Project completion 
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       Survey, Environmental Resources Consultancy (ERC), Dar es Salaam, June 2004). It must be 
       noted, however, that the ultimate impact on incomes depend on market situations. 
• With higher earnings, farmers have been able to cater for most of their needs. Many farmers are 
       now able to pay school fees for their children and afford better health care. Farmers have also 
       assisted in improving school facilities. The ERC survey of each scheme found that farmers have 
       built better homes, purchased bicycles (also observed by the ICR team), and agricultural inputs, 
       and a number of them have opened other avenues of business; 
• 1,674 farmers (1,052 men and 622 women; over 100 farmers per scheme) have been trained in scheme water 
management, crop production techniques, agro-business and financial management, and leadership skills. 
Farmers indicated that training in crop technology and water management has contributed significantly to 
improved yields; 
• Five MAFS/MWLD multidisciplinary teams have been formed to assist schemes, and ten District 
       Catchment Facilitation Teams (DCFT), one for each district, have been formed to replace these; 
• Farmers have been empowered to manage and maintain their own systems, through the establishment and 
registration of 19 Irrigators Organizations (11 as Irrigators Cooperative Societies and 8 as Irrigators 
Associations); 
• Due to improved water use efficiency, base flows have recovered in several downstream areas. 
 
(after World Bank 2004:3-12) 
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4: Strategy & Questions for Interviews in Tanzania 
We will use the questions only as a guideline from which to develop our discussion. 
 
Strategy: 
1) Identify the people we expect to interview 
2) Agree on the theme:  
• Focus on the translation/adaptation/implementation of the 4 principles of IWRM in Tanzania 
(See sketch-diagram) 
o How appropriate are the suggested solutions (i.e. IWRM  National Water Policy 
2002, Water Strategy 2004, new institutional setting, rise water fees, etc.) to the 
identified constraints in Tanzania? 
o And consequently, will the suggested solutions lead to sustainable water management 
in Tanzania - given that sustainable water management is a goal of IWRM? 
o And if not, what is their value? 
Sub themes: 
1) Which are the main problems in Tanzania? Are these 4 still the main problems? : 
• Lack of community involvement in management of water resources 
• Conflicting institutions and weak institutional capacities, both in terms of regulations and in terms of 
interests of the poor 
• Lack of data and information to inform policy and strategies for balanced water allocation 
• Inadequate funds for operation, maintenance and expansion of water supply systems. 
 
2) Relationship/s between the problems and the solutions: 
IWRM: river basins, participation, women, water as an economic good (solution) 
Water Policy 2002 + Water Strategy 2004 (solution)  
WB project - both irrigation and river basin management (solution) 
3) What are the criteria for success of the policy or project? 
 
People we planned to interview: 
 
Officials:  
World Bank (senior officials, Morogoro Wold Bank workshop coordinator and adviser) 
Ministry of Water (RBMSIIP project Coordinator, senior advisers) 
Ministry of Agriculture (Department of Irrigation) 
Ministry of Energy (Tanesco, Iringa District Department) 
RWBO (Coordinator, senior officials, advisers) 
TANESCO (Iringa District) 
 
Independent Experts, Academics, NGOs: 
• Lucy (WWF  Rufiji water conservation project) 
• Bruce Lankford (University of East Anglia, UK) 
• Charles Sokile (University of Dar es Salaam/RIPARWIN) 
• Maganaga (Uni. of Dar es Salaam) 
• Thomas (DOF) 
• Workshop participants 
 
Water User Associations (WUA)  
- Local leaders 
- Members of WUAs 
-  
Villagers who were included in the project (farmers) 
Villagers who were NOT included in the project (farmers, fishermen, pastoralists etc) 
 
Questionnaire:  
N.B. The questions below were a guide and not necessarily in the form we asked the interviewee. They were 
formed in such a way to suit role, education, etc. and flexible to each interviewee. 
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Ministry of Water 
1. What are the main water problems in Tanzania? 
2. How does the National Water Policy/Strategy address those problems? (lots of objectives but few 
measurements and clear strategies) 
a. What role does Law play in backing up the policy? 
b. How is customary law incorporated? 
3. What role does river basin management play?  
4. What role does participation play? 
5. What role does gender play? 
6. What role does economic good play? (Water chargingand how does it work?) 
7. What influence has the World Bank (WB) had on Tanzanian Water Policy? 
8. How did the WB funded project, RBMSIIP, contribute to the solution of the identified problems (1)?  
a. How has the current organizational set-up of RBWOs, WRD, WUAs helped? (in relation with 
efficiency, resource allocation, collaboration). Are these institutions stronger now and with the 
ability to solve water use and allocation problems? How can these problems be solved? 
b. How do you link with the Ministry of Agriculture and their Water Strategy, in terms of 
regulation, interests and projects? 
c. How is the local community involved in water management? 
d. How are problems regarding lack of data and information, in terms of policy formulation and 
strategy, being addressed? 
e. What kind of conflicts aroused during the project?...and how can they be resolved? 
f. The project responded to the limits of the ´91 Water Policy: did not deal with cross-sectoral 
linkages, allocation and participatory aspects: Today: do the project success within these 3 
aspects of concern? How? Criteria for this. 
g. The project aimed to solve the most conflictive basins, where intersectoral water allocation is 
encountering between agriculture, environment and hydropower. How has helped the project 
to diminish these conflicts? 
h. Are the levels of water utilisation for irrigation more adequate now so supply to reservoirs 
/hydropower production is well functioning the whole year? 
i. How did you provide incentives for transparent mechanisms for allocation? Is this working 
now? 
 
j. (What role does poverty reduction play in the project?) 
9. What are the criteria of success for the project/policy? 
10. Do you think the policy will result in sustainable water governance? 
11. If not, then what needs to be done? 
12. If you could review the policy/do the project again, what would you do? 
13. Some people think IWRM is too complex (e.g. tech, org, size)would you agree? And why 
14. Do you have any other contacts of interest? 
15. Follow up 
 
Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security 
1. How did the WB project contribute to the solution of the identified problems (1)?  
a. How has the current organizational set-up of RBWOs, WUAs etc helped for the irrigation 
system? 
b. How do you link with the Ministry of Water and their Water Strategy, in terms of regulation, 
interests and projects? 
c. How is the local community involved in water management? 
d. How are problems regarding lack of data and information, in terms of policy formulation and 
strategy, being addressed 
e. How will you fund the operation, maintenance and expansion of irrigation systems? 
f. What kind of conflicts arise?...and how can they resolved? 
g. Poverty: Has irrigation solved (or exacerbated) poverty? 
2. What are the criteria of success for the project/policy? 
3. Due to improve water use efficiency, downstream water users have benefited from the re-establishment 
of flows in several areas. Where? And has this been beneficial to all users in downstream? 
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4. One of the aims of the project was mitigation of neg, effects: What kind of negative effects did you 
found while and after the rehabilitation of the schemes? Environmentally, socio-cultural and 
economical. 
5. Which kind of mitigation did you planned and executed? 
6. Do you think the policy will result in sustainable water governance? 
7. If not, then what needs to be done? 
8. If you could review the policy/do the project again, what would you do? 
9. Some people think IWRM is too complex (e.g. tech, org, size)would you agree? And why 
10. Do you have any other contacts of interest? 
 
Academics:  
1. What are the main water problems in Tanzania? 
2. How do national policy and strategy address those problems? (lots of objectives but few measurements 
and clear strategies) 
a. What role does Law play in backing up the policy? 
b. How is customary law incorporated? 
3. What role does river basin management play?  
4. What role does participation play? 
5. What role does gender play? 
6. What role does economic good play? (water chargingand how does it work?) 
7. What influence has the WB had on Water Strategy in Tanzania? 
8. How did the WB project contribute to the solution of the identified problems (1)?  
a. How has the current organizational set-up of RBWOs, WUAs etc helped? 
b. How do the Ministries link up and work together? 
c. How is the local community involved in water management? 
d. How are problems regarding lack of data and information, in terms of policy formulation and 
strategy, being addressed 
e. How will you fund the operation, maintenance and expansion of irrigation systems? 
f. What kind of conflicts arise?...and how can they resolved? 
g. Poverty: Has the project (irrigation) and policy solved (or exacerbated) poverty? 
9. What are the criteria of success for the project/policy? 
10. Do you think the policy will result in sustainable water governance? 
11. If not, then what needs to be done? 
12. If you could review the policy/do the project again, what would you do? 
13. Some people think IWRM is too complex (e.g. tech, org, size)would you agree? And why 
14. Do you have any other contacts of interest? 
15. Follow up contact with person 
16. What is your theoretical background? ☺ 
 
RBWO  
1. What are the main water problems in Tanzania? 
2. What are the main water problems in your area? 
3. How does National policy and strategy address those problems? (lots of objectives but few 
measurements and clear strategies) 
a. What role does Law play in backing up the policy? 
b. How is customary law incorporated? 
4. How does the RBWO address these problems in terms of management? 
5. What role does river basin management play? How many people work nor in the office, distribution of 
responsibilities, relation with other district offices, Ministries,  
6. What role does participation play in river basin? 
7. What role does gender play? 
8. What role does economic good play? (Water chargingand how does it work?) 
9. What influence has the RBMSIIP had on Tanzanian Water Policy? 
10. How did the RBMSIIP project contribute to the solution of the identified problems (1)?  
a. How has the current organizational set-up of RBWOs, WUAs etc helped? 
b. How do you link with the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Food in terms of regulation, 
interests and projects? 
c. How is the local community involved in water management? 
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d. How are problems regarding lack of data and information, in terms of policy formulation and 
strategy, being addressed 
e. How will you fund the operation, maintenance and expansion of water supply systems? 
f. What kind of conflicts arise?...and how can they resolved? 
g. Poverty: Has the project (irrigation) and policy solved (or exacerbated) poverty? 
11. What are the criteria of success for the project?/policy? 
12. Do you think the policy will result in sustainable water governance? 
13. If not, then what needs to be done? 
14. If you could review the policy/do the project again, what would you do? 
15. Some people think IWRM is too complex (e.g. tech, org, size)would you agree? And why 
16. Do you have any other contacts of interest? 
 
WUAs 
1. What are the main water problems in the basin and the village? 
2. How does the RBWO address these problems in terms of management? 
3. How do you see river basin management? 
4. Which ethnic group and/or sector is participating in the local WUA? 
5. What is the role of the WUA? How many people, members, leaders, who they are, etc 
6. How are women participating in the WUA? 
7. What do you think about water feeand how does it work in the village? 
8. What influence has the RBMSIIP project had on the village? 
9. What kind of crops do you grow?  
10. Which difference exists on crop growing now after the RBMSIIP project? 
11. How many hectares were you growing before, and after the RBMSIIP project? 
12. Which kind of activities did you have within the RBMSIIP project? 
13. Problems with the irrigation system before the rehabilitation work started. 
14. Irrigation scheme: changes in the canals, actual operation and maintenance system, etc 
15. How does it work now? 
16. How did the RBMSIIP project contribute to the solution of the identified problems (1)?  
a. How has the current organizational set-up of RBWOs, WUAs etc helped? 
b. How is the local community involved in water management? 
c. How will you fund the operation, maintenance of the rehabilitated scheme? 
d. What kind of conflicts arise?...and how can they be resolved? 
e. Capacity building: how did you benefited from the courses and training process from the 
project (in which areas, criteria for this evaluation) 
17. If you could review the project again, what would you do? 
18. Do you have any other contacts of interest? 
 
Farmers (excluded) 
1. Why were you excluded from the project? Did you know about the RBMSIIP project? 
2. What do you think about it? 
3. What have the implications been? 
4. What are the main water problems in the village/basin? 
5. How does the RBWO address these problems in terms of management? 
6. Which kind of organisation do you have that is dealing with water and other resources? 
7. What role does gender play? 
8. How does water fees and rights system work? 
9. How do you manage conflicts and water conflicts for example?  
 
10. How has the current organizational set-up of RBWOs, WUAs etc helped to solve water issues? 
11. How is the local community involved in water management? 
12. What kind of conflicts arise (before and after project)?...and how can they be resolved? 
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